{"id":37586,"date":"2023-01-13T19:03:45","date_gmt":"2023-01-13T19:03:45","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/essays.homeworkacetutors.com\/2023\/01\/the-eurozone-crisis-and-eu-fiscal-governance-reform\/"},"modified":"2023-01-13T19:03:45","modified_gmt":"2023-01-13T19:03:45","slug":"the-eurozone-crisis-and-eu-fiscal-governance-reform","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.colapapers.com\/us\/the-eurozone-crisis-and-eu-fiscal-governance-reform\/","title":{"rendered":"The Eurozone Crisis and EU Fiscal Governance Reform"},"content":{"rendered":"
\n

\u00a0Framing the Eurozone Crisis: A Case of Limited Ambition<\/strong><\/p>\n

Abstract <\/strong><\/h3>\n

The eurozone crisis provided a new opportunity for obtaining supranational fiscal integration within the European single currency area. This study applies a framing analysis to the crisis discourse that emerged from within the European Union\u2019s (EU) intergovernmental forums involved in fiscal policy coordination. As well as linking policy frames to two different integration scenarios for the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU), the broader influence of macroeconomic ideology is also emphasised. It is found that the response to the intensification<\/a> of the crisis in Europe was to employ framing devices supporting intergovernmental fiscal discipline. While there were emergent supranational discourses over the longer term, these were reflective of a limited reform ambition. A key constraining factor here were the sovereignty concerns and issues of moral hazard circulating amongst member states,<\/a> which together have ensured that a supranational fiscal policy is unlikely to be obtained in Europe.\u00a0 <\/p>\n

Introduction <\/strong><\/h2>\n

This article considers
\nthe response from within the intergovernmental forums to the eurozone crisis
\nand the future prospects for fiscal supranationalism in Europe more broadly. When
\npolitical scientists have turned their attention to the politics of the crisis,
\nit has often figured as a case study to support the grand theoretical claims
\nmade by the \u2018new intergovernmentalism\u2019 (Bickerton et al. 2015; 2015a). This approach has tried to theorize a new paradox
\nin European integration in the post-Maastricht era: \u2018Member States
\npursue more integration but stubbornly resist further supranationalism\u2019
\n(Puetter 2012, 168). Certain institutional dynamics associated with the new intergovernmentalism can be found
\nto be at work within EMU where, particularly since the onset of the crisis,
\nthere have been marked increases in intergovernmental policy coordination
\nwithin the European Council and ECOFIN Council structures (Hodson 2011; Puetter
\n2012). However, the approach is still at an early stage of development and deep
\nempirical analysis of the political deliberations and policy environment within
\nthese settings are still lacking. Further criticisms have been made. In
\nparticular, Schimmelfennig (2015, 724) points out that, \u2018They do not
\ndistinguish intergovernmentalism and supranationalism by the integration
\noutcomes (either substantive or in terms of the level or scope of
\nintegration)\u2019. Thus, claims of an \u2018integration paradox\u2019 taking place within EMU
\nspecifically or across the wider EU remain uncertain. <\/p>\n

This article
\nfocuses on the issue of EU fiscal governance reform following the
\nintensification of eurozone crisis. The
\npotential role of ideas as engines of policy change within EMU is a prospect taken
\nseriously here (Dyson 2000). With this in mind, the\u00a0discursive institutionalist<\/em>\u00a0theoretical
\nframework<\/em> proposed by
\nSchmidt is employed (Schmidt 2008, 2010). This approach is well suited to
\nconsidering the role of ideas and discourse interactions in bringing about
\nchange in an EU institutional context (see Schmidt 2015). It is applied
\nthrough a framing analysis of the reform discussions that emerged from within
\nthe key intergovernmental forums involved in guiding the crisis response
\n(Goffman 1974). This article identifies
\nthe dominant policy frames (\u2018problems\u2019 and \u2018solutions\u2019) organising the reform
\ndebate, and links them to two alternative reform paths for EU fiscal
\ngovernance: intergovernmental and supranational. In doing so, this article
\nclarifies far more precisely the different political and economic policy
\noptions for reforming EMU governance, as well as previously underdetermined
\nconcepts such as \u2018fiscal union\u2019 and \u2018political union\u2019. As well as linking
\nindividual policy frames to different integration scenarios, the important role
\nof macroeconomic ideology in guiding framing preferences is also emphasised. <\/p>\n

Theoretical and Methodological Framework <\/h2>\n

It could be
\nassumed that the eurozone crisis would confirm neo<\/em>\u2013functionalist<\/em>\u00a0beliefs concerning the dynamics of the
\nEuropean integration\u00a0process<\/em>: the weaknesses
\nrevealed in the asymmetric single currency area create strong pressures for a functional \u2018spillover\u2019 of supranational
\ncompetencies to the European level (Rosamond 2005). However, when
\npolitical scientists have turned their attention to the crisis, it has often
\nbeen directed at the intensified intergovernmental policy coordination that has
\ntaken place within the European Council and ECOFIN Council (Hodson 2011; Puetter
\n2012; Bickerton et al. 2015; 2015a). While broader new intergovernmentalist claims of an \u2018integration paradox\u2019 in
\nEurope involving integration without supranationalism remain undetermined (see
\nSchimmelfennig 2015), these findings do suggest that deep supranational
\nintegration may not be obtained in EMU. Moreover, it has previously been found
\nthat a supranational reform agenda was not internalised by the Commission[1]<\/a>.
\nTogether these findings are important as the long-term sustainability of the
\nsingle currency area without significant steps being taken towards a more
\ndeeply integrated fiscal union has been questioned (De Grauwe 2013). Through a
\nframing analysis this article will seek to explore if the crisis response from
\nwithin the intergovernmental institutions was to push for supranationalism
\nwithin EU fiscal governance, or alternatively, a retaining of intergovernmental
\ncontrol at the EU level. And, if the later course prevails, it will seek to
\noffer a more complete theoretical explanation of why member states continue to
\nresist supranationalism, even in the face of significant centralisation
\npressures. A
\ndeeper understanding of the political determinants of the EMU policy
\nenvironment will also help facilitate a more complete explanation of why a
\nsupranational reform agenda was found not to have been internalised within DG
\nECFIN.<\/p>\n

