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ETHICS, CHARACTER, AND
\nAUTHENTIC TRANSFORMATIONAL
\nLEADERSHIP BEHAVIOR
\nBernard M. Bass*
\nPaul Steidlmeier
\nBinghamton University
\nThe morality of transformational leadership has been sharply questioned, particularly by libertarians,
\n\u201cgrass roots\u201d theorists, and organizational development consultants. This paper argues that
\nto be truly transformational, leadership must be grounded in moral foundations. The four components
\nof authentic transformational leadership (idealized influence, inspirational motivation, intellectual
\nstimulation, and individualized consideration) are contrasted with their counterfeits in
\ndissembling pseudo-transformational leadership on the basis of (1) the moral character of the
\nleaders and their concerns for self and others; (2) the ethical values embedded in the leaders\u2019
\nvision, articulation, and program, which followers can embrace or reject; and (3) the morality of
\nthe processes of social ethical choices and action in which the leaders and followers engage and
\ncollectively pursue.
\nThe literature on transformational leadership is linked to the long-standing literature on virtue
\nand moral character, as exemplified by Socratic and Confucian typologies. It is related as well
\nto the major themes of the modern Western ethical agenda: liberty, utility, and distributive justice
\nDeception, sophistry, and pretense are examined alongside issues of transcendence, agency, trust,
\nstriving for congruence in values, cooperative action, power, persuasion, and corporate governance
\nto establish the strategic and moral foundations of authentic transformational leadership.
\nETHICS, CHARACTER AND AUTHENTIC
\nTRANSFORMATIONAL LEADERSHIP
\nAre Bill Gates and Lou Gerstner transformational leaders What about \u201cchainsaw\u201d
\nAl Dunlap For many moral analysts, leadership is a many-headed hydra that
\nalternately shows the faces of Saddam Hussein and Pol Pot as well as those of
\nNelson Mandela and Mother Theresa. The stories that recount the accomplishments
\n* Direct all correspondence to: Bernard M. Bass, Binghamton University, Binghamton, NY 13902\u20136015;
\nemail: bbass@binghamton.edu.
\nLeadership Quarterly, 10(2), 181\u2013217.
\nCopyright \u00d3 1999 by Elsevier Science Inc.
\nAll rights of reproduction in any form reserved.
\nISSN: 1048-9843
\n182 LEADERSHIP QUARTERLY Vol. 10 No. 2 1999
\nof such leaders raise moral questions concerning both the character of the leaders
\nas well as the legitimacy of their programs.
\nFollowing Rogers and Farson (1955), Conger and Kanungo (1988, ch. 11) worried
\nthat charismatic leadership (which they defined similarly to transformational leadership)
\nof self-serving leaders could result in deception and exploitation of followers,
\nbut argued that most leaders pursued both personal and organizational interests.
\nSubsequently, Conger and Kanungo (1998, ch. 7) reviewed the dark side of charismatic
\nleaders: narcissicism, authoritarianism, Machiavellianism, flawed vision, a
\nneed for power coupled with lack of activity inhibition and promotion among
\nfollowers of dependency, personal identification, and lack of internalization of
\nvalues and beliefs. In this article, we attempt to differentiate such leaders from
\nauthentic charismatic and transformational leaders in terms of ethical discussions
\nof character and authenticity as well as the major themes of the modern Western
\nethical agenda: liberty, utility, and (distributive) justice.
\nThe ethics of leadership rests upon three pillars: (1) the moral character of the
\nleader; (2) the ethical legitimacy of the values embedded in the leaders vision,
\narticulation, and program which followers either embrace or reject; and (3) the
\nmorality of the processes of social ethical choice and action that leaders and followers
\nengage in and collectively pursue. Such ethical characteristics of leadership have
\nbeen widely acknowledged (Wren, 1998; Kouzes & Posner,1993; Greenleaf, 1977;
\nConger & Kanungo, 1998). Transformational leaders set examples to be emulated
\nby their followers. And as suggested by Burns (1978) and demonstrated by Dukerich,
\nNichols, and associates (1990) when leaders are more morally mature, those they
\nlead display higher moral reasoning. But not all leadership fits the same pattern and
\nethical analysis shifts with varying leadership modalities. Two forms of leadership
\nbehavior, transactional and transformational, and their components will be analyzed
\nhere in terms of moral issues.
\nCOMPONENTS OF LEADERSHIP AND RELATED MORAL ISSUES
\nMoral discourse is normative; it is captured in our language of right\/wrong, good\/
\nbad, should\/ought, good\/evil. While meta-ethical discourse is concerned with a
\ncritical analysis of the foundations of moral judgments\u2014the worldview and ontological
\nrationale that confers legitimacy upon a set of normative criteria and values\u2014
\npractical ethical discourse is primarily focused upon two issues (Table 1): analysis
\nof the moral agent and analysis of types of moral action.
\nA moral agent is evaluated as praiseworthy or blameworthy in light of three
\nprimary considerations: his or her (1) developmental level of conscience; (2) degree
\nof effective freedom; and (3) probity of intention. A moral act is evaluated as a
\ntype of behavior no matter who the agent may be. Behavior such as taking property
\nor breaking a promise is judged to be right or wrong in light three principal components:
\n(1) the end sought; (2) the means employed; and (3) the consequences.
\nThe pivotal issue in making moral judgments is the legitimacy of the grounding
\nworldview and beliefs that grounds a set of moral values and criteria. Depending
\nupon such worldview and beliefs, a religious leader may morally justify a holy war
\nand a Marxist may justify class warfare and dictatorship of the proletariat. As a
\nTransformational Leadership Behavior 183
\nTable 1. Components of Moral Analysis
\nMoral Agent
\nConscience Stage of values development, mediated by personal,
\nfamilial, social, spiritual and cultural factors
\n(Kohlberg, 1981); moral theories of conscientious
\nobjection
\nDegree of Freedom Responsibility mitigated by factors such as compulsion
\nor coercion; moral theories of existential freedom
\nvs determinism
\nIntention The agent\u2019s goal and anticipated outcomes; moral
\ntheories of maleficence and beneficence and
\negoism vs altruism
\nMoral Action
\nEnds sought Nobility of purpose of the action and whether it is
\naligned with core transcendental values, whether
\nreligious, philosophical, cultural
\nMeans employed Whether the end justifies the means
\nConsequences Whether the benefits and burdens of an action are
\nfairly distributed among those affected
\nresult, moral analysis always exhibits a two-fold nature, which combines (1) the
\nradical critique of underlying worldviews and grounds of moral legitimation and
\n(2) practical judgments of praiseworthy or blameworthy agents and right and wrong
\nbehavior within a concrete socio-cultural and historical milieu, as well as within
\nthe limitations of socio-historical conscience and freedom. Ethical analysis is further
\ncomplicated by the fact that it applies not only to content (taking another\u2019s property
\nis wrong; telling the truth is good) but to processes (especially those that affect the
\nfreedom and conscience of participants)
\nEthical content focuses upon values, which highlight the issue of standards and
\ncriteria of ethical behavior. While cultural relativities surely apply, foundational
\nmoral discourse rests upon polarities found in both moral intention (egoism versus
\naltruism) and in moral consequences (benefits and costs for self and others). Kanungo
\nand Mendonca (1996, ch. 3) argue persuasively for the centrality of altruism,
\nwhere everyone has moral standing and the interests of \u201cthe other\u201d matter. Indeed,
\nsomething like the Western human rights tradition, which has grown out of the
\ndefense of the dignity of the individual, mandates a minimal degree of altruism by
\nsafeguarding inalienable human rights not just of self but of all others, even in the
\nface of majority social choices.
\nThe morality of processes reflect the legitimacy of both influence processes on
\nthe part of leaders and empowerment processes on the part of followers as they
\nengage in dynamic self-transformation (Kanungo&Mendonca, 1996, ch. 4). Modern
\nWestern ethics has been preoccupied with moral processes, especially the relationship
\nbetween the individual, collectivities, (including families, states, business enterprises,
\nreligions and other socio-cultural organizations) and society as a whole. Its
\nmajor themes of liberty, utility and distributive justice attempt to specify what
\nindividuals owe each other, what individuals owe to the group and what groups
\nowe to individuals.
\n184 LEADERSHIP QUARTERLY Vol. 10 No. 2 1999
\nThe moral analysis of leadership contains all of these dynamics. It provides
\ncritique of both agents and actions. This makes it challenging to morally evaluate
\ncharismatic leaders such as the Ayotollah Khomeini or Mao Zedong in realms of
\nreligion and politics, and Andrew Carnegie or Steve Jobs in the marketplace. There
\nare clearly many leadership issues and styles that relate to questions ranging from
\nthe legitimacy of their authority and informed consent by followers to conscience,
\nfreedom and intention, and to ends, means and consequences.
\nThere are two distinct but interrelated ideal types of leadership: transactional
\nand transformational. In what follows we first clarify these concepts and then discuss
\nethical problems related with each. We conclude with an examination of Bass\u2019s
\nproposition (1998a), which is consistent with Burns (1978), that authentic transformational
\nleadership must rest on a moral foundation of legitimate values. The
\nopposite is inauthentic or pseudo-transformational leadership, that of leaders who
\nconsciously or unconsciously act in bad faith (Sartre, 1992).
\nTransformational and Transactional Leadership
\nTransactional leadership involves contingent reinforcement. Followers are motivated
\nby the leaders\u2019 promises, praise, and rewards, or they are corrected by negative
\nfeedback, reproof, threats, or disciplinary actions. The leaders react to whether the
\nfollowers carry out what the leaders and followers have \u201ctransacted\u201d to do. In
\ncontingent rewarding behavior leaders either make assignments or they may consult
\nwith followers about what is to be done in exchange for implicit or explicit rewards
\nand the desired allocation of resources. When leaders engage in active managementby-
\nexception, they monitor follower performance and correct followers\u2019 mistakes.
\nWhen leaders engage in passive management-by-exception, they wait passively for
\nfollowers\u2019 mistakes to be called to their attention before taking corrective action
\nwith negative feedback or reprimands. Laissez-faire leaders avoid leading.
\nTransformational leadership contains four components: charisma or idealized
\ninfluence (attributed or behavioral), inspirational motivation, intellectual stimulation,
\nand individualized consideration (Bass, 1985, 1998; Bass & Avolio, 1993). Followers
\nidentify with the charismatic leaders\u2019 aspirations and want to emulate the leaders.
\nShamir, House, and Arthur (1993), Conger and Kanungo (l988, 1998), Kanungo
\nand Mendonca (1996) conceive of the same components as all falling under the
\ncategory of charismatic leadership.
\nFor the purposes of discussion, we will speak of transformational and transactional
\nleaders when, in fact, most leaders have a profile of the full range of leadership
\nthat includes both transformational and transactional factors. However, those whom
\nwe call transformational do much more of the transformational than the transactional.
\nIn their defining moments, they are transformational. Those whom we label
\nas transactional leaders display much more transactional leadership behavior. They
\nare more likely to have attitudes, beliefs, and values more consistent with transactional
\nleadership, but they still may be likely to be transformational at times.
\nEach component of either transactional or transformational leadership has an
\nethical dimension. It is the behavior of leaders\u2014including their moral character,
\nvalues and programs\u2014that is authentic or inauthentic. Most leaders are likely to
\nTransformational Leadership Behavior 185
\nTable 2. Leading Moral Components of Transactional and
\nTransformational Leadership
\nTransactional Leadership
\nLeadership Dynamic Ethical Concern
\nTask Whether what is being done (the end) and the
\nmeans employed to do it are morally legitimate
\nReward system Whether sanctions or incentives impair effective
\nfreedom and respect conscience
\nIntentions Truth telling
\nTrust Promise keeping
\nConsequences Egoism vs altruism\u2014whether the legitimate moral
\nstanding and interests of all those affected are
\nrespected
\nDue process Impartial process of settling conflicts and claims
\nTransformational Leadership
\nIdealized influence Whether \u201cpuffery\u201d and egoism on part of the leader
\npredominate and whether s\/he is manipulative
\nor not
\nInspirational motivation Whether providing for true empowerment and selfactualization
\nof followers or not
\nIntellectual stimulation Whether the leader\u2019s program is open to dynamic
\ntranscendence and spirituality or is closed
\npropaganda and a \u201cline\u201d to follow
\nIndividualized Whether followers are treated as ends or means,
\nconsideration whether their unique dignity and interests are
\nrespected or not.
\ndisplay a mixed moral profile; so, when we speak of authentic transformational
\nleaders or authentic transactional leaders, we are labeling leaders who generally
\nare more authentic than inauthentic.
\nEthical Issues in Transactional Leadership
\nBoth styles of leadership, transformational and transactional, have strong philosophical
\nunderpinnings and ethical components (Table 2). In individualist philosophies,
\nwhere leaders and followers each rationally pursue their own self-interests,
\nit is generally thought that leaders should be transactional. A free contract is often
\nassumed as a model of transacting between leaders and followers. A contract has
\nto have moral legitimacy (Donaldson & Dunfee, 1994). The moral legitimacy of
\ntransactional leadership is demanding in many ways. It depends on granting the
\nsame liberty and opportunity to others that one claims for oneself, on telling the
\ntruth, keeping promises, distributing to each what is due, and employing valid
\nincentives or sanctions. It recognizes pluralism of values and diversity of motivations
\n(Rawls, 1971).
\nEthical Issues in Transformational Leadership
\nTransactional leadership models are grounded in a worldview of self-interest.
\nBut the exclusive pursuit of self-interest is found wanting by most ethicists (Gini,
\n186 LEADERSHIP QUARTERLY Vol. 10 No. 2 1999
\n1995, 1996; Rosenthal & Buchholz, 1995). Authentic transformational leadership
\nprovides a more reasonable and realistic concept of self\u2014a self that is connected
\nto friends, family, and community whose welfare may be more important to oneself
\nthan one\u2019s own. One\u2019s moral obligations to them are grounded in a broader conception
\nof individuals within community and related social norms and cultural beliefs.
\nAlthough there is plenty of transactional leadership in punishments for transgressions,
\nauthentic transformational leadership is more consistent than transactional
\nleadership with Judaic-Christian philosophical traditions and discourses on the
\nleadership of the moral sage that presuppose a trusting community as the central
\nlife context. Nonetheless, it is a matter of modern Western moral concern that
\nideals not be imposed, that behavior not be coerced, and that the search for truth
\nnot be stifled. Ethical norms and behavioral ideals should not be imposed but freely
\nembraced. Motivation should not be reduced to coercion but grow out of authentic
\ninner commitment. Questioning and creativity should be encouraged. Followers
\nshould not be mere means to self-satisfying ends for the leader but should be
\ntreated as ends in themselves. We label as inauthentic or \u201cpseudo\u201d that kind of
\ntransformational leadership that tramples upon those concerns.
\nBurns (1978) discussed leadership as transforming, and, on occasion, as transformational.
\nBoth the leader and the led are transformed\u2014sharply changed in performance
\nand outlook. But transforming others is just one of the effects of the leadership.
\nWealso need to examine the behaviors of authentic transformational leadership
\nand the attributions given to transformational leadership on a moral basis; that is,
\nthe processes of vision articulation and choice are matters of moral concern, not
\njust the consequences. It is the presence or absence of such a moral foundation of
\nthe leader as a moral agent that grounds the distinction between authentic versus
\npseudo-transformational leadership.
\nBurns (1978), Bass (1985) and Howell and Avolio (1992), among others, have
\nexamined the morality of transformational leadership. For Burns, to be transformational,
\nthe leader had to be morally uplifting. For Bass, in his early work, transformational
\nleaders could be virtuous or villainous depending on their values. Howell
\nand Avolio felt that only socialized leaders concerned for the common good can
\nbe truly transformational leaders. Personalized leaders, primarily concerned with
\ntheir own self-interests, could not be truly transformational leaders. Publicly, hoever,
\nand at a distance, they could act as if they were truly transformational although
\nprivately they were more concerned about themselves. O\u2019Connor, Mumford, and
\ncolleagues (1995) showed how such inauthenticity in transformational world class
\nleaders could result in destructive outcomes.
\nCritics attribute manipulative, deceptive and other such devious behaviors to socalled
\ntransformational leaders. Martin and Sims (1956) and Bailey (1988) hold
\nthat to succeed, all leaders must be manipulative. But, in fact, it is pseudo-transformational
\nleaders who are deceptive and manipulative. Authentic transformational
\nleaders may have to be manipulative at times for what they judge to be the common
\ngood, but manipulation is a frequent practice of pseudo-transformational leaders
\nand an infrequent practice of authentic transformational leaders. We contrast authentic
\nand pseudo-transformational leadership in terms of the four components
\nTransformational Leadership Behavior 187
\nof transformational leadership already mentioned: idealized influence (or charisma),
\ninspirational motivation, intellectual stimulation and individualized consideration.
\nIdealized Influence
\nIf the leadership is transformational, its charisma or idealized influence is envisioning,
\nconfident, and sets high standards for emulation. Recent literature underscores
\nthe spiritual dimensions of such influence (Fairholm, 1998, part V; Kanungo&
\nMendonca, 1996, pp. 87ff.) as well as the moral dimensions of the influence process
\nitself (Kanungo & Mendonca, 1996, pp. 52\u201356).
\nA first difference between authentic transformational leadership and pseudotransformational
\nleadership lies in the values for which they are idealized. For
\ninstance, the authentic leader calls for universal brotherhood; the pseudo-transformational
\nleader highlights fictitious \u201cwe-they\u201d differences in values and argues that
\n\u201cwe\u201d have inherently good values and \u201cthey\u201d do not. Bass (1985, pp. 182\u20135) summed
\nup the importance of the values held by a transformational leader in determining
\nhis or her actions. The observed behavior might seem the same, but according to
\nBurns (1978), only if the underlying values were morally uplifting, could the leader
\nbe considered transforming. Bass originally argued that transformational leaders
\ncould wear the black hats of villains or the white hats of heroes depending on
\ntheir values. This is mistaken; only those who wear white hats are seen as truly
\ntransformational. Those in black hats are now seen as pseudo-transformational.
\nThat is, while they may be transformational, they are inauthentic as transformational
\nleaders. They are the false messiahs and tyrants of history.
\nPseudo-transformational idealized leaders seek power and position even at the
\nexpense of their followers\u2019 achievements. They indulge in fantasies of power and
\nsuccess. They may argue that they are doing so for the good of the organization.
\nLike charismatics, in general, they feel that they honestly know the right answers
\nto problems which need to be sold through effective impression management.
\nSometimes, they even deceive themselves about their competencies. They exhort
\ntheir followers to \u201cTrust me!\u201d\u2014but they cannot be trusted. They engage in more
\nself-displays to get more attention from their followers Their visions are grandiose.
\nThey do not have the same sense of responsibility as do authentic charismaticinspirational
\nleaders.
\nPseudo-transformational idealized leaders may see themselves as honest and
\nstraightforward and supportive of their organization\u2019s mission but their behavior
\nis inconsistent and unreliable. They have an outer shell of authenticity but an inner
\nself that is false to the organization\u2019s purposes. They profess strong attachment to
\ntheir organization and its people but privately are ready to sacrifice them. Inauthentic
\nCEOs downsize their organization, increase their own compensation, and weep
\ncrocodile tears for the employees who have lost their jobs.
\nIn addition to what has already been said, Howell and Avolio (1992) point to
\nthe need of authentic transformational leaders to promote ethical policies, procedures
\nand processes within their organizations. They need to be committed to a
\nclearly stated, continually-enforced code of ethical conduct which helps establish
\nacceptable standards. They need to foster an organizational culture with high ethical
\n188 LEADERSHIP QUARTERLY Vol. 10 No. 2 1999
\nstandards by appropriate recruitment, training and rewards to eventuate in the
\ninternalization in all the organization\u2019s members of shared moral standards.
\nInspirational Motivation
\nThe inspirational motivation of transformational leadership provides followers
\nwith challenges and meaning for engaging in shared goals and undertakings. The
\ninspirational appeals of the authentic transformational leader tend to focus on the
\nbest in people\u2014on harmony, charity and good works; the inspirational appeals of
\nthe pseudo-transformational leader tend to focus on the worst in people\u2014on demonic
\nplots, conspiracies, unreal dangers, excuses, and insecurities. Kanungo and
\nMendonca (1996 pp. 61ff) have linked this to an empowerment process. For them,
\nempowerment is more than broadening the scope of participation by followers. It
\nis motivational and enabling, highlighting a new realization and transformation of
\nthe person.
\nIdealized, inspirational leaders, who are pseudo-transformational, may mislead,
\ndeceive and prevaricate. They can be subtle and speak with a forked tongue, for
\ninstance, offering followers empowerment, yet continuing to treat them as dependent
\nchildren (Sankowsky, 1995). They talk about empowerment but actually continue
\nto seek control (Conger&Kanungo, 1998). Previously, Bass (1985) mistakenly
\nargued that, although the dynamics might be the same if the leaders had virtuous
\nor evil ends, the moral differences were a matter of their aims and values, not the
\ndynamics involved in their influence. But both the dynamics and means-to-ends as
\nwell as the ends are different for authentic and inauthentic transformational leaders.
\nThe authentic are inwardly and outwardly concerned about the good that can be
\nachieved for the group, organization, or society for which they feel responsible.
\nThe inauthentic and pseudo-transformational may publicly give the same impression
\nand be idealized by their followers for it, but privately be concerned about the
\ngood they can achieve for themselves. They are captains who sail under false colors.
\nThey are spiritual leaders who are false prophets.
\nIntellectual Stimulation
\nThe intellectual stimulation of transformational leadership incorporates an open
\narchitecture dynamic into processes of situation evaluation, vision formulation and
\npatterns of implementation. Such openness has a transcendent and spiritual dimension
\nand helps followers to question assumptions and to generate more creative
\nsolutions to problems. It is especially suited to the normative side of ethics, where
\nhuman probing of the ground of being is both fathomless and endless. To the point,
\nthis dynamic breaks the bonds of organizational and leadership cultures that ignore
\nfundamental questions such as altruism (Kanungo and Mendonca, 1996, pp. 79ff).
\nThe intellectual stimulation of pseudo-transformational leaders manifests a logic
\ncontaining false assumptions to slay the dragons of uncertainty. Pseudo-transformational
\nleaders overweight authority and underweight reason. They take credit for
\nothers\u2019 ideas but make them scapegoats for failure (Sankowsky, 1995). They substitute
\nanecdotes for hard evidence. They feed on the ignorance of their followers so
\nthat their followers will accept more ambiguities and inconsistencies opening the
\nopportunities for the self-enhancement of charlatans:
\nTransformational Leadership Behavior 189
\nPeople like Rush Limbaugh and Louis Farrakhan live well off ignorance. . . .
\nThey are smart, ambitious men with great charisma, who look like giants to
\npeople of minor intellect. They are snake oil salesmen. They are confidence
\nmen who exploit . . . ignorant, scared, angry, frustrated people for personal
\ngain in the name of doing good for the entire nation or race (Lockman, 1995,
\np. 9a).
\nAuthentic transformational leaders persuade others on the merits of the issues.
\nPseudo-transformational leaders set and control agenda to manipulate the values
\nof importance to followers often at the expense of others or even harm to them.
\nAuthentic transformational leaders openly bring about changes in followers\u2019 values
\nby the merit and relevancy of the leader\u2019s ideas and mission to their followers\u2019
\nultimate benefit and satisfaction (Howell, 1988). Pseudo-transformational leaders
\nmay create the impression that they are doing the right things, but will secretly fail
\nto do so when doing the right things conflict with their own narcissistic interests.
\nThey are less likely to listen to conflicting views and more likely to be intolerant
\nof the differences of opinion between their followers and themselves (Howell &
\nAvolio, 1992). They substitute emotional argumentation for rational discourse.
\nIndividualized Consideration
\nThe individualized consideration component of transformational leadership underscores
\nthe necessity of altruism if leadership is to be anything more than authoritarian
\ncontrol (Kanungo & Mendonca, 1996, pp. 85ff). The transformational leader
\ntreats each follower as an individual and provides coaching, mentoring and growth
\nopportunities (Bass, 1985). While true transformational leaders are concerned about
\ndeveloping their followers into leaders, pseudo-transformational leaders are more
\nconcerned about maintaining the dependence of their followers. They exploit the
\nfeelings of their followers to maintain deference from them (Sankowsky, 1995).
\nPseudo-transformational leaders will welcome and expect blind obedience. They
\nwill attempt to enhance their personal status by maintaining the personal distance
\nbetween themselves and their followers. They encourage fantasy and magic in their
\nvision of the attractive future while true transformational leaders promote attainable
\nshared goals. Narcissistic pseudo-transformational leaders manipulate arguments
\nabout political choices with a \u201ctwist that achieves the desired responses\u201d (Bass, l989,
\np.45). Their style of individualized consideration foments favoritism and competition
\namong followers in the guise of being helpful. While the authentic individually
\nconsiderate leader is concerned about helping followers to become more competent
\nto provide for a more successful succession, the inauthentic counterpart seeks to
\nmaintain a parent-child relationship.
\nThe difference between authentic and pseudo-transformational leadership is also
\nseen in that authentic transformational leaders, who may have just as much need for
\npower as pseudo-transformational leaders, channel the need in socially constructive
\nways into the service of others. Pseudo-transformational leaders use power primarily
\nfor self-aggrandizement and are actually contemptuous privately of those they are
\nsupposed to be serving as leaders (Howell and Avolio, 1992). Although this may
\nnot be expressed publicly, privately pseudo-transformational leaders are concerned
\n190 LEADERSHIP QUARTERLY Vol. 10 No. 2 1999
\nabout their power and gaining more of it. Insiders who work closely with them
\nknow them to be deceptive, domineering, egotistical demagogues while their public
\nimage may be that of saviors. Pseudo-transformational leaders are predisposed
\ntoward self-serving biases. They claim they are right and good; others are wrong
\nand bad. They are the reason things go well; other persons are the reason for things
\ngoing badly. They wear different masks for different occasions, believe themselves
\nto be high in self-monitoring but are betrayed by their non-verbal contradictory
\nbehavior.
\nThe Moral Spectrum of Transformational Leadership
\nTransformational leadership traces out a complicated moral spectrum, in which
\nmost leaders combine authentic as well as inauthentic behavior. For example, many
\nleaders, particularly political leaders who cannot move too far in front of their
\nfollowers, walk a fine line of moral probity. In their efforts to accent the positive,
\nto make inspiring appeals, to maintain the enthusiasm and morale of followers,
\nthey are inauthentic in transformational leadership. They withhold the release of
\ninformation. Or they time its release for when it will do the most good. They give
\nthe appearance of confidence even when they are unsure about what they are doing
\nand what they are telling followers to do. They initiate projects which they personally
\noppose and delay implementing them so that the projects never are completed.
\nThey publicly support but privately oppose proposals. They openly compromise
\nbut privately divert the implementation of the compromise (Martin & Sims, 1956;
\nBass, 1968). They may have the public image of a saint but privately are deceptive
\ndevils. They may appear to their followers to behave as a transformational leader
\nbut the appearance is deceptive for inwardly they remain more interested in themselves
\nthan their followers. They knowingly focus their followers on fantasies instead
\nof attainable visions. They engage in shams and pretense. They don\u2019t practice what
\nthey preach. And these masquarades are at the expense of their followers. They
\nare pseudo-transformational. They are Freud\u2019s (1913) totemic leaders who satisfy
\nthe fantasies of their followers although they appear to direct their followers towards
\ntranscendental purposes, but in fact tend to cater to the self-delusionary interests
\nof their followers.
\nIn short, while authentic and inauthentic transformational leaders may fail to
\nexhibit any one of the four components\u2014idealized influence, inspirational motivation,
\nintellectual stimulation or individualized consideration\u2014the component that
\nordinarily is missing in the personalized leadership of the pseudo-transformational
\nleader is individualized consideration. Thus, many intellectually stimulating, inspirational
\nleaders such as Hyman Rickover, who transformed the U.S. Navy into the
\nnuclear age, were known for their self-aggrandizing, inconsiderate, abusive and
\nabrasive behavior (Polmar&Allen, 1982). Furthermore, instead of earning idealized
\ninfluence from their followers, the pseudo-transformational leaders seek to become
\nthe idols (rather than the ideals) of their followers (Howell & Avolio, 1992). The
\nethics of transformational leadership are subverted by the pseudo-transformational
\nleader\u2019s contempt for self and others, by learning to rationalize and justify their
\ndeceptions, and by their feelings of superiority. They see themselves as having
\nTransformational Leadership Behavior 191
\nan unconventional but higher morality (Goldberg, 1995). Nevertheless, they are
\nmistaken. O\u2019Connor, Mumford, and associates. (1995) contrasted the biographies
\nof 82 world class personalized and socialized charismatic leaders. The socialized
\ncharismatics were rated more highly in their morality than were the personalized,
\nespecially as they behaved during their rise to power.
\nLeaders are authentically transformational when they increase awareness of
\nwhat is right, good, important, and beautiful, when they help to elevate followers\u2019
\nneeds for achievement and self-actualization, when they foster in followers
\nhigher moral maturity, and when they move followers to go beyond their
\nself-interests for the good of their group, organization, or society. Pseudotransformational
\nleaders may also motivate and transform their followers,
\nbut, in doing so, they arouse support for special interests at the expense of
\nothers rather than what\u2019s good for the collectivity. They will foster psychodynamic
\nidentification, projection, fantasy, and rationalization as substitutes for
\nachievement and actualization. They will encourage \u2018we-they\u2019 competitiveness
\nand the pursuit of the leaders\u2019 own self-interests instead of the common good.
\nThey are more likely to foment envy, greed, hate, and conflict rather than
\naltruism, harmony, and cooperation. In making this distinction between the
\nauthentic transformational and pseudo-transformational leader, it should be
\nclear that we are describing two ideal types. Most leaders are neither completely
\nsaints nor completely sinners. They are neither completely selfless nor
\ncompletely selfish (Bass, 1998a, p. 171).
\nFor example, in an election campaign, the authentic transformational leader
\npoints the public to the societal problems he truly believes need solving. The
\ninauthentic transformational leader points to the same issues but is personally
\nuninterested in doing something about them. In an election campaign, the authentic
\ntransactional leader makes promises he thinks he can keep, if elected. But he or
\nshe may be overly optimistic and be unable to keep the promises. An inauthentic
\ntransactional leader knows he is making promises he cannot keep, if elected.
\nIf transformational leadership is authentic and true to self and others, it is characterized
\nby high moral and ethical standards in each of the dimensions discussed
\nabove. At the same time it aims to develop the leader as a moral person and creates
\na moral environment for the organization. In Fairholm\u2019s terms (1998) it is at once
\na type of leadership grounded in values, based in trust and rooted in spirituality.
\nAs an ideal moral type, authentic transformational leadership contrasts sharply with
\nwhat we term its pseudo or unethical manifestations as well as with conventional
\ntransactional leadership.
\nThe best of leadership is both transformational and transactional. Transformational
\nleadership augments the effectiveness of transactional leadership; it does not
\nreplace transactional leadership. (Waldman, Bass, & Yammarino, 1990; Kanungo &
\nMendonca, 1996, pp. 53ff.). Take the example of Abraham Lincoln. He made many
\ntransactional executive decisions based on his own sense of timing and political
\nexpediency such as delaying the Emancipation Proclamation until after the first
\nUnion victory at Antietem in 1862. Even then, to hold the slave states of Delaware,
\n192 LEADERSHIP QUARTERLY Vol. 10 No. 2 1999
\nMaryland, Kentucky and Missouri in the Union, the Proclamation only prohibited
\nslavery in those 11 states that had seceded. As an authentic transformational leader,
\nhis sense of duty and what he personally thought was right, good and proper,
\npropelled him into executive decisions unapproved by Congress and unsupported
\nby public opinion. He suspended Habeas Corpus in 1862 when Washington, D.C.
\nwas almost surrounded by rebel troops. Nevertheless, by his second inauguration
\nin 1864, he was espousing a generous, forgiving peace settlement \u201cwith malice
\ntowards none.\u201d
\nWhile transactional leadership manages outcomes and aims for behavioral compliance
\nindependent of the ideals a follower may happen to have, transformational
\nleadership is predicated upon the inner dynamics of a freely embraced change of
\nheart in the realm of core values and motivation, upon open-ended intellectual
\nstimulation and a commitment to treating people as ends not mere means. To bring
\nabout change, authentic transformational leadership fosters the modal values of
\nhonesty, loyalty, and fairness, as well as the end values of justice, equality, and
\nhuman rights. But pseudo-transformational leadership endorses perverse modal
\nvalues such as favoritism, victimization, and special interests and end values such
\nas racial superiority, submission, and Social Darwinism (Carey, 1992; Solomon,
\n1996). It can invent fictitious obstacles, imaginary enemies, and visions that are
\nchimeras.