The overarching theoretical
\nframework informing this analysis is discursive institutionalism (Schmidt 2008;
\n2010). Of particular relevance here is the distinction made by discursive
\ninstitutionalism between \u2018coordinative discourse\u2019\u2014which
\ntakes place internally within the EU policy making setting\u2014and \u2018communicative discourse\u2019\u2014which take place externally between EU policy
\nactors and the general public (Schmidt 2005). This study integrates discursive
\ninstitutionalism alongside a frame analysis. Framing has been criticised for
\nits lack of consistency in application of theory and method, with many
\ndifferent variants being operationalised without adequate clarification (Cacciatore et al. 2016). Framing has also been found
\nto share common processes with agenda-setting and priming, although framing
\noffers a more \u2018encompassing conceptual approach\u2019 (Aday 2006, 768). Here, a
\nsociological approach to framing is adopted, which can be traced back to the
\nwork of Goffman (1974). A frame is understood as a \u2018schemata of interpretation\u2019,
\nwhich can shape actors\u2019 perceptions of reality and, in turn, influence political
\nbehaviour (Goffman 1974, 21). Inspired by Goffman\u2019s approach, Benford and Snow
\n(2000) make an important distinction between \u2018prognostic\u2019 and \u2018diagnostic\u2019
\nframing: the construction of particular\u00a0problem representations<\/em> and possible solutions<\/em>. This is valuable for
\nfacilitating a deeper understanding of the diagnosis of the causes of the
\neurozone crisis arrived at, as well as an exploration of the interlinking
\nreforms suggested to solve or at least deal with the problems posed by the
\neurozone crisis.\u00a0 <\/p>\n

Ideas within frames can be understood as occurring at different levels of generalisation: specific policy ideas related to problem and solutions (e.g. strengthened rules-based surveillance versus debt mutualisation); normative ideas which attach value to political action (e.g. fiscal discipline versus fiscal solidarity); and finally these can be connected to programmatic ideas related to broader policy paradigms and ideologies (Schmidt 2005; 2008). As a means to locate the key framing ideas that are likely to figure in the institutional discourse on the eurozone crisis, a wider review of the reform literature on EU fiscal governance will be completed (see the section below, \u2018Literature Review\u2019). Table (1) helps to link the different problem and solution policy frames that will be uncovered as part of this discussion to two different integration scenarios for EMU: intergovernmental and supranational. As well as showing how ideas relate to different policy measures (problems and solutions) and normative arguments, the wider role of macroeconomic ideology in guiding framing preferences for EMU reform is also highlighted here. Following a framing analysis, the dominant frames uncovered will also be explored in relation to the wider interplay between ideas and institutions within EMU[2].<\/p>\n

\u00a0Two guiding macroeconomic
\nideologies are important for understanding developments in European monetary
\nintegration: neoliberalism and Keynesianism. Neoliberalism is a highly
\ncontested term, although from an ideological standpoint it favours market based solutions and methods over\u00a0government<\/em>\u00a0intervention
\n(Holden 2011). In
\ncontrast, perhaps the most important insight of Keynesianism is the recognition of the need for\u00a0demand management by the state <\/em>both
\nin economic downturns and\u00a0booms <\/em>(Skidelsky 1992, 572-624). Keynesian theory,
\ntherefore, demands a far more active role for the state in managing the economy
\nthrough fiscal policy. Neoliberal
\nideas have been found to have become deeply embedded within the EMU policy
\nframework, including the prevalence of \u2018sound money<\/em>\u2019 and \u2018sound finance\u2019 ideas imparting fiscal
\ndiscipline (Dyson 2002). There
\nis no prior reason why neoliberalism should be associated with
\nintergovernmentalism and Keynesianism with supranationalism. However, when applied to events
\ntaking place during the eurozone crisis, a Keynesianism philosophy demands a
\nlevel of centralised fiscal solidarity amongst member states, which would imply
\nedging towards a more supranational model of fiscal integration. On the
\ncontrary, building on, rather than replacing, the Stability and Growth Pact
\n(SGP) arrangements for fiscal discipline would preserve the intergovernmental
\nlogic of EMU governance, and is more aligned with neoliberal preferences. <\/p>\n