\nTransactional leadership is moral when the truth is told, promises are kept,
\nnegotiations are fair and choices are free (Hollander, 1995). It is immoral when
\ninformation harmful to followers is deliberately concealed from them, when bribes
\nare proffered, when nepotism is practiced, and when authority is abused.
\nEthical Criticisms of Transformational Leadership
\nThe concepts of leadership we endorse represent ideal types where transactional
\nleadership rests upon transformational foundations and transformational leadership
\nis enlivened and guided by an inner ethical core. Nonetheless, its ethics have
\nbeen questioned despite the fact that transformational leadership was conceived
\nas leadership which involved moral maturity (Kuhnert & Lewis, 1987) and the
\nmoral uplifting of followers (Burns, 1978).
\nMeta-analytical evidence supports the generalizeable findings that transformational
\nleadership is more effective, productive, innovative, and satisfying to followers
\nthan is transactional leadership (Lowe, Kroeck & Sivasubrahmaniam, 1996). People\u2019s
\nimplicit theories of leadership are likely to be more transformational than
\ntransactional (Avolio & Bass, 1991) However, its ethics have been questioned. It
\nhas been suggested that transformational leadership: (1) lends itself to amoral
\npuffery since it makes use of impression management (e.g., Snyder, 1987); (2)
\nmanipulates followers along a primrose path on which they lose more than they
\ngain (e.g., White & Wooten, 1986); (3) encourages followers to go beyond their
\nown self-interests for the good of the organization and even emotionally engages
\nfollowers irrationally in pursuits of evil ends contrary to the followers\u2019 best interests
\n(e.g., Stevens, D\u2019Intino,&Victor, 1995); (4) is antithetical to organizational learning
\nand development involving shared leadership, equality, consensus and participative
\nTransformational Leadership Behavior 193
\ndecision-making (e.g., McKendall, 1993); (5) lacks the checks and balances of countervailing
\ninterests, influences and power to avoid dictatorship and oppression of
\na minority by a majority (e.g., Keeley, 1995); and (6) the distinction between
\nauthentic and pseudo transformational leadership is not applicable across cultures.
\nAlthough the criticisms overlap, we analyze them in terms of four broad frameworks:
\na) traditional ethics of moral character and virtue as found in Socratic and
\nConfucian traditions (criticism 1 above); b) the modern Western ethical agenda of
\nindividual liberty, utilitarian social choice, and distributive justice (criticisms 2, 3
\nand 4 above); c) providing for a balance of power and \u201cdue process\u201d in anticipation
\nof the breakdown in practice of ideal types of leadership and ethics (criticism 5
\nabove); and d) authentic transformational leadership and cultural factors (criticism
\n6 above).
\nMORAL CHARACTER, VIRTUE, AND
\nTRANSFORMATIONAL LEADERSHIP
\nIn leadership, character matters. This is not to deny that evil people can bring about
\ngood things or that good people can lead the way to moral ruin. Rather, leadership
\nprovides a moral compass and, over the long term, both personal development and
\nthe common good are best served by a moral compass that reads true. In this
\nsection we draw some lessons from the traditions of the moral sage and social
\nprophet which have enjoyed prominence in a wide variety of cultures. Whether
\nvisionary or ascetic, the sage and prophet have also widely been perceived as agents
\nof change, as well as people to be emulated and as leaders of others, not followers.
\nTo be sure, moral leadership is not to be confused with occupying official positions
\nof authority. In fact, the sage and prophet often held no official office and inveighed
\nagainst the moral corruption of the \u201cprincipalities and powers.\u201d
\nAn approach to ethics based upon moral character and virtue enjoys an extraordinarily
\nbroad cross-cultural base in terms of the \u201cframing narratives\u201d that guide
\nethical discourse in cultural settings as diverse as Western and Confucian traditions.
\nFrom Plato\u2019s \u201cphilosopher king\u201d to the virtuous Confucian minister of the State,
\nthe \u201cmoral sage\u201d and the \u201csuperior person\u201d are portrayed as both a font of wisdom
\nand the embodiment of virtue, whose very presence and being brings about personal
\nand social transformations.
\nThe moral development of the leader embraces individual, familial and spiritual
\ndynamics of personality (Kanungo & Mendonca, 1996, pp. 59, 87ff., 98ff.; Fairholm,
\n1997, part V). The spiritual dimension underscores not only virtuous behavior but
\nan attitude of openness to the transcendent meaning of human existence. Moral
\nbeliefs concerning a leader\u2019s character are reliably associated with conventional
\nmorality as assessed by Bass (1956) include: being humble, being virtuous, obeying
\nthe dictates of one\u2019s conscience, maintaining old friendships and forming new ones,
\nbeing loyal, generous and forgiving, helping others, conforming to custom, and
\nmaintaining good faith.
\nIn what follows we recall the traditions of the ethics of virtue that undergird
\nboth Western and Confucian traditions. We confine ourselves to Plato\u2019s Apology
\n(Tredennick, 1969) and the Confucian Analects (Xin, 1994). In doing so, we are
\n194 LEADERSHIP QUARTERLY Vol. 10 No. 2 1999
\nwell aware of the limitations of both Socratic and Confucian thought for the contemporary
\nworld in terms of worldview, social hierarchy and immobility, views of the
\nhuman person, ideals of truth and so forth (Whitehead, 1933; deBary, 1991b). Yet,
\nborrowing from Whitehead that all Western philosophy is but a footnote to Plato,
\nboth Socrates and Confucius imparted root metaphors and framing narratives of
\nthe moral person as a transforming person that have guided philosophical discourse
\never since, both in the West and in the East.
\nThe Virtuous Person as Transformational
\nAlthough there are many diverse elements of Chinese moral tradition that are
\nfrequently at odds with each other, there does seem to be some general agreement
\nthat among other things, the moral life rests upon foundations of individual virtue
\nand that the individually virtuous person transforms others as well as the social
\nenvironment (Schwartz, 1985; Lin, Rosemont, & Ames, 1995).
\nBoth Socrates and Confucius have come to epitomize leaders with authentic
\nidealized influence. There is no doubt that over the centuries they have taken on
\nheroic dimensions. Their framing narratives underscore a fundamental dynamic of
\nleadership. Each proposed to his followers the highest ethical standards which they
\nthemselves implemented in their own lives. More important, in terms of authenticity,
\neach was recognized as a sage and leader by others, not by self-proclamation.
\nHistorically, the central focus of ethical concern in Chinese traditions manifests
\na right ordering of personal relationships. Epitomized in Confucius\u2019 \u201cfive relations,\u201d
\n(Taylor & Arbuckle, 1995; Tu, 1985, ch. 3). Chinese ethics emphasizes personal
\nvirtue and specify proper conduct in family, kinship, and friendship relations, as
\nwell as among social equals and between superiors and subordinates in sociopolitical
\norganizations and institutions. The social and political order has always
\nbeen seen as a moral issue and it plays a critical role in realizing humanity\u2019s ethical
\ndestiny (Schwarz, 1985, p. 52; deBary, 1991a). The virtue of ren (human-heartedness,
\nbenevolence, love) and the virtue of yi (righteousness) are the grounding virtues
\nof the moral life. They express the way (dao) that one existentially embraces. Ren
\nis the lodestar that permeates every action of the superior person.
\nThe moral person in each tradition would sacrifice anything for the sake of
\nvirtue. For example, the Confucian moral tradition is strikingly clear about the
\nrelation of profits to moral virtue. From the Analects one reads:
\nConfucius said, \u201cWealth and honor are what every person desires. But if they
\nhave been obtained in violation of moral principles, they must not be kept.
\nPoverty and humble station are what every person dislikes. But if they can
\nbe avoided only in violation of moral principles, they must not be avoided.
\nIf a superior person departs from humanity (ren), how can s\/he fulfill that
\nname A superior person never abandons ren, even for the lapse of a single
\nmeal. In moments of haste, one acts according to it. In times of difficulty or
\nconfusion, one acts according to it\u201d (Analects, 4.5).
\nIn Socratic terms, one finds a striking similarity: the moral person does not \u201cput
\nmoney or anything else before virtue\u201d (Apology, 42A).
\nTransformational Leadership Behavior 195
\nBoth Socrates and Confucius base their approach upon authentic inspirational
\nmotivation. Each proposes a transcendent vision of fulfillment, justice, and peace
\nbased upon the right ordering of relationships. Each is transcendent and grasps the
\n\u201cbeyond in our midst,\u201d a better future. Each transforms by invitation, not by
\ncoercion. Each manifests consistency between word and deed.
\nThe inspiration is simple: virtue is its own reward. The basic scenario of the
\nmoral sage in each tradition emphasizes virtue and moral character. In the days
\nleading up to his condemnation to death, Socrates was taken up with a single
\nquestion: how to be excellent at being human He sharply criticized the pseudotransformational
\nsophists\u2014the purveyors of false wisdom\u2014because they did not
\nknow themselves; even worse, they abandoned fidelity to the way of truth. While
\npretending to be wise, they were foolish. The Socratic enterprise is grounded in a
\nrelentless pursuit of the truth, in the development of wisdom and the cultivation
\nof virtue. Indeed, Socrates himself transformed others precisely because of his
\nfearless commitment to virtue.
\nFor Confucius, the moral sage (shengren) is the key person in bringing about
\npersonal righteousness and social justice. A superior person (jyundz) is a moral
\nperson, who walks the moral way and attempts to practice virtue through selfcultivation.
\nBoth the sage and the superior person live under the restraint of virtue
\nand aim to transform society accordingly. A superior person is perforce a moral
\nleader (Analects, 17:3). The common, inferior or small person (xiaoren) either does
\nnot know or does not follow the way and is not a positive moral force.
\nEven though written texts idealize them, the commitment to authentic intellectual
\nstimulation of their disciples is notable in each. Both Confucius and Socrates are
\nmemorable for their \u201cways of proceeding\u201d (methodologies) that were based upon
\nrelentless questioning. For each moral wisdom was the highest prize. It was for his
\nspirit of inquiry and transformative vision that Socrates was put to death for according
\nto his words in Plato\u2019s Apology:
\n. . . it is the greatest good for a man every day to discuss virtue and the other
\nthings about which you hear me talking and examining myself and everybody
\nelse . . . the unexamined life is not worth living for a man (Treddenick, 1969,
\n36c; emphasis added).
\nWe do not find in either thinker a treatise on commerce and markets. In fact,
\nthey seem to take for granted the institutions of their day together with embedded
\nsocial hierarchies. Yet for them, every individual had dignity and moral standing
\nand this formed the basis for authentic individualized consideration. Each takes the
\ninterests of others seriously and is forgetful of self alone. Each facilitates a common
\ngood for all and a future for individuals that is worth sacrificing for. In both Socrates
\nand Confucius we discover an almost tutorial or mentoring method that had as its
\nfocus \u201cpersonal cultivation\u201d as a \u201csuperior person\u201d (Confucius) or a true \u201clover of
\nwisdom\u201d (Socrates). If individual interests are to be sacrificed, it is only to be done
\nfor the sake of attaining virtue and justice, not for wealth or for possessions or to
\nserve the leader\u2019s interests.
\nIn today\u2019s world, Socrates and Confucius seem almost hopelessly naive, offering
\n196 LEADERSHIP QUARTERLY Vol. 10 No. 2 1999
\na vision based on the premise that through personal cultivation guided by moral
\nleaders people will develop strong moral character and embrace virtue above all
\nother things and, in so doing, will transform themselves and society. Personal virtue
\nand moral wisdom of the leader provide the checks and balances upon power and
\nself-aggrandizement! From this simple framework of truth-wisdom-virtue a vision
\nof the transforming power of the moral sage has flowed down through the ages.
\nThe heart of the moral enterprise is the development of good character, which is
\ndefined by commitment to virtue in all circumstances. This framework was integrated
\ninto Judaic-Christian traditions through personages such as Augustine, Aquinas,
\nand Maimonides. In Judaic-Christian traditions, the moral sage (saint, holy
\nperson) exercises a transforming influence upon those all those whom s\/he contacts.
\nThe moral sage is a leader.
\nThese traditions of the moral sage serve as a root metaphor and framing narrative
\nof each respective culture\u2019s value systems. In terms of cultural practices, however,
\nthe dynamics vary considerably . In \u8bba\u6587\u5e2e\u52a9\/\u8bba\u6587\u5199\u4f5c\u670d\u52a1\/\u8d1f\u62c5\u5f97\u8d77\u6211\u53ca\u65f6\u63d0\u4ea4\u6211\u6700\u597d\u7684\u8d28\u91cf – China, for example, the morality of factionalism
\nand personal networks (guanxi) are highly discussed (Pye, 1995), especially in light
\nof recent economic reforms (Shanghai Investigative Group, 1995; Zhu & Ye, 1995).
\nIn all of this, based on Chinese sources themselves, it is the moral quality of
\nleadership that is foremost in people\u2019s minds.
\nWhile the tradition of virtue ethics has been less prominent in philosophical
\ntraditions of modern Western rationalism, it remained very much alive in religious
\ncircles (MacIntire, 1981) and recently has found increasing applications to business
\nethics (Koehn, 1995; Maitland, 1997). With the renewed emphasis upon leadership
\nin both strategic management and business ethics, the virtues and moral character
\nof leaders have taken center stage.
\nFrom the literature on transformational leadership, it is clear that there are
\nmany points of congruence between the \u201cauthentic moral sage\u201d and the \u201cauthentic
\ntransformational leader.\u201d Being a moral leader is more a creative art than science.
\nIts hallmark is existential practice, where one engenders virtue in self, others and
\nsociety though example and virtuous conduct. The \u201csuperior person\u201d transforms
\nrelations between people in society to reflect the \u201cway\u201d of the \u201cmandate of heaven.\u201d
\nWhat emerges from the above is that a moral person is a superior person precisely
\nby his or her embrace of the way of virtue. The process of growth in virtue is one
\nof creative transformation of self (Tu, 1985; deBary, 1991a; 1991b). But this is no
\nindividualist project\u2014it occurs both within and for a fiduciary community. A person
\nbecomes virtuous within a community. A person becomes virtuous for the community\u2014
\nto \u201cgive all people security and peace.\u201d (Xin, 1994, Analects, 14, 42) The true
\ntransformational leader is to be, in Confucian terms, a \u201csuperior person.\u201d We
\nexamine this further in light of how a leader deals with impression management.
\nSophistry, Pretense, and Impression Management
\nImpression management is the regulation of information about a vision, the
\norganization, and the Self. The authentic transformational leader may remain ethical
\nin using impression management to provide followers with \u201cidentity images\u201d of
\ntrustworthiness, credibility, moral worth, innovativeness, esteem, and power (GardTransformational
\nLeadership Behavior 197
\nner&Avolio, 1998, p.40). Conversely, impression management may be the sophistry
\nand pretense of the pseudo-transformational leader providing self glorification,
\n\u201cspin\u201d on events, excuses, and the big lie. The criticism of its immorality reads as
\nif it were directly taken from the Analects and from the Apology!
\nTo foster their influence and esteem among their followers, \u201ctransformational\u201d
\npersons, particularly those leaders who want to bolster their charismatic and inspirational
\nimage, engage in impression management. (Gronn, 1994). Gardner and
\nAvolio (1998) note that many charismatic leaders orchestrate their presentations
\nto frame, script and stage their performance. The presentations can be moral,
\namoral or immoral. For example, to maintain morale in the face of uncertainties,
\nwithout sacrificing their virtuousness, competent leaders may send out messages
\nto rally support. Evidence may be provided projecting an image of strength and
\ndecisiveness. On the other hand, morality will be tested when incompetent leaders
\nfocus all the attention on their strengths rather than their weaknesses, appeal to
\nthe fantasies of their followers, adopt the values they feel fit the implicit theories
\nthat followers have about ideal leadership, paint a vision of the future that is more
\nfantasy than reality, and exaggerate the meaningfulness of the followers\u2019 efforts.
\nThey are, in short, the \u201csophists\u201d and \u201csmall persons\u201d whom Socrates and Confucius
\ncondemned. The most telling difference between them and true moral leaders is
\nthat their puffery and self-aggrandizement emanates from them and their handlers,
\nrather than from acclamation by the people who might choose to emulate them.