The focus here is on the framing activities that took<\/em>
\nplace within the European Council and ECOFIN Council (shadowed by the informal
\n\u2018eurogroup\u2019), although<\/em>these frames will also be located in
\nthe context of the wider crisis discussions taking place within the EU
\nCommission and ECB settings. The analysis distinguishes between two distinct phases of the eurozone
\ncrisis: a crisis \u2018escalation\u2019 and crisis \u2018normalisation\u2019 phase. The crisis
\nescalation phase can be traced back to the intensification of the global
\nfinancial crisis in the summer of 2007. With attention focused on the frailties
\nof the American financial system, the eurozone economy at first assumed a
\n\u2018safe-haven\u2019 status for many commentators (Wyplosz 2009)<\/em>\u2014although
\nthere was some prescient warnings as to the multiple risks the downturn could
\npose to the institutions of the European single currency area (Feldstein 2008).
\nIn early 2010, following significant upwards revisions in the budget deficit
\nfigures for Greece,\u00a0 there was a sudden erosion
\nin market confidence in the Eurozone leading to<\/em>long-term
\ngovernment bond yield spreads increasing dramatically for the periphery member
\nstates (Checherita et al. 2010). With
\nthe risk of sovereign default\u00a0and uncontrollable\u00a0contagion<\/em>\u00a0effects
\nat its most serious, the President of the European Council, Herman Van
\nRompuy, swiftly put together a case for the supremacy of a European Council led
\nTask Force in guiding a \u2018fast-track\u2019 process for EMU reform. \u00a0<\/p>\n

By<\/em> the fall of 2012, market reactions
\ntowards the eurozone had normalised significantly. Key
\nhere was the ECB fulfilling its function as a lender of last resort (De Grauwe
\n2016, 126-141), which was aided by Mario Draghi\u2019s<\/em>\u00a0statement at the end of July 2012 that
\n\u2018[w]ithin our mandate, the ECB is ready to\u00a0do whatever it takes<\/em>\u00a0to preserve the euro\u2019. In response to the calming
\nin market conditions, the attention of European leaders switched to the
\nmeasures required to stabilise EMU over the longer term<\/em>. Laying the
\nfoundations for these reform discussions were two strategic documents: the
\nDecember 2012 report, prepared at the request of the European Council by
\nPresident Van Rompuy, jointly with the Presidents of the European Commission,
\nthe ECB, and the Eurogroup, entitled Towards a Genuine Economic and Monetary
\nUnion <\/em>and the Commission\u2019s own A Blueprint for a Deep and Genuine Economic and
\nMonetary Union: Launching a European Debate<\/em>, published in November 2012. Building on the previous
\ndocuments, in June 2015, the President of the Commission, in close
\ncooperation with the Presidents of the Council, the ECB, the Eurogroup and the
\nEuropean Parliament, presented the so-called \u2018Five Presidents\u2019 Report\u2019 entitled
\nCompleting Europe\u2019s Economic and Monetary
\nUnion<\/em>. Official documents and
\nspeeches throughout these deliberation phases will be supplemented by a
\nseries of semi-structured interviews that were conducted with senior EU officials
\nlocated within the European Council, ECOFIN Council and DG ECFIN during the
\nmost important phases of the crisis. It is important to differentiate between
\nthe full internalisation of discourse within institutions and discourse that is
\ndeployed in rhetoric as a strategic political device (Hay 2006). Interview data
\nis then useful for forming a comparison between communicative discourses <\/em>to the general public and the internal coordinative
\ndiscourses of policy construction taking place among policy actors (Schmidt
\n2008). <\/p>\n

Literature Review <\/h2>\n

The escalation of
\nthe Eurozone crisis in 2010 fixed attention on the design failures of the
\neurozone and the practicalities of having a monetary union without the
\naccompanying integration of the fiscal side (De Grauwe 2013). Since 2010, most
\nof the reform proposals suggested to complete the architecture of EMU have
\ncentred on the prospect of implementing two neo-Keynesian fiscal solidarity
\nmechanisms: 1) centralised fiscal capacity (or federal budget) for
\nstabilisation purposes; 2) and the introduction of debt mutualisation schemes.
\nA Policy Contribution for Bruegel details the four main options for developing
\na fiscal capacity for the eurozone with stabilisation functions: 1)
\nunemployment insurance; 2) payments related to deviations of output from
\npotential; 3) the narrowing of large spreads; 4) and discretionary spending
\n(Wolf 2012). Suggestions for debt mutualisation include the so called European
\nSafe Bonds (Euro-nomics group 2011) and Redemption bonds (Bofinger et al<\/em>. 2011). In view of the salient
\nfeatures of fiscal policy, it is understood as imperative that progress towards
\na more supranational fiscal union is accompanied by deeper political
\nintegration to guarantee the democratic legitimacy of EMU governance (Schmidt,
\n2015). <\/p>\n

Despite calls
\nbeing made for EMU to be completed through a process of supranational fiscal
\nintegration, there is an altogether different integration route that would
\nmaintain the intergovernmental logic of fiscal arrangements in Europe.
\nNeoliberal monetarist principles are pervasive here, with discussions of fiscal
\nsolidarity being disregarded in favour of a limited fiscal discipline agenda
\n(von Hagen et al. 2009; 2011). The main concern under this integration scenario
\nis with heightened budgetary surveillance and enforcement mechanisms, which could
\nbe secured under the preventative and corrective arms of the pre-existing SGP
\nframework. The fundamentally decentralised character of EU fiscal governance
\nwould also be preserved. In the literature, support for such a limited reform
\nagenda is often supported by a belief that the
\neurozone crisis was primarily the result of excessive\u00a0fiscal profligacy<\/em>\u00a0in
\nthe periphery member states (Sinn 2010). Of course, the distinct lack of
\npolitical integration envisioned here would mean that channels of democratic
\nlegitimacy would remain largely indirect via member state governments. <\/p>\n

Through this
\ndiscussion of the literature, two reform scenarios for EMU have been
\nidentified: intergovernmental and supranational. These two models can be
\nunderstood as being supported by a selection of different policy\u00a0frames,<\/em>\u00a0implying different definitions of what the\u00a0problem <\/em>is and different ideas of what the suitable policy solutions<\/em>\u00a0may be (see Table 1). First, the intergovernmental reform scenario is
\nguided by a simplistic fiscal profligacy diagnosis of the eurozone crisis. Such
\nan interpretation of the crisis strongly implies neoliberal policy solutions in
\nthe form of strengthened rules-based fiscal discipline. Framing the crisis in
\nthese more limited terms may also be both politically and intellectually
\nattractive. This is because these frames do not demand challenging integration
\nsteps being taken towards a deeper level of fiscal
\nand political union<\/em>. Alternatively, the more far
\nreaching supranational reform scenario is informed by a broader interpretation
\nof the crisis problem as a problem of regional imbalances. In turn, possible
\nsolutions are understood as going far beyond neoliberal fiscal discipline in
\nthe direction of the implementation of neo-Keynesian solidarity measures, including debt
\nmutualisation and an enlarged EU budget. The need to ensure the democratic <\/em>legitimacy for decisions taken at the Union
\nlevel is also problematized under this integration scenario, leading to demands
\nfor the simultaneous development of a flanking political union. <\/p>\n

Table 1: Framing the Eurozone Crisis <\/strong><\/p>\n

\"\"<\/figure>\n

Building on [name deleted
\nfor peer review] <\/p>\n

Framing the Eurozone Crisis\u00a0 <\/strong><\/h2>\n

Crisis Escalation Phase <\/em><\/h3>\n

Following the intensification
\nof the global financial crisis in July 2007, the eurozone was at first
\nconsidered by some to be a \u2018safe haven\u2019 (Wyplosz 2009). With the full implications of the deepening global financial crisis for
\nthe eurozone not yet apparent, the crisis problem was initially framed
\nby European leaders as one created externally by the financial excesses built-up
\nwithin the \u2018Anglo-Saxon\u2019 economies. As one DG ECFIN official observed, \u2018Governments
\nbelieved the crisis to have originated primarily in poor regulatory practices
\nin New York and London\u2026and Europe was being pulled into the crisis through
\nthe global financial system\u2019 (Secretariat Official in DG ECFIN 2 2013). A
\nsimilar sentiment was also reflected in more communicative discourse as
\nEuropean leaders attempted to externalise the crisis. The German Chancellor,
\nAngela Merkel, was uncompromising in asserting before the German Bundestag that
\n\u2018excessively cheap money in the US was a driver of today\u2019s crises\u2019 (Financial
\nTimes 2008). Moreover, French President, Nicolas Sarkozy, proclaimed in similar
\nterms that \u2018the crisis was a product of the Anglo-Saxon model\u2019 (Financial Times
\n2009). <\/p>\n

Despite European
\nleaders framing the 2008 financial collapse as an almost exclusively
\n\u2018Anglo-Saxon\u2019 phenomenon with epicentres in New York and London, European
\nleaders, led by Nicolas Sarkozy as the then acting president of the Council,
\ndid push for a strong coordinated European response alongside the G20 and American
\neconomies (Hodson 2011). In this early period, the framing of solutions to the
\ncrisis in Europe, overlapping with the international response and IMF
\nrecommendations, was guided heavily by Keynesian principles as leaders sought
\nto avert financial contagion and recessionary spillovers into the real economy
\nthrough coordinated fiscal expansion. In Europe, this translated into an
\nattempt to combine both national and EU resources to \u2018support demand\u2019 and
\n\u2018cushion economies from the worst effects of the financial meltdown\u2019 (Secretariat
\nOfficial in DG ECFIN 1 2013). In November 2008, after an extraordinary summit
\nof the euro area Heads of Government led by Nicolas\u00a0Sarkozy<\/em>, the Commission proposed a Keynesian \u2018European
\nEconomic Recovery plan\u2019 (ECRP), which championed a substantial coordinated
\nfiscal stimulus: \u2018The Commission is
\nproposing that, as a matter of urgency, Member States and the EU agree to an immediate
\nbudgetary impulse amounting to \u20ac 200 billion (1.5% of GDP)\u2019(Commission
\n2008). <\/p>\n

Importantly though,
\na key principal underpinning the plan was that any budgetary stimulus should be
\n\u2018timely, targeted, and temporary\u2019\u2014and
\nthat \u2018Member States should commit to reverse the budgetary deterioration and
\nreturn to the aims set out in the [SGP\u2019s] medium term objectives\u2019 (Commission
\n2008, 6-7).\u00a0 As Joaqu\u00edn Almunia<\/em>,\u00a0Vice President<\/em>\u00a0of the European Commission, commented
\nat the time: \u2018we have red lines<\/em>,\u00a0we cannot<\/em>\u00a0put
\nan excessive\u00a0burden<\/em>\u00a0on\u00a0the next generation\u2019 (Commission 2008a, 6).
\nSimilarly, the conclusions of the ECOFIN Council continued to support the
\nlong-term application of the SGP: \u2018<\/em>we remain fully committed to
\nsound and sustainable public finances. The Stability and Growth Pact provides
\nadequate flexibility to deal with these exceptional situations\u2019 (Council 2009).
\nThus, while European leaders led by Nicolas\u00a0Sarkozy<\/em>, along with the broader international
\ncommunity, embraced more Keynesian orientated fiscal stimulus in order to counter
\nthe expected downward trend in demand presented by the intensification of the
\nglobal financial crisis, the long-term European commitment to the neoliberal
\nrules-based SGP framework remained relatively stable during this early crisis
\nperiod. <\/p>\n