\nThere are differences between absolute truth-telling, the shading of facts, and the
\nbig lies; between emotional and intellectual appeals; and between objectivity and
\nadvocacy. The basic moral issues are captured in the virtues of authenticity, integrity,
\ntruthfulness, and credibility. Moral character and virtue are only adequately expressed
\nin actions and behavior, not mere words. Moral philosophy in every culture
\nand age has been riddled with falsity and pretense\u2014\u201cfalse prophets,\u201d \u201cangels of
\ndarkness\u201d who clothe themselves in light, or \u201csophists\u201d\u2014in short, pseudo-transformational
\nleaders whose specialty is rationalization of what they do. Nonetheless:
\nthe credibility of the leaders suffers when the truth is stretched. Trust in the
\nleaders is risked and . . . trust is the single most important variable moderating
\nthe effects of transformational leadership on the performance, attitudes, and
\nsatisfaction of the followers (according to a large-scale survey by Podsakoff,
\nNiehoff, Moorman, & Fetter (1993). Although distant leaders may be able to
\nplay with the truth longer than can close, immediate leaders . . . the trust so
\nnecessary for authentic transformational leadership is lost when leaders are
\ncaught in lies, when the fantasies fail to materialize, or when hypocrisies and
\ninconsistencies are exposed (Bass, 1998a, p.173).
\nWhen self-promotion and hype are excessive, they can create the impression of
\nbeing manipulative, untrustworthy, overzealous and conceited (Gardner & Avolio,
\n1998). The relentless moral inquiry advocated by both Socrates and Confucius, as
\nwell as much religious tradition easily puncture such balloons.
\nImpression management is the norm for advertising, publicity agents, and spin
\ndoctors seeking visibility and celebrity status for their clients. Morality may be a
\n198 LEADERSHIP QUARTERLY Vol. 10 No. 2 1999
\nmatter of what is customary. Hype may be acceptable and controllable by the
\navailability of full information and the concern for maintaining credibility and trust.
\nRhetorical skills which enhance appeals work best for leaders who are at a distance
\nfrom their followers rather than close to their followers (Shamir, 1995). Leaders
\nclose to their followers lose trust readily with loss of reputation for not telling the
\ntruth.
\nTruly transformational leaders, who are seeking the greatest good for the
\ngreatest number without violating individual rights, and are concerned about
\ndoing what is right and honest are likely to avoid stretching the truth or going
\nbeyond the evidence for they want to set an example to followers about the
\nvalue of valid and accurate communication in maintaining the mutual trust
\nof the leaders and their followers (Bass, 1998a, p. 174).
\nNonetheless, in a \u201clesser of two evils\u201d type of argument, when no likely outcome
\nin a particular situation is morally ideal, and the \u201csecond best\u201d seems better than
\nnothing, there may be instances when a moral leader may find it necessary to
\nmoderate the hard facts of a circumstance. The transformational leader can be
\nhopeful and optimistic without being deceitful and perfidious. Heifetz (1994) suggests
\nthat it is ethically acceptable to delay telling patients they have a terminal
\nillness until the physician feels the patients are ready to hear the prognosis.
\nIn trying to cope with the strong isolationist sentiments in 1940 in the United
\nStates and the emergency needs of Britain to keep open the North Atlantic supply
\nroutes being threatened by German successful submarine warfare, President Roosevelt
\ninitiated the \u201clending\u201d of 50 U.S. Navy destroyers to the British rather than
\nasking an isolationist Congress to give them the destroyers.
\nImpression management can also be used defensively to protect the leader\u2019s
\nand the organization\u2019s image and vision. Ronald Reagan was labeled the \u201cTeflon
\nPresident\u201d because of his skill in deflecting criticism (Gardner & Avolio, 1998).
\nTHE MODERN ETHICAL AGENDA OF INDIVIDUAL LIBERTY,
\nUTILITY AND JUSTICE
\nTo guide moral actions, modern Western ethics marks a change in Western tradition
\nin its articulation of ethical criteria. While recognizing the moral heritage based
\nupon faith, modern Western ethics was inspired to large degree by reason and by
\nscience. It has placed emphasis upon rules or principles to be followed in concrete
\nsituations; as a social ethic it has emphasized procedural justice. At one extreme,
\nthis new ethical agenda has assigned the highest value to individual liberty and the
\nright of the individual both to determine his or her interests and to pursue them.
\nWhen a leader appears to arbitrarily or surreptitiously influence the values of
\nfollowers or to interfere with individual determination and pursuit of interests, it
\nis judged morally objectionable. This issue goes to the heart of the dimensions that
\nwe ascribe to an authentic transformational leader. It questions whether it is possible
\nto have \u201cidealized influence\u201d and \u201cinspirational motivation\u201d without controlling,
\ndominating and otherwise diminishing the liberty of conscience, free choice and
\nTransformational Leadership Behavior 199
\nself-determination of followers. It questions whether leadership that asks for the
\ndedicated commitment of followers can, in the same breath, truly provide for
\nindividualized consideration of a follower\u2019s interests.
\nWhat Constitutes Ethical Leadership for Libertarians
\nLibertarians such as Robert Nozick (1974) and Ayn Rand (1964) view any form
\nof leadership that dominates followers as antithetical to core values. They see the
\nexercise of liberty and free choice by the individual as the heart of the moral
\nenterprise and the thwarting of such liberty by others as the major moral evil. For
\nNozick and Rand, life is inherently social, in the sense that one pursues happiness
\nwhile rubbing up against others doing the same. However, their view of society is
\natomistic: society is an aggregate of self-contracting individuals who go about life
\nboth determining what is their happiness as well as how to pursue it. Based upon
\nsuch a dynamic of liberty, social moral obligations derive only from free valid
\ncontracts and the truthfulness and promises they entail. Transactional leadership
\nis valid to the extent that is consistent with a morally legitimate contract between
\naffected individuals. In this view, transformational leadership can only be viewed
\nwith suspicion as a covert exercise at control and domination. Everyone should be
\nhis or her own transforming leader.
\nSimilar themes are sounded in areas of modern existentialist philosophy exemplified
\nby Camus, Sarte and Marcel (e.g., Sartre, 1992). The heart of the moral project
\nis to \u201cchoose oneself\u201d and claim responsibility for the \u201cself\u201d that one is and for the
\nrelationships one has. To blindly follow others, to embrace their life projects rather
\nthan one\u2019s own, to fail to exercise such freedom is a moral evil. Any form of
\nleadership that entails abandoning the existential responsibility for one\u2019s self is a
\nplague.
\nThere is little moral role for leaders in such a context, except to enhance individual
\nliberty, rights, and self-determination. Unfortunately, a good deal of the leadership
\nliterature is predicated upon the \u201cleader-single follower\u201d model and neglects the
\ndynamics of \u201cleader-diverse stakeholders.\u201d There are certainly grounds for such a
\nfocus: A leader may be a catalytic agent of a follower\u2019s personal development. The
\nleader may be inspirational, may set an example to emulate, enhance liberty and
\nchoice, and facilitate the pursuits of one\u2019s interests. However, the moral analysis
\nof leadership is severely deficient if it is limited to such considerations. The leader
\nis more than an \u201cenhancer\u201d of individual self-determination and is also more than
\nthe most effective calculator of the \u201cgreatest happiness of the greatest number.\u201d
\nWhat Constitutes Ethical Leadership in the Human Relations Movement
\nThe Human Relations Movement is at the other extreme of the libertarian
\nethical position. It espouses shared values, equality, power sharing, consensus,
\nand participative decision-making. It sometimes equates individual leadership with
\ndominant behavior, the power of authority, the giving of directions, the arbitrary
\nmaking of decisions, and neglect of followers\u2019 interests (Rost, 1991). We argue that
\nsuch a notion of leadership is truncated and neglects the inspirational side of
\nleadership and the legitimate needs for the power of position, authoritative initia200
\nLEADERSHIP QUARTERLY Vol. 10 No. 2 1999
\ntives, and leader and follower responsibilities. In community affairs, the Human
\nRelations Movement takes the form of \u201cgrass roots\u201d democracy. In organizations,
\nit is seen in much of the theory and practices of Organizational Development (OD).
\nIt is also seen in sensitivity training that features the spontaneous emergence of
\nthe different roles of leadership in initially ambiguous situations. Learning how
\nto give and receive feedback provides the means for the group to progress. For
\norganizations to improve themselves, the seeds of reform reside in the values,
\ninterests and capabilities of their members. Organizations could improve if the
\nmembers were empowered to try out their ideas and learn from feedback (Bass,
\n1968). The follower-leader distinction should wither away (Burns, 1998; Rost, 1991).
\nMeeting the Moral Requirements of Libertarians and Human Relationists
\nBoth libertarian and human relations theories are predicated upon the moral
\ndignity of each person\u2014\u201ceveryone counts for one.\u201d The core values of modern
\nWestern philosophy affirm individual liberty, inviolability of conscience, self-determination,
\nand choice. Rawls (1971), echoing the tradition of Locke (1960), suggests
\nthat the liberty of individuals be maximized subject only to the condition that there
\nbe similar liberty for all others. Yet there is a notion of the common good that
\ntranscends a mere aggregate of individual goods. And, as all authority derives from
\nthe consent of the governed, the key problem is one of social choice, where the
\ncommon good is provided for without infringing upon inalienable individual human
\nrights. Individual and community exist in a delicate tension (Bellah et al., 1985).
\nEthically, this provides the grounds for discussions of civic virtue. We suggest
\nthat it also provides the grounds for the necessity of authentic transformational
\nleadership. In what follows we discuss these issues on the basis of stakeholder
\ntheory, value congruence, agency and cooperative action.
\nStakeholder Theory
\nIt is helpful to place leadership in the context of contemporary stakeholder
\ntheory (Freeman, 1984), where a business firm or social organization is seen as
\ncomposed of various constituencies (workers, customers, suppliers, managers, shareholders,
\nlocal communities and so forth) all of whom have a legitimate strategic
\nand moral stake in the organization. Yet they all may have different values and
\ninterests, different resources, and different sets of other stakeholder relationships
\nderiving from other organizations. The core problem is to achieve the common
\ngood of the organization, while at the same time meeting the needs and safeguarding
\nthe rights of the various stakeholders. To achieve such an outcome, people must
\nto some extent come together and cooperate on the basis of values, interests, and
\nsocial choice. In such a view, the common good is not a mere aggregate of individual
\ninterests or a \u201cgreatest happiness\u201d of a majority (Steidlmeier, 1992; pp. 66\u201371,
\n97\u201399, 260\u2013263). It is a truly common good, that is only possible through civic virtue,
\ncooperative action by all participants. Examples are found in the common goods
\nof language and culture, of social peace and order and economic welfare. These
\nare all social as well as individual goods and only attainable through cooperative
\naction and the exercise of civic virtue.
\nTransformational Leadership Behavior 201
\nIt is in such an arena that one finds the greatest need for authentic transformational
\nleadership, for only such leadership can help people develop the common
\ninterests of a community beyond the aggregate interests of its individuals. Authentic
\ntransformational leadership goes beyond the individual leader or follower, the
\naggregate of individual interests, or a calculus of greatest utility. Fundamentally,
\nthe authentic transformational leader must forge a path of congruence of values
\nand interests among stakeholders, while avoiding the pseudo-transformational land
\nmines of deceit, manipulation, self-aggrandizement, and power abuse. It is clear
\nthat leadership can become exploitative and abusive. In this regard, criticisms
\nof transformational leadership stem from the human relations and organizational
\ndevelopment literature in management and the individual\/community dialectic in
\nethics (Bellah et al., 1985).
\nAchieving Value Congruence
\nMany find moral fault with transformational leadership when it motivates followers
\nto go beyond their self-interests for the good of the group or organization. For
\nStevens, D\u2019Intino and Victor (1995), transformational leaders influence the values
\nof the members of an organization so they will adopt the leaders\u2019 values as their
\nown. This \u201cfundamentally violates the democratic and humanistic values\u201d of Organizational
\nDevelopment (p. 125). Under such influence, members are induced by the
\nleadership to eschew their own best interests for the sake of the organization. For
\nWhite and Wooten (1986), the democratic and humanistic values of OD conflict
\nwith the organizational values of productivity and efficiency. In dealing with such
\nvalue conflicts, the transformational leader redirects the members into pursuing
\norganizational efficiency instead of the members\u2019 personal needs for income, security,
\naffiliation, and career development (McKendall, 1993). Transformational leadership
\nis seen as immoral in the manner that it moves members to sacrifice their
\nown life plans for the sake the organization\u2019s needs. There is no moral justification
\nfor the vision of the CEO becoming the future to be sought by the employees.
\nFurthermore, democracy and humanism espoused by OD require that all such
\ndevelopments result from consensual participative leadership and the \u201cfair settlement
\nof values conflicts\u201d (Stephens, D\u2019Intino, & Victor, l995, p.135).
\nFor Rost (1991), the achievement of value congruence between the leader and
\nthe led demands consensual decisions, individual rights, and freedom of choice.
\nYet free choice narrowly conceived can result in the tragedy of the commons. In
\nthe ethics of Nozick and Rand, the solution is found by negotiating interests in terms
\nof a contract and then fulfilling that contract. And indeed, \u201cwin-win\u201d mathematically
\noptimal solutions can be calculated (Brams & Taylor, 1996). Nonetheless, free
\nchoice can produce the Abilene Paradox in which each member of a family group
\ndoes not want to go to Abilene. With free choice and each member believing he
\nor she is going along with the wishes of the others, without the leadership to test
\nfor consensus, every member of the family goes to Abilene although no one wanted
\nto go (Harvey, 1996). Contracts can be skewed in favor of those with more resources,
\ncontacts, and \u201cbargaining power.\u201d People often appreciate leadership that points
\nthe way out of dilemmas whether it comes from others within their own collective
\nor from external authority. Leaders as divergent in their politics as Mao Zedong
\n202 LEADERSHIP QUARTERLY Vol. 10 No. 2 1999
\nand Shimon Peres agreed that the task of leadership is to sense the problems of
\ntheir followers and to articulate solutions that satisfied their interests.
\nRost (1991), reminiscent of libertarians Nozick and Rand, asks for leader-follower
\ndistinctions be erased to reach true participative democracy. Burns (1998) partially
\nagrees and would substitute for leaders and followers, initiators, supporters and
\nopponents. But the counter-arguments are that if everyone in a group is responsible
\nfor its leadership, no one is responsible. Furthermore, if a group is initially leaderless,
\nthe members compete with each other for leadership. One or more leaders emerge
\nwho initiate and propose more than the other members. Followers emerge who
\nare responsive to the leaders, and non-responsive isolated persons remain who are
\npassive (Bass, 1954).
\nIf trying to align the values of members of an organization with the good of all
\nstakeholders is unethical , then it is unethical to contingently reward prison inmates
\nwith time off for good behavior or for transformational teachers to move pupils to
\ninternalize the values of good citizenship for the benefit of society. \u201cLibertarians
\nwould agree that one\u2019s life plans are paramount but they are close to espousing
\nanarchy as are the OD extremists who charge immorality if the transformational
\nleader intervenes in the individual follower\u2019s life plans\u201d (Bass, 1998a, p. 179).
\nWith this line of thinking that it is immoral to align the values and behavior of
\norganizational leaders and followers, it then is unethical to send a soldier into
\nharm\u2019s way or to require an employee to avoid disclosing trade secrets of the
\nformer employer when the employee transfers to a competing firm. Authentic
\ntransformational leaders achieve value-congruence with followers by sharing with
\nthem what both will regard as right and good. Pseudo-transformational leaders
\nachieve value-congruence by sharing unrealistic, unattainable, and exploitative expectations.
\nThus, we argue that there is much moral justification for authentic transformational
\nleaders trying to achieve value-congruence between themselves and those
\nthey lead. When such congruence is achieved, both the leaders and the led are
\nmore satisfied emotionally (Meglino, Ravlin, & Adkins, 1989). The leaders are
\naided by acculturation processes, for as followers are socialized into an organization,
\nthe congruence increases between their values and the values of the organization
\n(O\u2019Reilly et al., l991). And the congruence results in leaders being seen by followers
\nas more considerate, competent, and successful (Weiss, 1978). Additionally, followers
\nare more satisfied with their assignments (Engelbrecht & Murray, 1993).