\u00a0In the Spring of 2010 Greek public debt was
\ndowngraded by the main credit rating agencies to junk status and a growing
\nspread in yields emerged in Eurozone sovereign bonds (Checherita et al. 2010). Recalling these events later, President
\nVan Rompuy noted that this sudden loss of confidence in the Eurozone provoked
\nby Greece was a \u2018real shock\u2019 for which \u2018we were not prepared\u2019 (Council 2014). As
\none official in DG ECFIN remarked: \u2018It was now internal: a crisis of the
\nEurozone\u2019 (Secretariat Official in DG ECFIN 2 2013). As the crisis intensified
\nwithin the eurozone it was reframed by European leaders as a problem of fiscal
\nprofligacy amongst the periphery member states. On 11 February 2010, in a short
\nemergency statement issued by Heads of State, they remarked that \u2018all euro
\nmembers must conduct sound national policies in accordance with the agreed
\nrules\u2019 (Council 2010). The discussion was also centred on Greece, with the
\nGreek government being told \u2018to implement all these measures in a rigorous and
\ndetermined manner to effectively reduce the budgetary deficit by 4% in 2010\u2019
\n(Council 2010). From a reading of the coordinative discourse, it was now
\nGermany that was seen to be providing ideational leadership for framing the
\ncrisis in behavioural terms on Greek fiscal profligacy. <\/p>\n

As the largest eurozone country of
\ncourse Germany\u2019s voice was perhaps louder than the rest. I think it is fair to
\nsay that there was a perception in Germany that the troubles in the sovereign
\ndebt market had been caused by excessive government spending by certain
\nperiphery member states. (Council Directorate for Economic Policy Official
\n2013). <\/p>\n

The Commission
\nalso concurred with these views. In fact, the EU executive took the
\nunprecedented step of issuing a series of strict recommendations to ensure
\nthat the budget deficit of Greece was brought below 3% of GDP by 2012
\n(Commission 2010a). Joaqu\u00edn Almunia<\/em>,\u00a0Vice President<\/em>\u00a0of the European Commission, commented
\nthat \u2018this is the first time we
\nhave established such an intense and quasi-permanent system of monitoring\u2019
\n(Commission 2010a).<\/em> <\/strong><\/em><\/p>\n

In response to the
\nescalating crisis in the eurozone, President Van Rompuy argued the case in
\nMarch 2010 for the pre-eminence of a European Council led Task Force in driving
\nreform negotiations on EMU governance. The framing of policy solutions within
\nthe framework of the Task Force setting was guided more by a neoliberal
\nideology towards the imposition of strengthened intergovernmental fiscal
\ndiscipline. In the first statement issued by the Task Force on the 25 March
\n2010, the shift in policy responses by European leaders was already firmly
\nestablished: \u2018the current situation demonstrates the need to strengthen and
\ncomplement the existing framework to ensure fiscal sustainability in the euro
\nzone\u2019 (European Council 2010b). Moreover, the final conclusions of the March 2010
\nEuropean Council summit further instructed the Task Force \u2018to identify the measures needed<\/em>\u00a0to\u00a0reach<\/em>\u00a0the\u00a0objective<\/em>\u00a0of an improved crisis resolution
\nframework and\u00a0better budgetary discipline<\/em>\u2026exploring
\nall options to reinforce the existing legal framework\u2019 (European Council
\n2010a). <\/p>\n

Again, in the coordinative
\ndiscourse, officials drew attention to the renewed ideational leadership played
\nby Germany in framing policy solutions for the crisis: <\/p>\n

You have to understand that for
\nGermany in particular the idea of having enforceable rules and sanctions to
\nmaintain budgetary discipline is central to their vision of how EMU should
\noperate. And during the crisis it was Germany that pressed the hardest for
\nheighted budgetary surveillance (Member of the Cabinet for the European Council
\nPresident, 2014). <\/p>\n

A separate official
\ncommented on what they perceived as the inevitably of Germany\u2019s leading role in
\nsetting the reform priorities within the task force: \u2018But of course Germany
\ntakes a leading role here in view of its economic size. So Germany
\nautomatically was seen to take on a leading role, whether it wanted it or not
\n\u2018(Council Directorate for Economic Policy Official 2013). In contrast, French
\nPresident, Nicolas Sarkozy led continued pleas for more fiscal solidarity: \u2018The
\neuro is our currency. It implies solidarity. There can be no doubt on the
\nexpression of this solidarity\u2019 (BBC 2010). However, while it has been observed
\nthat \u2018France under the stewardship of
\nSarkozy also had a role to play here\u2019, it has been noted that he, in effect,
\nwas \u2018forced to concede too many of Germany\u2019s demands during the crisis
\ndeliberations\u2019 (Council Directorate for Economic Policy Official 2013). Thus,
\nwhile Nicolas Sarkozy played an important role in leading a more Keynesian international
\nresponse at the onset of the global financial crisis, as the crisis intensified
\nwithin the eurozone the French President was forced to abandon solutions
\ninvolving fiscal solidarity in favour of Germany\u2019s more limited fiscal
\ndiscipline objectives. \u00a0<\/p>\n