\nTransformational leadership is value-centered. Leader and followers share visions
\nand values, mutual trust and respect, and unity in diversity (Fairholm, 1991);
\nhowever, the moral question remains. Are the followers coerced or unknowingly
\nseduced into adopting the values of the leadership, or is the emerging congruence
\nin the values of the leader and the led the result of their mutual influences For
\nhuman relationists, the coming together of the values of the leader and followers
\nis morally acceptable only if it comes about from participative decision-making
\npursuing consensus between leaders and followers. Whether a leader is participative
\nor directive, however, is not a matter of morality. It is a matter of the naivete\u00b4 or
\nexperience of the followers and many other contextual considerations (Hersey &
\nBlanchard, 1969). In many cases, directive leadership is more appropriate and
\nTransformational Leadership Behavior 203
\nacceptable to all concerned (Bass, 1990). Ethically, values may be imparted directively
\nto followers by authorities whom they respect and trust, and from whom they
\nwant guidance: priests, physicians, parents, and teachers. If the values espoused are
\nimmoral, then the authorities are pseudo-transformational.
\nSocial Utility and the Achievement of the Congruence of Interests:
\nTranscendence, Agency and Trust
\nIn Western philosophy the notion of utility is often put forward as the proper
\nethical goal of social choice, provided that it does not transgress inalienable individual
\nrights. For all that, it is not easy to specify what the term \u201cutility\u201d means. John
\nStuart Mill (1967, p. 900) identified it as the \u201cgreatest happiness principle\u201d e.g.
\n\u201c. . . actions are right in proportion as they tend to promote happiness, wrong as
\nthey tend to produce the reverse of happiness. By happiness is intended pleasure,
\nand the absence of pain. By unhappiness, pain, and the privation of pleasure.\u201d
\nModern parlance is less precise and variously interprets utility to mean achieving
\nthe greatest good, the greatest satisfactions or just majority rule, either for a given
\nact (to properly separate one\u2019s household trash) or for a given rule (such as affirmative
\naction) over a short or long term. In simplest terms the rule of utility, as
\npopularly understood, argues that the consequences of rules or actions are morally
\ngood is they benefit the majority without transgressing inalienable individual rights.
\nThis applies to both individual and social choices. Ideally, social utility is arrived
\nat through the exercise of liberty: elections in politics, consumer sovereignty in the
\nmarketplace, participation in the workplace.
\nProblems remain when information is insufficient and outcomes are uncertain.
\nWhat one thinks about the adequacy of utility as a moral measure gets back to
\nwhat one thinks about human communities\u2014life in groups, organizations, and
\nsocieties. In the libertarian view and in much of the literature of business ethics
\n(Gini, 1996; 1995) and leadership (Rosenthal & Buchholz, 1995), an atomistic view
\nof collective life prevails. The collective life is constituted by freely contracting
\natomistic individuals, who, in order to survive, must pursue their self-interest rationally.
\nSelf-determination is the ideal; each is his or her own leader and, in the
\ninterest of autonomy, as self-sufficient as possible. The common good is seen as
\nthe aggregate of individual goods that yields the greatest utility.
\nIf, however, one views life in community as affording a common good and level
\nof personal development that is beyond what atomistic individuals can achieve on
\ntheir own, then the terminal goals sought are beyond a calculus of utility and better
\nexpressed in terms of enlivening relationships based upon justice and peace and
\ngrounded in trust.
\nIn either case, however, leadership is necessary to forge a common ground. While
\nan atomistic view would favor transactional leadership, a communitarian view calls
\nfor transformational leadership. How is a common ground to be brought about
\nInfluential interactions range from \u201cmaking sense\u201d out of the situation people
\nface collectively to making cooperative decisions. In such processes, an authentic
\ntransformational leader is one who can facilitate the process and move it along
\nby articulating ideals and vision, providing inspirational motivation, stimulating
\n204 LEADERSHIP QUARTERLY Vol. 10 No. 2 1999
\nintellectual creativity, and ensuring individual consideration within cooperative
\nactions by the group. Ethics very much concerns interpersonal interactions and
\nevolves in a complex set of processes mediated through background institutions of
\nfamilies, schools, media, jurisprudence, religion, and the arts.
\nIs Aligning Values Unethical
\nShamir, House, and Arthur (1993) explore and explain the role of the leader in the
\nmatching process between individual interests and social choice. They see nothing
\nimmoral in it. But as already noted, Stevens, D\u2019Intino, and Victor (1995) among
\nothers see transformational leaders as subversive, because transformational leaders
\nencourage members of an organization to go beyond their own self-interests for
\nthe good of the organization. As a consequence, the members lose more than they
\ngain. Conflicts between leaders and followers are settled to the benefit of the leader
\nand the detriment of the followers. Followers sacrifice their own interests in order
\nto conform to the leaders\u2019 vision of what will be best for the organization. Although
\nShamir, House, and Arthur (1993) argue that the essence of charismatic leadership
\nis the matching of the hierarchy of values that are salient within the follower\u2019s selfconcept
\nto those of the leader, such is regarded as immoral by critics. Indeed, much
\nof pseudo-transformational leadership talk of empowerment can be bogus (Ciulla,
\n1996; 1995)
\nJackall (1988) conceives of the corporation to be like a medieval fiefdom. The
\nCEO is a feudal lord who offers his vassal managers and enserfed employees
\ntransactional material benefits and advancement in exchange for their service. In
\nseeking loyalty and trust from their managers and employees, the CEOs may also
\npractice pseudo-transformational rather than authentic transformational leadership.
\nAfter being asked to forgo personal, family and community interests, the managers
\nand employees may find themselves out of a job due to the downsizing of the
\norganization. The CEO may feel morally justified by underscoring that the downsizing
\nwas necessary for the organization\u2019s survival and for the benefit of the remaining
\nemployees and other stakeholders. But the supportive evidence is often missing.
\nAlthough, immediate cost reduction is obtained by downsizing, often the expected
\nlong-term benefits to the organization are a chimera (McKinley, Sanchez, & Schick,
\n1995). Additionally, the costs to employees, their families, and their communities
\noutweigh the expected gains to the organization. The ethical test comes when
\ncalculating the benefits to senior management and shareholders compared to the
\ncosts to the employees of downsizing as well as the long-term effects on the health
\nof the organization.
\nThe Significance of Agency
\nWhen the process of convergence of values and interests is such a potential
\nminefield of immorality, how can it be made to work First, it is important to realize
\nthat modern organizations are characterized by agency (Eisenhardt, 1989) and that
\nsuch agency only functions benevolently if there is a solid foundation of moral
\ntrust (Hosmer, 1995). In modern organizations, the ideal of an individual actively
\nmanaging all of his or her affairs is archaic. In both political, market, and cultural
\ninstitutions, the individual\u2014whom we call the principal\u2014engages another, whether
\nTransformational Leadership Behavior 205
\na congress person, manager, lawyer or confidante\u2014whom we call the agent\u2014to act
\nto secure his or her interests. The economics and business literature, especially that
\nof finance, is full of the \u201cagency problem,\u201d how to ensure that the agent does in
\nfact keep the bargain (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). We argue, by way of extension,
\nthat a leader very often functions as an agent of followers\u2019 interests. This argument
\nis \u201cby extension,\u201d because the \u201cprincipal\/agent relationship\u201d in this case is often
\ntacit and informal rather than specified in a written contract. In either case, however,
\nthe principal\/agent relationship cannot possibly succeed without trust (Solomon,
\n1996). As we present the issue here, transformational leaders act as an agent for
\nvarious followers in a wide number of capacities. The leaders do this as long as
\nfollowers continue to treat them as leaders. If transformational leadership is to be
\nauthentic, it must possess the virtue of trustworthiness. Nowhere is this issue more
\nto the fore than with the component of individualized consideration.
\nDistributive Justice
\nDistributive justice is arguably the most contentious issue in modern ethics.
\nSkewed opportunity sets and skewed distributions of benefits and costs are at the
\nheart of conflicts about employee compensation, stockholder returns and executive
\ncompensation, and options and bonuses reaped, whether a company prospers or
\nnot. Even when an outcome is ostensibly \u201cwin\/win\u201d the proportionate shares often
\nfavor the powerful in a manner not justifiable on the basis of either work or
\nmerit or need. There is probably no greater or more pointed test of authentic
\ntransformational leaders than the shares they take for themselves. There is no doubt
\nthat there are many and grievous distributive injustices and that they are caused by
\nthose in authority who claim to exercise benevolent leadership. The organizational
\njustice literature has focused more upon wrongdoings and perceived injustices done
\nto individuals by the organization than on positive steps and facilitating mechanisms
\nto ensure an ethical environment (Greenberg, 1987, 1990; Sheppard, Lewicki,&
\nMinton, 1992). But it does underscore the \u201cfairness issue\u201d in terms of the distribution
\nof benefits and costs, whether they be access and opportunities for career advancement
\nor concrete goods, services and compensation.
\nEven though it often appears that individual employee\u2019s interests are sacrificed
\nin the transforming process for the good of the organization, they do not have to
\nbe. Nor will those interests have to depend on the democratic participation of
\nfollowers in each and every detail, as described in the section on agency above.
\nThe truly transformational leader concerned with an ethical philosophy in managing
\nan organization conceives of the organization\u2019s ultimate criterion of worth as the
\nextent to which it satisfies all of its stakeholders. In the case of business firms, this
\nmeans aligning and balancing the interests of the various stakeholders\u2014owners
\nand shareholders, managers and employees, suppliers and customers, community
\nand society. In the case of not-for-profit institutions and social movements, this
\nmeans aligning and balancing the interests of the officers and directors, the rankand
\nfile, and the public (Bass, 1952). Additionally, the leadership may need to take
\ninto account constituents\u2019 families, government regulations, technological advances
\nand future needs.
\nAlso ignored by the overemphasis on grassroots participation is what happens
\n206 LEADERSHIP QUARTERLY Vol. 10 No. 2 1999
\nwhen individual interests outweigh the common good and transformational leadership
\nis absent. Whenever the same limited resource is freely available to all individuals
\napart from the costs and efforts to obtain the resource, what results is the
\n\u201ctragedy of the commons\u201d (Siebold, 1993). Thus, if the resource\u2014the common\u2014is
\npublic grazing land, each nearby farmer can try to maximize its use in his selfinterest.
\nSoon the land becomes overgrazed and is able to feed fewer and fewer
\nanimals. Such is what happened to 17th Century Boston farmers. In the 1980s New
\nEngland fishing boat owners invested heavily in new, high technology vessels and
\nproceeded collectively to over-fish the Grand Banks and nearby fishing grounds.
\nMarine biologists had predicted ten years earlier what would happen. The reproductive
\ncapabilities of the fisheries were seriously depleted. Owners were bankrupted;
\nthe fishing had to come to a near-halt. Missing was transformational leadership
\nfrom government executive or legislature, directing the regulation of a more rational
\npolicy. Missing likewise was transformational leadership from within the fishing
\nindustry to voluntarily promote cooperative guidelines for conservation. Authentic
\ntransformational leadership could have stimulated agreements about priorities,
\nshared values, perceived common goals, and meaningful purposes. The individual
\nboat owners involved would have been moved to go beyond their self-interests for
\nthe good of the collective.
\nThe fishing tragedy of the commons could have been prevented by leadership
\nthat recognized the problem, envisioned a fair win-win solution to it, then, communicated
\nand persuaded others about the problem and possible solutions. Also needed
\nwas leadership to develop the required cultural and organizational infrastructure.
\nUnfortunately, the fishing commons is now all the oceans of the world. Voluntary
\nconservation at the local level is no longer enough because of the international
\npoaching by the large factory ships with a global reach. Statesman-like transformational
\nleadership is needed at a world-wide level to save the declining stocks of fish
\nin all the oceans for agreements among local traditional fisher-folk, international
\nfactory vessels, conservationists, scientists and governments (Parfit, 1995).
\nGovernance, Directive Leadership and Cooperative Action
\nAs noted earlier, authentic transformational leaders may be directive rather than
\nparticipative as they attempt to align individual and organizational interests. if they
\ngrasp the sense of what is needed and can articulate what will align the interests
\nof their followers and the organization.
\nThere is no one best way to lead in all situations. Few leaders of organizations
\nand movements give orders and direct without reasons. Many more give orders
\nwith reasons that are often persuasive reasons. Most often, leaders consult with
\nfollowers before they, the leaders, decide. Less frequently, they empower followers
\nthrough delegation of responsibilities or participate with followers in shared decisions.
\nOrdinarily followers are more satisfied with consultative or participative
\ndecision-making but the effectiveness of the decisions will depend on how knowledge,
\nwisdom and expertise are distributed between the leaders and followers (Bass,
\nValenzi, et al., 1975).
\nHierarchical organization and assembly lines are being modified and replaced
\nby more fluid teams of members to deal with the changing requirements of new
\nTransformational Leadership Behavior 207
\ntechnologies, markets and work forces. More participation is needed for agreements
\nabout objectives, methods, and values. Neverless, direction from higher authority
\nis also needed and it does not have to be arbitrary and without reason and explanation.
\nBut members of teams must go beyond their own their self-interests to seek
\nthe objectives of their fluid organizations. Along with its checks and balances,
\ndemocratic governance likewise requires that its leaders also go beyond their own
\nself-interests. Polities are to be guided into control of irrationality and promotion
\nof the values of logic and rationality Although humans are naturally self-interested,
\nthey are capable of virtue (Locke, 1960). Self-interest instead of interest in the
\ncommon good can be countered by transactional controls or by the appeals of
\ntransformational leadership. Either would be morally justified unless it was coerced,
\nwithout the consent of the governed or due to blind trust (Adkinson, 1987).
\nIt is clear from the organizational psychology literature that organizational features
\n(Badaracco & Webb, 1995; Darley, 1994), group processes (Gersick and
\nHackman, 1990), and individual cognitive functioning within the context of a job
\n(Messick and Bazerman, 1996) can all impede business ethics and even morally
\ndisengage the individual (Bandura et al., 1996). The authentic transformational
\nleader strives to ameliorate such structural impediments with sound ethical practices.
\nIt is not a command function, but, rather, a creative and mediating function that
\naims to achieve a true consensus in aligning individual and organizational interests
\nin addition to other legitimate stakeholder interests. However, the meaning of true
\nconsensus may be misunderstood. In true consensus, the interests of all are fully
\nconsidered, but the final decision reached may fail to please everyone completely.
\nThe decision is accepted as the best under the circumstances even if it means some
\nindividual members\u2019 interests may have to be sacrificed. In moving members beyond
\ntheir self-interests, rather than being in conflict with the purposes and philosophy
\nof ethical human relations and organizational development (OD) we believe, to
\nthe contrary, that for the most part, the theory and practices of transformational
\nleadership are compatible with them.
\nOrganizational Development and Transformational Leadership:
\nMore Alike than Different
\nTransformational leaders can play important roles in organizational development.
\nThey can make use of process observation and many of the techniques of
\nOD and improved understanding of group dynamics. But this opens possibilities
\nof pseudo-transformational behavior. White and Wooten (1986) pointed out that
\nsometimes data may be misused and misrepresentations occur in the OD process.
\nInspirational leaders may oversimplify their messages or use exaggerated emotional
\nappeals. In both instances, individual interests may be sacrificed for organizational
\nenhancement.
\nIn assessing the \u201cethics of authority\u201d we need to recognize the reality of agency
\nin democratic participative processes and to distinguish between the authoritarian
\npersonality and the directive leader. When it comes to the common good of an
\norganization, the leader in many ways may be directive as a well-intentioned agent
\nof the principals.
\n208 LEADERSHIP QUARTERLY Vol. 10 No. 2 1999
\nThe authoritarian personality is anti-democratic, inflexible, submissive to higher
\nauthority, conventional in thinking, and prefers low risk and highly structured
\nsituations. Directive leaders tell what needs to be done, usually with explanation,
\ngive orders, and make decisions for self and others, but ordinarily give reasons for
\nthe orders and decisions.
\nConflicts in values are a continuing occurrence in utilitarian organizations. Which
\nis more important Productivity Safety Cost Reduction Efficiency Employee
\nand manager well-being Profitability Survival Growth Some say stockholder
\ninterests are paramount. Others argue that morality requires maximizing the wellbeing
\nof the employees. Transformational leaders find ways to align those seemingly
\nconflicting interests. For Graham (1995), transactional leadership is at Kohlberg\u2019s
\n(1981) \u201cpre-conventional\u201d level of moral development as it emphasizes job requirements
\nand contracts. Transformational leadership is at Kohlberg\u2019s \u201cpost-conventional\u201d
\nlevel of moral development as it emphasizes universal principles of justice
\nand the interests of all stakeholders in the organization (Turner & Barling, 1998).