These framing
\npriorities were reflected in the Final Report of the Task Force released to the
\npublic in October 2010. The main pillar of the suggested reforms was geared
\ntowards \u2018greater fiscal discipline\u2026 through a stronger stability and growth
\npact\u2019 (European Council 2010, 3-4).\u00a0 As
\npart of its ongoing institutional dialogue with the Task Force, the ECB also
\noffered its public support for legislative measures supporting a more rigorous\u00a0\u2018quasi<\/em>-automatic\u2019 implementation
\nof the SGP rules (ECB 2010). Three key objectives were embedded in the
\nFinal Report of the Task Force: \u2018the need for a greater focus on debt and
\nfiscal sustainability\u2019, \u2018to reinforce compliance\u2019 and \u2018to ensure that national
\nfiscal frameworks reflect the EU\u2019s fiscal rules\u2019 (European Council 2010, 1-12).
\nIn remarks following the final meeting of the Task Force, President Van Rompuy
\ndocumented that the \u2018task force\u2019s commitment to a stronger Pact was high from
\nthe beginning to the end\u2019 (European Council 2010c). Converging with the framing
\n\u00a0activities of the Task Force, in
\nSeptember 2010 the Commission proposed the so-called \u2018six-pack\u2019 of legislative proposals
\ncentred on the concept of \u2018prudent fiscal policy-making\u2019 (Commission 2010, 1). These
\n\u2018fast-tracked\u2019 proposals sought to strengthen the impact and effectiveness of
\nthe preventative arm of the SGP by giving it \u2018teeth\u2019 (EU Commission 2010, 4-5).
\nThese early framing activities led by deliberations within the Task Force also helped
\nset the subsequent policy agenda in the form of a legislative \u2018two-pack\u2019
\n(proposed in November 2011) and intergovernmental \u2018fiscal compact\u2019 (agreed 8-9
\nDecember 2011). Building on the legislative six-pack, both measures were
\nlimited to strengthening intergovernmental fiscal discipline under the SGP,
\nthrough strengthened budgetary surveillance and reinforced compliance (see Commission
\n2012). <\/p>\n

Crisis Normalisation Phase <\/em><\/h3>\n

From the summer of 2012
\nto the winter of 2013 there was a gradual reduction in the eurozone periphery
\nbond yield spreads. Key here was the ECB fulfilling its
\nfunction as a lender of last resort (De Grauwe 2013; 2016). With the ECB able
\nto temporarily normalise market reactions within the eurozone, it offered the
\nprospect that European leaders may seek to reframe the crisis as demanding more
\nsupranational solutions. This assumption appeared to be confirmed when
\nPresident Herman Van Rompuy, following a European Council summit at the end of
\nJune 2012, first mentioned the prospect of laying down a \u2018longer-term vision\u2019
\nfor strengthening EMU (European Council 2012c). Following prior negotiations in the European Council, President
\nVan Rompuy, jointly with the Presidents of the European Commission, the ECB,
\nand the Eurogroup, presented in December 2012 a report entitled Towards a
\nGenuine Economic and Monetary Union<\/em>.
\nHowever, despite the possibility of a critical juncture event, the framing of policy
\nsolutions within the report continued to prioritise the strengthening of
\nintergovernmental fiscal discipline over the short-term. <\/p>\n

The
\nnear term priority is to complete and implement the new steps for stronger
\neconomic governance\u2026The other elements related to strengthening fiscal
\ngovernance in the euro area (\u2018Two-Pack\u2019), which are still in the legislative
\nprocess, should be finalised urgently and be implemented thoroughly (European
\nCouncil 2012, 8).<\/p>\n

These reform
\npriorities were also reflected in the coordinative discourse: \u2018The priority has
\nremained the implementation of the measures contained in the \u2018\u2018six-pack\u2019\u2019 and \u2018\u2018two-pack\u2019\u2019
\nproposals\u2019 (Council Directorate for Economic Policy Official 2013). And again,
\nGermany\u2019s ideational leadership in framing policy solutions was observed to be
\npivotal here: \u2018There is an understanding amongst member states that budget
\ndiscipline has to be ensured before more financial support can be offered. This
\nis also a German insistence\u2019 (Council Directorate for Economic Policy Official,
\n2013). Moreover, while the ECB internally called for a \u2018quantum leap\u2019 in
\nintegration within EMU, this was strictly interpreted in terms of \u2018further
\nstrengthening the budgetary discipline of the euro area Member States\u2019 (ECB
\n2012:8). <\/p>\n

When discussing
\nthe reform solutions for implementation over the long-term (five years and
\nmore), there was a shift in the discourse of the Towards a Genuine Economic
\nand Monetary Union<\/em> report towards the language of supranationalism.
\nHowever, these framing devices were only reflective of a limited reform
\nambition. For example, the report mentions the possibility of gradually
\ndeveloping a \u2018fiscal capacity\u2019, which could help \u2018cushion the impact of
\ncountry-specific shocks\u2019 and \u2018prevent contagion across the euro area\u2019 (European
\nCouncil 2012, 9). Yet the precise form that any fiscal capacity should take
\nwithin the euro area was left vague, with the report acknowledging that \u2018the
\nexact conditions and thresholds for the activation of transfers would need to
\nbe studied carefully\u2019 (European Council 2012, 11). Moreover, it was also
\nemphasised that the development of a fiscal capacity within the eurozone should \u2018not lead to\u00a0permanent transfers<\/em>\u00a0between countries\u2019 and that this
\nprocess should occur \u2018without resorting to the mutualisation of
\nsovereign debt\u2019 (European Council 2012, 10-12). Tellingly, within the
\nsubsequent Conclusions of the December 2012 European Council, any mention of a
\nfiscal capacity or shock absorption function for EMU was omitted, along with
\nplans for debt-mutualisation (European Council \u00a02012a). <\/p>\n

In the
\ncoordinative discourse, officials were able to account for the limited ambition
\nshown in framing supranational solutions to the eurozone crisis by pointing
\ntowards a mixture of sovereignty concerns and issues of moral hazard amongst
\nmember states. For example, one official highlighted the constraining influence
\nof these national interest ideas on integration within EMU: <\/p>\n

A degree of debt mutualisation or financial risk sharing could, in
\ntheory, help lower borrowing costs amongst the periphery member states and help
\nward off pressure from the financial markets\u2026 but
\nit effectively means the transfer of sovereignty, at least to some extent. That
\nis the biggest obstacle: that is what it is all about. In the end it comes down
\nto sovereignty and money (Council Directorate for Economic Policy
\nOfficial 2013).<\/p>\n

Similar ideas were
\nraised by one official who, when asked to comment on the probability of
\nsecuring supranational fiscal integration, answered candidly: \u2018I think it is not very probable because of state
\nsovereignty concerns\u2019 (Advisor to the Cabinet of the European Council President
\n2014). The official argued that this is because a \u2018fiscal union with tax powers
\ngoing
\nto the European Union level would be completely turning upside down the way the
\nUnion is currently running\u2019 (Advisor to
\nthe Cabinet of the European Council President 2014).
\nA separate official also drew attention to the importance of \u2018concerns of moral
\nhazard\u2019, predominantly amongst the \u2018core member states who want to be able to
\ninfluence the periphery member states\u2019 debt situation\u2019 (Member of the Cabinet for the European Council
\nPresident 2014). <\/p>\n

There were also discussions in the Towards a Genuine Economic and
\nMonetary Union<\/em> report concerning the development of a
\nflanking \u2018political union\u2019 aspect, although again the supranational framing of
\nthe discourse was lacking in ambition.\u00a0 In
\norder to underpin the \u2018democratic legitimacy and accountability\u2019 of decision
\nmaking the report called for the \u2018the involvement of the European Parliament as
\nregards accountability for decisions taken at the European level\u2019, while at the
\nsame time \u2018maintaining the pivotal role of national parliaments, as
\nappropriate\u2019 (European Council 2012, 16-17). The promise to maintain a
\n\u2018pivotal\u2019 role for national parliaments, even in the event of a vertical
\ntransfer of powers to the European level, would appear to stem from an
\nobservation made in the report that \u2018decisions on national budgets are at the
\nheart of Member States\u2019 parliamentary democracies\u2019 (European Council 2012, 16).
\nThe report, then, explicitly divorced itself from supranational political
\nsolutions. In the coordinative discourse, sovereignty concerns were again
\nraised as major hurdle to political integration: \u2018People have different interests and different concepts of what a
\npolitical union would be and as to what sovereign powers should be transferred\u2019\u2014adding
\nthat \u2018we are not even discussing this\u2019 (Council Directorate for Economic
\nPolicy Official 2013).<\/p>\n

In November 2012 the Commission published its own Communication
\noutlining A blueprint for a deep and genuine economic and monetary
\nunion: Launching a European Debate. Converging with the Van Rompuy report, the
\nimmediate framing of policy solutions was restricted to fiscal discipline
\nobjectives:<\/em> \u2018immediate priority should be given to
\nthe full deployment of the new economic governance tools brought by the \u2018\u2018six-pack\u2019\u2019
\nas well as rapid adoption of current Commission proposals such as the \u2018\u2018two-pack\u2019\u2019
\n(Commission 2012, 12). Once again, like the Van Rompuy report, the
\nblueprint did cautiously embed more supranational frames when addressing the
\nlong-term reform agenda for EMU (five years and more). <\/em>This is in keeping
\nwith the EU Commission\u2019s pledge that \u2018steps towards more responsibility and
\neconomic discipline should be combined with more solidarity and financial
\nsupport\u2019 (EU Commission 2012, 11). Accordingly, the framing of solutions
\nshifted to demand more in the way of fiscal solidarity, with tentative ideas
\nfor a \u2018fiscal capacity\u2019 (or \u2018federal budget\u2019) and even \u2018debt mutualisation\u2019
\nschemes being\u00a0 aired as possibilities \u2018to
\nsupport member states in the absorption of economic shocks\u2019 (Commission 2012,
\n25-26). However, these solidarity mechanisms were envisioned as being implemented
\nstrictly after the new arrangements for fiscal discipline have been fully
\nimplemented. Also, the procedural details and legal basis for the solidarity
\nmechanisms was left vague, with proposal covering options from \u2018contractual
\narrangements\u2019 to an \u2018insurance\u2019 type system. <\/em>As one official commented: \u2018I
\nthink there needs to be some ingredients of fiscal union. It\u2019s not entirely
\nclear which ones and to what extent; there are different views and these are
\ntricky questions\u2019 (Senior Fiscal Policy Advisor in DG ECFIN 2013).
\nMoreover, the blueprint also shied away from committing itself to any process
\nof supranational political integration, with the EU Commission arguing that the
\n\u2018t<\/em>he Lisbon Treaty has perfected the EU\u2019s unique model of supranational
\ndemocracy\u2019 (Commission 2012, 35).\u00a0 <\/p>\n