\nPOWER, PERSUASION, CHECKS AND BALANCES, AND THE MODERN
\nETHICAL AGENDA
\nWe have presented authentic transformational leadership as an ideal type. Transformational
\nleadership, particularly pseudo-transformational leadership may lend itself
\nto the unchecked abuses of power. It is power abuses that concern us here (Tsou,
\n1995). Keely (1995) faults transformational leadership for lacking the checks and
\nbalances of transactional leadership. Much of checks and balances argument refers
\nto macro-social legislative, administrative and judicial checks and balances upon
\npolitical power, rather than checks and balances upon power within organizations.
\nThe latter does exist, in theory at least, in terms of (ideally) independent Boards
\nof Directors, stakeholder proxies, labor unions, the free choice of suppliers, and
\nconsumer sovereignty. Indeed, competitive market theory presupposes that power
\nis held in check and that oligopolistic or monopolistic forms of power should be
\nregulated if not eliminated. Furthermore, in complex markets and enterprises where
\nthe managers lead the firm as agents of the principals\u2019 interests, checks and balances
\nare a problem precisely when markets are dominated by power groups and agents
\nfeel they can ignore the principals\u2019 interests. They may be aided and abetted by
\nthe lack of appropriate auditing and disclosures of revenues and expenses. Exploitative
\nand abusive bosses remain with us. How can they be controlled or dislodged
\nparticularly if they are also pseudo-transformational Boards of Directors, government
\nregulators, and union officials provide possible checks. Boards may force
\nresignations; regulators may fine; unions may strike. All may sue.
\nThe bigger question is about what protects minority opposition in organizations
\nand communities when the majority succumbs to the appeals of the transformational
\nleader. Keeley (l995) looked to James Madison\u2019s contention in the Federalists
\nPapers that a constitutional government required contending interests to be heard
\nso that after rational debate, among the contending factions, optimal decisions
\ncould be made. Otherwise, the many factions of society could be controlled by
\nthose in power and would abandon their own best interests if they were coerced
\nTransformational Leadership Behavior 209
\ninto sharing the same interests. According to Keeley (1995) interpreting Madison,
\nan unhealthy concentration of power, and dictatorship by the majority at the expense
\nof the minority, results from transformational leadership which succeeds in convincing
\npeople with truly diverse interests that they share common goals even if they
\ntruly don\u2019t. For Keeley the rules of governance must require the separation of
\npowers of the executive, the assembly, and the judiciary. Outcomes must depend
\non negotiation and the give-and-take of transactional leadership. If only the interests
\nof the strongest faction dominate, more factional conflict will emerge with less
\ntolerance for minority views. Rival and opposing interests are best controlled if
\npurpose and power are separated and transactional negotiations, trade-offs, and
\nexchanges produce compromises acceptable to all concerned. This is in contrast to
\nthe emphasis of transformational leadership on the sharing in a common vision and
\na common purpose.
\nThe all-or-none argument of Keeley misses the point. Madison himself embraced
\nthe overriding importance of the common good and espoused the need to sacrifice
\nprivate opinion and private interests to the public good (Wren, 1998). In the politics
\nof checks and balances, particularly when it comes to marginal moral standards,
\ntransactional negotiations are likely to see much bluffing, withholding information,
\nmanipulating facts, making political alliances and trade-offs, settling past obligations,
\ndelaying implementations, openly compromising but covertly diverting plans,
\nand timing the release of news. Power is used to weaken opposition and strengthen
\nsupport. When authentic transformational leaders see themselves in a win-lose
\nnegotiation, they try to convert it into a win-win joint problem-solving situation or,
\nif this fails, they become effective transactional negotiators trying wherever possible
\nto use persuasion rather than power.
\nFor Thomas Jefferson, checks and balances would not be needed if the country
\nshared common interests. His transformational vision was that of nation of small,
\nindependent farmers and mechanics with common interests who could reach the
\nright decisions after rational debate. Public education to create an informed citizenry
\nwas required for this to happen. In this vein, J.S. Mill argued strongly for encouraging
\nfree speech to provide the marketplace for ideas in which the best arguments
\nbuttressed by the most compelling evidence and reasoning would prevail (Higgenbottom,
\n1996).
\nAUTHENTIC MORAL LEADERSHIP AND CULTURAL RELATIVISM
\nEvidence is accumulating that some of the variance in leadership theory and behavior
\nis universal and some is contingent on culture of country and organization
\n(Bass, 1995, 1997; House et al, 1998) The assertion that authentic transformational
\nleadership has a moral core raises the dilemma of \u201cwhat core values\u201d guide both
\nthe leaders and followers: Are some universal Are others relative to the culture
\nor expressed differently in different cultures It can be argued that whether or not
\ntransformational leadership is authentic depends on the culture of the followers
\nand whether it is judged true or false depends on who does the judging (Schwartz &
\nSagiv, 1995).
\nIn terms of ethics, one examines culture in terms of its impact upon the moral
\n210 LEADERSHIP QUARTERLY Vol. 10 No. 2 1999
\nagent and perceptions of moral actions. At issue are the moral agent\u2019s development
\nof conscience, intentions and degrees of effective freedom as well as the ends,
\nmeans and consequences of moral actions. With respect to the broad spectrum of
\nmoral values there is more congruence than is commonly assumed. Broadly defined,
\n\u201cbenevolence\u201d is in many ways a universal value as reflected in discussions of
\naltruism (Kanungo & Mendonca, 1996, ch. 6), as well as in the root metaphors
\nemanating from Confucian and Socratic traditions. Yet, for example, while friendship
\nand reciprocity may be universally valued in terms of moral excellence, they
\nmay well play out differently across cultures.
\nHofstede (1980,1997) presents a simple framework for analyzing culture in terms
\nof possibly universal values and practices (which he defines widely as including
\nrituals, heroes, and symbols). For instance, friendship, love, ownership, work, fairness
\nin exchange are universal values found in diverse cultures throughout the
\nworld. At the same time the social customs and practices through which they are
\nrealized vary considerably (Clegg & Redding, 1990; Steidlmeier, 1995).
\nIt was this combination of anthropological and socio-cultural diversity together
\nwith the notion of evolution that struck at the heart of natural law ethics and the
\nnotion that universal and eternal moral values undergird all cultures. In today\u2019s
\nworld it is really only religious ethical traditions that assert the validity of universal
\nmoral values as well as practices based on the divine will; even within the great
\nreligious traditions, however, there is hardly full agreement and each is splintered
\ninto schools of thought.
\nThe point is this: for transformational leadership to be \u201cauthentic,\u201d it must
\nincorporate a central core of moral values. Yet the \u201cpractices\u201d (in Hofstede\u2019s terms)
\nof such values are highly culturally relative. Further, even when a set of core values,
\nsuch as friendship or honesty, may be found in all cultures their ordering and
\nrelative importance may also vary by culture.
\nTo take an example, what we call \u201cWestern culture\u201d is not even philosophically
\nof one piece. Consider two leaders. The first holds as a core value Mill\u2019s (1967)
\nprinciple of utilitarianism\u2014to act in such a way (or to advocate social rules that)
\nmake for the greatest happiness of the greatest number. The second adheres to Kant\u2019s
\nsecond formulation of his categorical imperative\u2014never to deal with another person
\nsimply as a means to an end but only as an end in his or her self. (Paton, 1969, pp.
\n70, 105). On the basis of core values, within western culture itself we end up with
\ntwo very different types of transformational and transactional leaders, who would
\ninfluence and motivate and deal with followers in radically different ways.
\nAdd in global cultures and the possible numbers of authentic moral configurations
\nare kaleidoscopic, even when one only deals with broad brush strokes contrasting
\n\u201cWestern\u201d with \u201cEastern\u201d moral philosophies, or Islam with Buddhism or Christianity.
\nNonetheless, it is striking that out of global diversity, Christian Martin Luther
\nKing found inspiration in Hindu Mahatma Gandhi\u2019s philosophy of non-violence,
\nor that human rights could become the subject of a universal United Nations
\ndeclaration.
\nRather than simply leading to the affirmation of ethical relativism, such global
\ndiversity of values underscores the need of transformational leaders at all levels of
\nhuman society. At the core of all leadership\u2014whether Hillary Clinton\u2019s or Benazir
\nTransformational Leadership Behavior 211
\nBhutto\u2019s\u2014one finds a value core. Second, not all values are congruent with one
\nanother. We see this in modern Western philosophy itself in weighing human rights
\nagainst social utility and equity versus efficiency. The conclusion is that by its very
\nnature, ethics has been and always will be a \u201cdangling conversation\u201d and \u201cunfinished
\nsymphony\u201d as far as its specific content, norms, and practices are concerned. Perhaps
\nthe greatest challenge of leadership is precisely to bridge ethical relativism by
\nforging a platform of common values and stimulating alignment and congruence
\nof interests. What is required of the authentic transformational leader is not a
\nblueprint for all to follow but a sort of Socratic commitment to the process of
\nsearching out moral excellence.
\nSUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
\nCritics argue that transformational leadership is unethical. They contend that its
\nrhetoric may appeal to emotions rather than to reason. They contend that it lacks
\nthe checks and balances of democratic discourse and power distribution. They contend
\nthat it violates the principles of the Organization Development (OD) Movement and
\nthat it manipulates followers into ignoring the followers\u2019 own best interests.
\nThe critics fail to consider the positive aspects of inspirational leadership. They
\nignore the shortcomings of democratic processes and OD. They fail to distinguish
\nbetween transformational and pseudo-transformational leadership. We agree with
\nGill Hickman (l996) that rather than being unethical, true transformational leaders
\nidentify the core values and unifying purposes of the organization and its members,
\nliberate their human potential, and foster pluralistic leadership and effective, satisfied
\nfollowers.
\nRather than being immoral, transformational leadership has become a necessity
\nin the post-industrial world of work. As Cascio (1995) has pointed out, the traditional
\nmanufacturing or service job, a fixed bundle of tasks performed by an individual
\nworker, has been replaced by a manufacturing or service process, completed by a
\nflexible team with diverse skills, interests and attitudes. As a consequence
\n. . . today\u2019s networked, interdependent, culturally diverse organizations require
\ntransformational leadership to bring out . . . in followers . . . their creativity,
\nimagination, and best efforts (Cascio, 1995, p. 930).
\nSelf-aggrandizing, fantasizing, pseudo-transformational leaders can be branded
\nas immoral. But authentic transformational leaders, as moral agents, expand the
\ndomain of effective freedom, the horizon of conscience and the scope for altruistic
\nintention. Their actions aim toward noble ends, legitimate means, and fair consequences.
\nEngaged as they are in the moral uplifting of their followers, in the sharing
\nof mutually rewarding visions of success, and in enabling and empowering them to
\nconvert the visions into realities, they should be applauded, not chastised.
\nAcknowledgments: The authors wish to express their appreciation to two anonymous
\nreviewers and to Professor Joanne Ciulla of the Jepson School of Leadership,
\nUniversity of Richmond, for her insightful suggestions.
\n212 LEADERSHIP QUARTERLY Vol. 10 No. 2 1999
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What We Know About Leadership
\nRobert Hogan
\nHogan Assessment Systems
\nRobert B. Kaiser
\nKaplan DeVries Inc.
\nThis article reviews the empirical literature on personality, leadership, and organizational
\neffectiveness to make 3 major points. First, leadership is a real and vastly
\nconsequential phenomenon, perhaps the single most important issue in the human
\nsciences. Second, leadership is about the performance of teams, groups, and organizations.
\nGood leadership promotes effective team and group performance, which in turn
\nenhances the well-being of the incumbents; bad leadership degrades the quality of life
\nfor everyone associated with it. Third, personality predicts leadership\u2014who we are is
\nhow we lead\u2014and this information can be used to select future leaders or improve the
\nperformance of current incumbents.
\nA very smart political scientist friend used to
\nsay, \u201cThe fundamental question in human affairs
\nis, who shall rule\u201d We think the fundamental
\nquestion is, \u201cwho should rule\u201d Leadership
\nis one of the most important topics in the
\nhuman sciences and historically one of the more
\npoorly understood; it is important for two reasons.
\nFirst, leadership solves the problem of
\nhow to organize collective effort; consequently,
\nit is the key to organizational effectiveness.
\nWith good leadership, organizations (governments,
\ncorporations, universities, hospitals,
\narmies) thrive and prosper. When organizations
\nsucceed, the financial and psychological wellbeing
\nof the incumbents is enhanced.
\nSecond, and more important from a moral
\nperspective, bad leaders perpetrate terrible misery
\non those subject to their domain. Consider
\nthe career of Foday Sankoh, the former dictator
\nof Sierra Leone, who died in July 2003. Sankoh
\nwas born in 1937 and grew up in a Sierra Leone
\ndominated by a small, corrupt urban elite whom
\nhe deeply resented. He joined the Sierra Leonean
\narmy but was sent to prison for 7 years in
\n1971 for taking part in an attempted coup. After
\nhis release, he went to Libya to train with other
\nWest African revolutionaries; there he met
\nCharles Taylor (the recently deposed dictator of
\nLiberia), who became Sankoh\u2019s major ally.
\nSankoh founded the Revolutionary United
\nFront to overthrow the Sierra Leonean government
\nand take over the country\u2019s diamond
\nmines.
\nSankoh was bright, charming, and charismatic,
\nand he immediately attracted a large popular
\nfollowing, especially among the teenage
\nunderclass. He promised to reform education,
\nhealth care, and other public services and to
\ndistribute the diamond revenues. Instead, he
\nused the revenues to buy arms (from Charles
\nTaylor) and political support. He paid his soldiers
\nirregularly because he expected them to
\nlive by looting and even by cannibalizing victims
\nof the army. New recruits were sometimes
\nrequired to murder their own parents, which
\ntoughened them and made it hard to return
\nhome. His young recruits, deprived of parenting
\nand raised in chaos, were notoriously savage
\nand specialized in amputating appendages,
\nwhich they kept in bags. Those with the most
\nbody parts were rewarded. By the end of the
\n1990s, Sierra Leone was, according to the
\nUnited Nations, the poorest country on earth. To
\nstop the slaughter and ameliorate the misery, the
\nUnited Nations, after several false starts, intervened
\nin 2000. Sankoh was taken captive by an
\nemboldened mob that had been fired upon by
\nhis bodyguards. He was subsequently indicted
\nRobert Hogan, Hogan Assessment Systems, Tulsa, Oklahoma;
\nRobert B. Kaiser, Kaplan DeVries Inc., Greensboro,
\nNorth Carolina.
\nWe are grateful for the helpful comments of Roy
\nBaumeister and John Antonakis on earlier versions of this
\narticle.
\nCorrespondence concerning this article should be addressed
\nto Robert Hogan, Hogan Assessment Systems, 2622
\nEast 21st Street, Tulsa, OK 74114, or Robert B. Kaiser,
\nKaplan DeVries Inc., 1903 G Ashwood Court, Greensboro,
\nNC 27455. E-mail: rhogan@hoganassessments.com or
\nrkaiser@kaplandevries.com
\nReview of General Psychology Copyright 2005 by the Educational Publishing Foundation
\n2005, Vol. 9, No. 2, 169\u2013180 1089-2680\/05\/$12.00 DOI: 10.1037\/1089-2680.9.2.169
\n169
\nThis document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.
\nThis article is intended solely for the personal use of the individual user and is not to be disseminated broadly.
\nby an international court for crimes against humanity.
\nWhile in prison, he \u201clost his mind,\u201d had
\na stroke, and died of a pulmonary embolism,
\nleaving his impoverished country and its mutilated
\ncitizenry finally in peace. Sadly, the moral
\nto this story\u2014that bad leaders cause much misery\u2014
\nis all too common.
\nThis article tries to make three points. The
\nfirst is that leadership matters; it is hugely consequential
\nfor the success of organizations and
\nthe well-being of employees and citizens. Second,
\nwhen conceptualized in the context of human
\norigins, it becomes clear that leadership is
\nan adaptive tool for individual and group survival.
\nWe believe that, in essence, leadership
\nprimarily concerns building and maintaining effective
\nteams: persuading people to give up, for
\na while, their selfish pursuits and pursue a common
\ngoal. Our final point is that the personality
\nof a leader affects the performance of a team:
\nWho we are determines how we lead.
\nConceptualizing Leadership
\nWe first began studying leadership in the
\nmid-1980s, and we quickly discovered that the
\nliterature contained few defensible generalizations
\nother than such nuggets as leaders seem to
\nbe somewhat taller and a little bit brighter than
\ntheir subordinates (Stogdill, 1948). Since then
\nwe have been assembling a perspective on leadership
\nthat makes sense to us. The following is
\na review of our perspective.
\nConceptualizing History
\nThere are two major viewpoints regarding the
\nprincipal dynamic in history and human affairs,
\nand they derive from two distinct causal perspectives.
\nThe first is the tradition represented
\nby Hegel, Marx, Durkheim, and modern-day
\nsociologists (and social psychologists, although
\nthey do not realize it); this tradition assumes
\nthat there is a tide running in human affairs, a
\ntide defined by history or the economy\u2014by
\nlarge impersonal forces outside human control\u2014
\nand individuals are merely floating on the
\ntide. Many of us have the illusion that we control
\nour own destiny, but what individual actions
\nbrought about the worldwide depression
\nof the 1930s that swept the Nazis into power in
\nGermany In this Marxist view, people are
\nmerely the creatures of their circumstances.
\nThe second view is represented by Sigmund
\nFreud, Thomas Carlyle, and Max Weber, who
\nargued that, from time to time, shrewd, talented,
\nand charismatic figures emerge in society, captivate
\nand energize a significant following, and
\nthen change history. Although writers such as
\nHerbert Marcuse (1969) have tried to integrate
\nthe views of Marx and Freud, the history of
\nsocial theory over the past 100 years has been
\nthe dialectic exchange between these two
\nperspectives.
\nWe adopt the currently out-of-vogue view
\nthat history is the history of social movements
\nled by individuals, for better or worse (as described
\nin the preceding). That is, we favor
\nexplanations based on concrete personalities
\nrather than abstract social forces.
\nDefining Personality
\nPersonality concerns two major elements: (a)
\ngeneralizations about human nature (what people
\nare like way down deep) and (b) systematic
\naccounts of individual differences (which differences
\nare important and how they arise).
\nWith regard to generalizations, the pioneers of
\npersonality psychology (e.g., Freud, Jung,
\nAdler, Horney, and Erikson) argued that the
\nmost important generalization we can make is
\nthat everyone is somewhat neurotic, which
\nmeans that the most important problem in life is
\nto overcome one\u2019s neurosis. However, that generalization
\nis contradicted by the data; for example,
\nthe base rate of neuroticism is too low to
\nbe a generalized characteristic (Renaud & Estes,
\n1961). Moreover, the \u201cgood life\u201d involves more
\nthan the absence of pathology (Seligman &
\nCsikszentmihalyi, 2000).
\nOn the other hand, a review of sociology,
\nanthropology, and evolutionary psychology
\nsuggests an alternative generalization that, in
\nfact, is two related generalizations. First, people
\nalways live in groups; we evolved as groupliving
\nanimals. Second, every group has a status
\nhierarchy; there are people at the bottom, in the
\nmiddle, and at the top, and everyone knows who
\nis where. This suggests that the most important
\nproblems in life concern getting along with
\nother people and achieving some measure of
\nstatus. We refer to these concerns as \u201cgetting
\n170 HOGAN AND KAISER
\nThis document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.
\nThis article is intended solely for the personal use of the individual user and is not to be disseminated broadly.
\nalong\u201d and \u201cgetting ahead,\u201d and individual differences
\nin these capabilities predict a wide
\nrange of occupational outcomes (see J. Hogan
\n& Holland, 2003). It is also worth noting that
\neffective leaders are skilled at building relationships
\nand acquiring status.
\nTo understand personality, the concept
\nshould be defined from two perspectives: (a)
\nhow a person thinks about him- or herself (i.e.,
\na person\u2019s identity) and (b) how others think
\nabout that person (i.e., a person\u2019s reputation). A
\nperson\u2019s identity concerns his or her most
\ndeeply held beliefs, whereas a person\u2019s reputation
\nis an index of his or her success in life.
\nIdentity is hard to study, and we do not know a
\ngreat deal about it. In contrast, reputation is easy
\nto study and vastly consequential.
\nOur research indicates that it is important to
\ndistinguish two aspects of reputation, which we
\ncall \u201cthe bright side\u201d and \u201cthe dark side.\u201d The
\nbright side concerns the initial impression we
\nmake on others\u2014it reflects our social performance
\nwhen we are at our best\u2014for example, in
\na job interview or on a first date. The five-factor
\nmodel (Wiggins, 1996) is a taxonomy of the
\nbright side; it reflects how observers perceive
\nand describe others in the early stages of a
\nrelationship (McAdams, 1995). The dark side
\nreflects the impression we make on others when
\nwe let our guard down or when we are at our
\nworst, such as when we are stressed, ill, or
\nintoxicated. The bright side concerns the person
\nyou meet in an interview; the dark side concerns
\nthe person who actually comes to work. Dark
\nside tendencies typically coexist with well-developed
\nsocial skills that mask or compensate
\nfor them in the short run. Over time, however,
\ndark side tendencies erode trust and undermine
\nrelationships. Both the bright side and the dark
\nside of reputation can be studied through observer
\ndescriptions, and most of the major outcomes
\nin life (jobs, promotions, relationships)
\ndepend on reputation. Moreover, effective leaders
\nhave distinctive reputations (as described
\nsubsequently).
\nThe Leadership Literature
\nAlthough the leadership literature is immense,
\nit can be effectively sorted into two
\ncategories that we call the troubadour tradition
\nand the academic tradition. The troubadour tradition
\nis by far the larger and more popular
\nliterature. It consists of such works as Leadership
\nSecrets of Attila the Hun (Roberts, 1990)
\nand the self-serving and account-settling memoirs
\nof former CEOs and politicians. Despite its
\npopularity, the troubadour tradition is a vast
\ncollection of opinions with very little supporting
\nevidence; it is entertaining but unreliable.
\nIn contrast, the academic tradition is a collection
\nof dependable empirical nuggets, but it
\nis also a collection of decontextualized facts that
\ndo not add up to a persuasive account of leadership.
\nThis is the result of two unfortunate
\ntrends in earlier leadership research. The first
\nconcerns the fact that leadership researchers
\nhave historically ignored personality (Bass,
\n1990), and they have done so despite evidence
\nthat personality has effects on leadership (see,
\nfor example, Mann\u2019s, 1959, conclusions as
\ncompared with the reanalysis of his data by
\nLord, DeVader, & Alliger, 1986). Second, researchers
\nhave routinely defined leadership either
\nas standing out in a crowd or as occupying
\na senior position in an organization. Both definitions
\noverlook the fundamental essence of
\nleadership.
\nLeadership Effectiveness
\nLeadership is usually defined in terms of the
\npeople who are in charge of organizations and
\ntheir units; by definition, such people are leaders.
\nBut reflect for a moment on the skills
\nneeded to successfully negotiate the status hierarchy
\nof a large bureaucratic organization.
\nThink about the people who are in charge of the
\norganization where you work and try to find
\nexamples of real leadership. The people who
\nrise to the tops of large organizations are distinguished
\nby hard work, intelligence, ambition,
\npolitical skill, and luck but not necessarily by
\ntalent for leadership.
\nAs an alternative way to conceptualize leadership,
\nthink for a moment about human origins.
\nPeople evolved as group-living animals, because
\nthere is safety in numbers. Over the 2
\nmillion years of human prehistory, the various
\nhominid groups were in competition for the
\ncontrol of resources, and the competition was
\ntypically quite savage. For example, when
\nGenghis Khan invaded Persia, he killed every
\ninhabitant (de Hartog, 2000). People are natu-
\nSPECIAL ISSUE: WHAT WE KNOW ABOUT LEADERSHIP 171
\nThis document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.
\nThis article is intended solely for the personal use of the individual user and is not to be disseminated broadly.
\nrally selfish and inclined to pursue their shortterm
\nself-interest. Leadership involves persuading
\npeople to set aside, for a time, their selfish
\npursuits and work in support of the communal
\ninterest. In the context of the violent tribal warfare
\nthat characterized most of human history,
\nleadership was a solution for group survival;
\nleadership is a collective phenomenon (Avolio,
\nSosik, Jung, & Berson, 2003, p. 287).
\nIn our view, then, leadership should be defined
\nin terms of the ability to build and maintain
\na group that performs well relative to its
\ncompetition. It follows that leadership should be
\nevaluated in terms of the performance of the
\ngroup over time. Our view is a radical departure
\nfrom the conventional wisdom of leadership
\nresearch. Most studies define leadership in
\nterms of emergence\u2014the person in a group of
\nstrangers who exerts the most influence\u2014or in
\nterms of ratings of an individual \u201cleader\u201d by
\nmore senior \u201cleaders.\u201d Although very few studies
\nhave used indices of group performance as
\nthe criterion for leadership,1 we believe this is
\nthe most appropriate way to define and evaluate
\nleadership. With this definition in mind, we turn
\nto a discussion of what we know about
\nleadership.
\nWhat We Know About Leadership
\nThe foregoing is the framework in terms of
\nwhich we conceptualize leadership. The remainder
\nof the article concerns the dependable
\nfacts, what we know about leadership that is
\nempirically true. We think we can summarize
\nwhat we know in terms of seven points.
\nCompetencies
\nOur first point concerns competency models.
\nThe competency movement began with the
\nwork of David McClelland (1973), a personality
\npsychologist with practical interests. McClelland\u2019s
\nmodel was designed to identify competencies
\nthat were specific to a particular job in a
\nparticular organization, with no intention of
\ngeneralizing. The modern enthusiasm for competencies
\nseems to have taken off after the publication
\nin 1982 of a book by McClelland\u2019s
\ncolleague, Boyatzis, partly as a result of the
\nbook\u2019s appeal and partly as a result of widespread
\ndislike of traditional methods of job
\nanalysis as applied to managerial work. The
\ncompetency movement spread rapidly and
\nquickly became chaotic and idiosyncratic. Our
\nfirst point is that every existing competency
\nmodel can be captured with the domain model
\nproposed by Hogan and Warrenfeltz (2003).
\nThe model appears in Table 1.
\nIn brief, this model identifies four broad
\nclasses of managerial competencies: (a) intrapersonal
\nskills (regulating one\u2019s emotions and
\neasily accommodating to authority), (b) interpersonal
\nskills (building and maintaining relationships),
\n(c) business skills (planning, budgeting,
\ncoordinating, and monitoring business activities),
\nand (d) leadership skills (building and
\nmotivating a high-performance team). We
\nwould like to highlight three points about this
\ndomain model. First, it is developmental: Intrapersonal
\nskills develop first, probably in the
\npreteen years; interpersonal skills develop next,
\nprobably during the teenage years; business
\nskills develop when a person enters the workforce;
\nand leadership skills develop last. Second,
\nthe model is a hierarchy of increasing
\ntrainability, with intrapersonal skills being hard
\nto train and leadership skills being the easiest to
\ntrain. Third, the model is comprehensive; every
\nexisting competency model can be organized in
\nterms of these four domains.
\nIn addition to having a taxonomy of competencies,
\nwe also have very good measures of the
\nkey elements in these domains. There is solid
\nmeta-analytic evidence showing that measures
\nof core self-esteem and measures of integrity
\npredict occupational performance in the .30\u2013
\n.50 range (Judge & Bono, 2001; Ones, Viswesvaran,
\n& Schmidt, 1993). Similarly, measures
\nof interpersonal skill correlate in the .50 region
\nwith performance in customer service and sales
\njobs (Frei & McDaniel, 1998; Vinchur, Schippmann,
\nSwitzer, & Roth, 1998). We can also
\npredict business skills using measures of cognitive
\nability with equally good results (Schmidt
\n1 For example, in one of the first meta-analyses of leadership,
\nLord et al. (1986) remarked that most leadership
\nresearchers \u201chave over generalized results from leadership
\nperceptions to the topic of leadership effectiveness\u201d (p.
\n407). Although researchers are beginning to realize the
\nimportance of defining leader effectiveness in terms of team
\nor unit performance, much work remains to be done on this
\ntopic.
\n172 HOGAN AND KAISER
\nThis document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.
\nThis article is intended solely for the personal use of the individual user and is not to be disseminated broadly.
\n& Hunter, 2004). Finally, we can predict various
\naspects of leadership performance with validities
\nas high as .50 using multivariate regression
\nequations of normal personality (e.g.,
\nHogan & Hogan, 2002; Judge, Bono, Ilies, &
\nGerhardt, 2002). All of this means that we have
\nthe assessment tools needed to identify potential
\nleaders; regrettably, these tools are rarely used
\nin selecting corporate executives (DeVries,
\n1993).
\nImplicit Models of Leadership
\nEarlier we stated that discussions of personality
\nshould distinguish between identity and
\nreputation. Our second point is that we now
\nhave a very clear view of the reputational elements
\nof leadership. Specifically, the literature
\non implicit leadership theories suggests the
\ncharacteristics people look for in their leaders;
\nthis research also tells us which of the positive
\nattributes listed by C. Peterson and Seligman
\n(2004) define effective leaders in the eyes of the
\nled. In order of importance, the four themes that
\nappear regularly in this literature\u2014the leadership
\nvirtues\u2014are integrity, decisiveness, competence,
\nand vision (e.g., Kouzes & Posner,
\n2002; Lord, Foti, & DeVader, 1984).
\nCredibility as a leader depends vitally on
\nperceived integrity: keeping one\u2019s word, fulfilling
\none\u2019s promises, not playing favorites, and
\nnot taking advantage of one\u2019s situation. The
\nmost important question we ask of potential
\nleaders is, \u201cCan we trust you not to abuse the
\nprivilege of authority\u201d A meta-analysis conducted
\nby Dirks and Ferrin (2002) showed reliable
\ncorrelations between trust in one\u2019s supervisor
\nand a range of positive leadership outcomes,
\nincluding improved job performance,
\njob satisfaction, and organizational commitment.
\nLike Caesar\u2019s wife, people in leadership
\npositions must avoid even the appearance of
\nimpropriety.
\nIn addition, good leaders make good decisions
\nin a timely way. In times of crisis and
\nuncertainty, the most effective leaders make
\nprompt decisions (Vroom & Jago, 1988; Yukl,
\n1998, chap. 11). Naval historians are astonished
\nat the quality of Horatio Nelson\u2019s decision making
\nunder the almost unimaginably difficult and
\nconfusing conditions of a sea battle (Pocock,
\n1987). But decisiveness is also important under
\nnormal conditions. Mintzberg (1973) observed
\nthat managers are involved in decision making
\nall day long, and the quality of their decisions
\naccumulates.
\nTable 1
\nThe Domain Model of Competencies
\nDomain Definition and sample competencies
\nIntrapersonal Internalized standards of performance; able to control emotions and
\nbehavior (courage and willingness to take a stand; career
\nambition and perseverance; integrity, ethics, and values; core
\nself-esteem and emotional stability; patience; tolerance of
\nambiguity)
\nInterpersonal Social skill role-taking and role-playing ability; talent for building
\nand maintaining relationships (political savoir faire, peer and
\nboss relations, self-presentation and impression management,
\nlistening and negotiating, oral and written communications,
\ncustomer focus, approachability)
\nBusiness Abilities and technical knowledge needed to plan, budget,
\ncoordinate, and monitor organizational activity (business acumen,
\nquality decision making, intellectual horsepower,
\nfunctional\/technical skills, organizing ability, priority setting,
\ndeveloping effective business strategy)
\nLeadership Influence and team-building skills (providing direction, support,
\nand standards for accomplishment; communicating a compelling
\nvision; caring about, developing, and challenging direct reports;
\nhiring and staffing strategically; motivating others; building
\neffective teams; managing diversity)
\nSPECIAL ISSUE: WHAT WE KNOW ABOUT LEADERSHIP 173
\nThis document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.
\nThis article is intended solely for the personal use of the individual user and is not to be disseminated broadly.
\nGood leaders are also competent; they are a
\ncontributing resource for their groups. In huntergatherer
\ntribes\u2014which are ferociously democratic\u2014
\nthe head man is usually distinguished
\nfrom the group by superior hunting ability and a
\nbroader moral perspective (see Boehm, 1999).
\nExpertise is needed for legitimacy and respect
\nfrom the team (French & Raven, 1959); the fact
\nthat colleges and universities are typically led
\nby failed academics partially explains problems
\nwith faculty morale.
\nFinally, good leaders are able to project a
\nvision, to explain to the group the purpose,
\nmeaning, and significance of its key undertakings.
\nNapoleon noted that \u201cleaders are dealers in
\nhope\u201d; we would add that vision is their currency.
\nIn addition, vision facilitates team performance
\nby clarifying roles, goals, and the way
\nforward (House, 1971). George H. W. Bush is
\nby all accounts a decent and likable man, but he
\nis utterly pragmatic in his thinking; before the
\n1992 election, he complained to his staff that he
\ndid not understand \u201cthis vision thing,\u201d which, of
\ncourse, is not what people want to hear from
\npotential leaders.
\nGood to Great
\nMost business books are empirical nonsense,
\nbut Collins\u2019s (2001a) book, Good to Great,
\nseems to be an exception. He and his staff
\nsearched databases for the Fortune 1000 companies
\nto identify companies that had 15 years
\nof performance below the average of their business
\nsector and then 15 years of sustained performance
\nsignificantly above the average of
\ntheir sector. They found 11 companies that fit
\nthis profile. The next question was, what distinguished
\nthese 11 companies Their somewhat
\nreluctant conclusion was that the distinguishing
\nfeature was a new CEO who took charge of the
\norganization and then improved its performance.
\nThese 11 CEOs all shared the same two characteristics
\n(above and beyond the four elements
\ndescribed earlier; Collins, 2001b). First, they
\nwere modest and humble, as opposed to selfdramatizing
\nand self-promoting. Second, they
\nwere phenomenally, almost preternaturally, persistent.
\nThese findings were a jolt to the business
\nliterature (which had been promoting the
\ncult of the charismatic CEO), but we think they
\nmake sense in terms of the data provided by
\nethnographic studies of leadership (Boehm,
\n1999). In hunter-gatherer groups, the head man
\nis modest, self-effacing, competent, and committed
\nto the collective good. And if he is not,
\nhe gets removed, sometimes quite violently.
\nPersonality and Leadership
\nIn the best study yet published on the links
\nbetween personality and leadership, Judge et al.
\n(2002) conducted a meta-analysis in which they
\nexamined 78 studies of the relationship between
\npersonality and leadership. They organized personality
\nin terms of the generally accepted taxonomy
\nof reputation, called the five-factor
\nmodel (Wiggins, 1996); this is a taxonomy of
\nthe bright side of personality. The dimensions
\nof the five-factor model are Extraversion,
\nAgreeableness, Conscientiousness, Emotional
\nStability, and Openness. (Emotional Stability
\nand Conscientiousness reflect the first element
\nof the domain model shown in Table 1, intrapersonal
\nskills; Extraversion and Agreeableness
\nconcern the second domain, interpersonal skills;
\nand Openness, which is related to vision, anchors
\nthe fourth domain, leadership skills.)
\nJudge et al. (2002) classified their leadership
\ncriteria in terms of both emergence and effectiveness.
\nTheir results showed that all five dimensions
\nwere related to overall leadership
\n(emergence and effectiveness combined), with
\ntrue correlations of .24 or greater for each, except
\nfor Agreeableness (.08). The multiple R
\nvalue for all five dimensions predicting emergence
\nwas .53, and it was .39 for predicting
\ntheir criterion of effectiveness (see Hogan &
\nHogan, 2002, and Lord et al., 1986, for similarly
\nstrong relationships between leadership
\nand personality).
\nDoes Leadership Matter
\nIt is useful to know that personality predicts
\nindices of leadership effectiveness, but does
\nleadership actually matter in terms of the performance
\nof an organization And, if it does,
\nthen what are the mechanisms The answer to
\nthe first question is yes; the relevant data come
\nfrom studies of the economic utility of senior
\nmanagers. For example, Joyce, Nohria, and
\nRoberson (2003) reported that CEOs account
\nfor about 14% of the variance in firm perfor-
\n174 HOGAN AND KAISER
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\nmance. To put this number in perspective, industry
\nsector accounts for about 19% of that
\nvariance (McGahan & Porter, 1997). In addition,
\nBarrick, Day, Lord, and Alexander (1991)
\nshowed that, relative to executives with average
\nperformance, high performers provide an additional
\n$25 million in value to an organization
\nduring their tenure (see also Day & Lord, 1988,
\nand Thomas, 1988, for evidence regarding the
\nfinancial impact of leaders on organizations).
\nConcerning the question of how leaders influence
\nthe performance of their organizations,
\nthe general model is that leader personality influences
\nthe dynamics and culture of the top
\nmanagement team, and the characteristics of the
\ntop management team influence the performance
\nof the organization. Two very interesting
\narticles provide data to support these themes. In
\nthe first, R. S. Peterson, Smith, Martorana, and
\nOwens (2003) used data from CEOs of 17 very
\nlarge corporations (e.g., IBM, Coca-Cola, Disney,
\nXerox, CBS, Chrysler, and General Motors)
\nto show that CEO personality powerfully
\naffects the dynamics and culture of the top
\nmanagement team, with correlations in the .50
\nrange for most hypothesized relationships between
\npersonality and various aspects of team
\nfunctioning (e.g., cohesiveness, corruption, and
\nrisk tolerance). Moreover, the characteristics of
\nthe top management team were substantially
\ncorrelated with business outcomes such as income
\nand sales growth, return on investment,
\nand return on assets.
\nIn the second article, Harter, Schmidt, and
\nHayes (2002) reviewed the literature on employee
\nsatisfaction and showed that satisfaction
\nmeans, in essence, satisfaction with supervisors.
\nThat is, how employees view their supervisors
\nis the primary determinant of their overall satisfaction.
\nThen, in a meta-analysis, including
\n198,514 employees from 7,939 business units,
\nthey showed that employee engagement and
\nsatisfaction, at the business-unit level, correlated
\n.37 and .38, respectively, with a composite
\nindex of business-unit performance that included
\nturnover, customer loyalty, and financial
\nperformance.
\nPutting these various studies together, we see
\nthat (a) personality predicts leadership style
\n(who we are determines how we lead), (b) leadership
\nstyle predicts employee attitudes and
\nteam functioning, and (c) attitudes and team
\nfunctioning predict organizational performance.
\nThis model linking leader personality to organizational
\nperformance is portrayed in Figure 1.
\nManagerial Incompetence
\nAlthough the literature on managerial competence
\nis sparse and fragmented (but growing),
\nthe literature on managerial incompetence is
\nremarkably coherent. The problem is very important;
\nsurvey after survey shows that 65%\u2013
\n75% of the employees in any given organization
\nreport that the worst aspect of their job is their
\nimmediate boss. Estimates of the base rate for
\nmanagerial incompetence in corporate life
\nrange from 30% to 75%; a recent review reported
\nthe average estimate to be 50% (DeVries
\n& Kaiser, 2003). Historically, managerial incompetence
\nhas been conceptualized in terms of
\nnot having the characteristics needed for success,
\nthat is, too little of the right stuff. We
\nbelieve that failure is related more to having
\nundesirable qualities than to lacking desirable
\nones, that is, having the wrong stuff.
\nBentz (1985) pioneered the study of managerial
\nincompetence with an interview study of
\nfailed managers at Sears; he noted that virtually
\nall of them had a \u201cpersonality defect\u201d of some
\nFigure 1. How leader personality affects organizational performance.
\nSPECIAL ISSUE: WHAT WE KNOW ABOUT LEADERSHIP 175
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\nsort. Bentz\u2019s findings were then replicated by
\nresearchers at the Center for Creative Leadership
\n(McCall & Lombardo, 1983) and others.
\nLeslie and Van Velsor (1996) summarized the
\nliterature on failed managers in terms of four
\nthemes: (a) poor interpersonal skills (being insensitive,
\narrogant, cold, aloof, and overly ambitious),
\n(b) unable to get work done (betraying
\ntrust, not following through, and being overly
\nambitious), (c) unable to build a team, and (d)
\nunable to make the transition after a promotion.
\nAfter reviewing this literature, Hogan and
\nHogan (1997) proposed that the standard personality
\ndisorders, as described in the Diagnostic
\nand Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders
\n4th edition (DSM\u2013IV; American Psychiatric Association,
\n1994), provide a taxonomy of the
\nmost important causes of managerial failure.
\nPersonality disorders are not forms of mental
\nillness; they are dysfunctional interpersonal dispositions
\nthat (a) coexist with talent, ambition,
\nand good social skills and (b) prevent people
\nfrom completing the essential task of leadership:
\nbuilding a team. These dysfunctional dispositions
\nare what we described earlier as the
\ndark side of personality. Hogan and Hogan developed
\nan inventory of the 11 key dimensions
\nof the dark side using the DSM\u2013IV Axis II
\npersonality disorders as a guide. The inventory
\nis intended to predict managerial failure, and
\nsubsequent research shows that it does (Hogan
\n& Hogan, 2001). This taxonomy is presented in
\nTable 2.
\nThere are three points to note about these
\ndark side characteristics. First, they are hard to
\ndetect, for two reasons. On the one hand, they
\ncoexist with well-developed social skills
\n(Hogan & Hogan, 1997, 2001). On the other
\nhand, these tendencies, although flawed, are intended
\nto make a positive impression on others,
\nand they do in the short run. For example,
\npeople with high scores on the Bold scale (narcissism)
\ninitially seem confident and charismatic.
\nOver time, however, these features turn
\ninto a sense of entitlement and an inability to
\nlearn from mistakes. Paulhus (1998) reported
\nthat, in an unstructured group task in which the
\nparticipants are strangers, narcissism predicts
\nmaking a strong initial impression and being
\nnominated as a leader but subsequently being
\nrejected by the group as a result of arrogance
\nand high-handedness. Indeed, Baumeister and
\nScher (1988) reported that the distinguishing
\nfeature of most forms of self-defeating behavior
\nis the pursuit of short-term gains that carry
\nsignificant long-term costs (see Table 2 for
\nother examples of this dynamic).
\nSecond, although high scores on the 11 dark
\nside dimensions shown in Table 2 are associated
\nwith negative consequences in the long run, low
\nscores are not necessarily desirable either; this
\nis what makes personality psychology so interesting.
\nLow levels of dutifulness suggest problems
\nwith authority; low levels of imaginativeness
\nsuggest lack of vision; low levels of boldness
\nsuggest indecisiveness; and so on.
\nOptimum performance is associated with more
\nmoderate scores. Kaplan and Kaiser have applied
\nthis reasoning to executive assessment;
\ntheir data clearly show that there is an optimal
\nlevel for most managerial behaviors (e.g.,
\nKaplan & Kaiser, 2003).
\nThe third point concerns how executive selection
\ndecisions are made (Sessa, Kaiser, Taylor,
\n& Campbell, 1998). Most formal selection
\ntools are rarely used. Former subordinates\u2014
\nthose who are best able to report on a person\u2019s
\ntalent for leadership\u2014are almost never consulted.
\nOften new executives are recruited from
\noutside the organization, making it even more
\ndifficult to evaluate the candidate appropriately.
\nThe most common selection tool is an interview,
\nand the dark side tendencies are designed
\nto create favorable immediate impressions; narcissists
\nand psychopaths excel during interviews.
\nWe speculate that many executives are
\nhired for the very characteristics that ultimately
\nlead them to fail.
\nOrganizational Effectiveness
\nThe professional literature in psychology has
\nvery little to say about the determinants of organizational
\neffectiveness. Perhaps the bestknown
\ntreatment of the subject is provided by
\nKatz and Kahn (1978). After noting how complicated
\nthe subject is, Katz and Kahn suggested
\ndefining organizational effectiveness idiographically,
\nin terms of how efficiently an organization
\nconverts its resource inputs into outputs.
\nThis definition is internally consistent but
\nignores the fact that organizations are in competition
\nwith one another.
\n176 HOGAN AND KAISER
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\nTable 2
\nDimensions of Managerial Incompetence
\nDimension Axis II disorder Definition Short-term strength(s) Long-term weakness(es)
\nExcitable Borderline Moody, intense, easily annoyed by people
\nand projects; fails to follow through
\nEnergetic and enthusiastic Displays outbursts and emotional
\nvolatility
\nCautious Avoidant Reluctant to take risks as a result of
\nbeing criticized
\nMakes few mistakes Indecisive and risk averse
\nSkeptical Paranoid Cynical, mistrusts others\u2019 intentions,
\nargumentative and combative
\nInsightful about organizational
\npolitics
\nMistrustful, vindictive, litigious
\nReserved Schizoid Aloof and uncommunicative, insensitive
\nto others\u2019 feelings
\nTough and resolute under pressure Uncommunicative and
\ninsensitive to morale issues
\nLeisurely Passive\u2013aggressive Overtly cooperative, privately
\nprocrastinating, stubborn, resentful of
\nrequests for increased performance
\nCharming with good social skills Displays passive\u2013aggressive
\nmeanness
\nBold Narcissistic Excessively self-confident; exhibits
\ngrandiosity and entitlement; unable to
\nlearn from mistakes
\nCourageous, confident, charismatic Unable to admit mistakes; sense
\nof entitlement
\nMischievous Antisocial\/psychopathic Excessively takes risks and tests limits;
\nbright, manipulative, deceitful, cunning,
\nand exploitive
\nWilling to take risks, charming Lies, defies rules and authority,
\nexploits others
\nColorful Histrionic Expressive, animated, and dramatic;
\nwants to be noticed and the center of
\nattention
\nEntertaining, flirtatious, engaging Impulsive, attention seeking;
\nmanages by crisis
\nImaginative Schizotypal Acts and thinks in creative but sometimes
\nodd or eccentric ways
\nDisplays visionary outside-the-box
\nthinking
\nFanciful; displays over-the-top
\nvision, erratic decision making
\nDiligent Obsessive\u2013compulsive Meticulous, precise, perfectionistic,
\ninflexible, intolerant of ambiguity
\nHard working; has high standards;
\nself-sacrificing
\nOvercontrolling, rigid,
\nmicromanaging
\nDutiful Dependent Conforms and is eager to please superiors Team player; considerate; keeps
\nboss informed
\nIndecisive, overly concerned
\nabout pleasing superiors
\nSPECIAL ISSUE: WHAT WE KNOW ABOUT LEADERSHIP 177
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\nOur final point does not concern a reliable
\nempirical generalization about leadership;
\nrather, it proposes a model for conceptualizing
\norganizational effectiveness. However, organizational
\neffectiveness is an organic part of any
\ndiscussion of leadership when leadership is seen
\nas a collective phenomenon, a resource for the
\nperformance and survival of a collectivity. In
\nour view, organizational effectiveness can be
\nconceptualized in terms of five components.
\nThe first component of organizational effectiveness
\nis talented personnel. Other things being
\nequal, a more talented team will outperform
\na less talented team. Talented personnel are
\nidentified through good selection methods and
\nrecruited through good leadership. The second
\ncomponent of organizational effectiveness is
\nmotivated personnel: people who are willing to
\nperform to the limits of their ability. Other
\nthings being equal, a motivated team will outperform
\na demoralized team. The level of motivation
\nin a team or organization is directly
\nrelated to the performance of management (Harter
\net al., 2002).
\nThe third component of organizational effectiveness
\nis a talented management team, with
\ntalent defined in terms of the domain model
\npresented in Table 1 (and incompetence defined
\nin terms of the taxonomy presented in Table 2).
\nThe fourth component is an effective strategy
\nfor outperforming the competition. This is
\nwhere many organizations have problems. An
\neffective strategy depends on systematic research
\nand a deep knowledge of industry trends.
\nBut business managers do not enjoy research
\n(otherwise, they would be in the research business),
\nand people who enjoy research do not
\ntalk frequently with business managers. As a
\nresult, business strategy is often developed on
\nan ad hoc basis by top management teams (think
\nabout the strategy that has been instituted at
\nyour place of employment and how it was
\ndeveloped).
\nThe final component of organizational effectiveness
\nis a set of monitoring systems that will
\nallow senior leadership to keep track of the
\ntalent level of the staff, the motivational level of
\nthe staff, the performance of the management
\ngroup, and the effectiveness of the business
\nstrategy. It is the responsibility of the senior
\nleadership in an organization to put these five
\ncomponents in place. Ultimately, then, good
\nleadership is the key to organizational effectiveness.
\nConsequently, every organization makes
\nhiring mistakes, every organization alienates at
\nleast part of its workforce, every organization
\nhas its share of bad managers, many organizations
\npay only lip service to strategy formulation,
\nand many organizations fail to monitor
\ntheir own performance in these key areas. Thus,
\nevery organization has its inefficiencies. As
\nPericles said to the elders of Athens on the eve
\nof their cataclysmic war with Sparta, \u201cI care less
\nabout the Spartans\u2019 strategy than I do about our
\nmistakes.\u201d
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\n180 HOGAN AND KAISER
\nThis document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.
\nThis article is intended solely for the personal use of the individual user and is not to be disseminated broadly.