In June 2015, the
\nPresident of the Commission, in close cooperation with the Presidents of the
\nCouncil, the ECB, the Eurogroup and the European Parliament, presented the
\nso-called \u2018Five Presidents\u2019 Report\u2019 entitled Completing Europe\u2019s Economic and Monetary Union<\/em>. It is notable that
\nin the updated report the framing of policy solutions for fiscal integration
\nwas even less ambitious than it had been in earlier institutional reports
\ndrafted during earlier periods of the crisis. <\/em>Apart from repeating the
\nneed to improve compliance with the new rules contained in the \u2018six-pack\u2019,
\n\u2018two-pack\u2019 and Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance, there were no
\ninstitutional innovations suggested for implementation over the short-term.
\nInstead<\/em>, intergovernmental fiscal discipline was again framed as the
\npriority solution\u2014with repeated
\nreferences made to \u2018responsible budgetary policies\u2019 (Commission 2015, 14). The
\nreport also warned that \u2018every Member State must stick to the rules, or the
\ncredibility of this framework is at risk\u2019 (Commission 2015, 14-15).<\/p>\n

\u00a0In terms of the framing of solutions over the longer-term
\n(five years or more), previous references to a \u2018fiscal capacity\u2019 and limited
\nforms of debt mutualisation were completely omitted. Instead, the Five
\nPresidents tentatively floated the idea of a \u2018euro area-wide fiscal
\nstabilisation function\u2019 (Commission 2015, 14-15). Postponed strictly for \u2018in
\nthe longer term\u2019, the development of such a\u00a0
\nfunction is envisioned as the culmination of a process of \u2018convergence\u2019
\nand \u2018further pooling\u2019 of decision-making on national budgets (Commission 2015,
\n14-155).\u00a0 The report also cautioned that
\n\u2018it should not lead to permanent transfers between countries\u2019 and that efforts
\nshould be made to \u2018guarantee it is consistent with the existing EU fiscal framework\u2019
\n(Commission 2015, 15). Tellingly the report was also explicit that \u2018the exact design of such
\neuro area stabilisers requires more in-depth work\u2019 (Commission 2015, 14). As
\npart of the Commission Presidents\u2019 2015 \u2018State of the Union\u2019 address, he argued
\nfor \u2018a more effective and democratic system of economic and fiscal
\nsurveillance\u2019 (Commission 2015a). However, there was again a noticeable lack of
\nprogress on political union. <\/em>While the report affirmed \u2018a key role
\nfor the European Parliament and national Parliaments\u2019, practical steps to
\nensure the democratic legitimacy of decision making were limited to proposals
\nto consolidate the external representation of the euro and the integration
\nintergovernmental solutions (i.e. Treaty on Stability, Coordination and
\nGovernance) within the EU legal framework (Commission 2015, 17-18).<\/p>\n

Framing in Context <\/h2>\n

The
\ndominant framing activities uncovered need to be understood in the context of
\nthe wider EMU policy environment. One of the key
\nfoundations of EMU was the ideational consensus reached in Europe on neoliberal
\neconomic principles in the 1980\u2019s (McNamara 1998). However, while there
\ndeveloped a relative consensus that monetary policy would function in
\naccordance with neoliberal principles, very little thought was given during the
\ndeliberations at Maastricht on the 1992 Treaty
\non European Union (TEU) as to the possibility of accompanying these
\nintegration steps with progress towards a supranational fiscal union. As Verdun
\ncommented:\u00a0 \u2018Fiscal policy harmonisation
\nwas just simply one step too far; there was no support for a transfer of
\nsovereignty over these matters to the European level\u2019 (Verdun 1998, 122). From
\nan early stage, therefore, political necessity dictated that fiscal policy
\nwould remain firmly in the intergovernmental realm. Yet from the perspective of
\nunderpinning EMU with an institutional framework that is in keeping with
\nneoliberal ideas of \u2018sound money\u2019 and \u2018sound finance\u2019 (Dyson 2002), European
\neconomic and monetary integration was not completed at Maastricht. It was against this backdrop that the then German Minister
\nfor finance, Theo Waigel, advanced a proposal for a rules-based \u2018Stability Pact
\nfor Europe\u2019 in 1996. In summary, owning to the political constraints preventing
\nfiscal supranationalism, coupled with the importation of neoliberal ideas,
\nintergovernmental fiscal discipline became institutionalised at heart of EMU
\nearly on. <\/p>\n

Since
\nits formation, the course of EU fiscal governance reform has been characterised
\nby a strong \u2018path-dependency\u2019 (Pierson 1996). In fact, in view of the
\npath-dependent constraints of the political environment, on top of the
\nprevailing neoliberal ideational consensus, the rules-based framework for EU
\nfiscal governance was never seriously challenged by European leaders throughout
\nthe first ten years of the single currency area (see Heipertz and Verdun 2011. While the onset of the eurozone crisis had the
\npotential to represent a \u2018critical juncture\u2019 in the path for EMU integration
\n(Bulmer 1994), the revival of concerns amongst member states over sovereignty
\nand moral hazard have continued to render the intergovernmental structure of
\nEMU a political necessity. However, although the minimal structure of EMU
\nremains a manifestation of different conceptions of national interest, the
\nprevailing neoliberal ideology has simultaneously continued to condition
\nperceptions as to the efficacy of the SGP rules-based framework for fiscal
\ndiscipline.<\/p>\n

Thus,
\nwhile French President Nicolas Sarkozy, in tandem with the international
\ncommunity, was seen to be influential in leading a brief resurgence of more <\/em>Keynesian<\/em> oriented demand
\nstimulus during the early stages of the crisis, European leaders defended the
\ncontinued application of the SGP as the overarching framework for EU fiscal
\ngovernance. The dramatic shift in early 2010 from \u2018Anglo-Saxon\u2019 external
\nexcesses to the internal vulnerabilities within the eurozone only exaggerated
\nthe path-dependent effect of competing national interests amongst member states
\nwhile reinforcing the reversion to neoliberal solutions. \u00a0First, policy makers were responding with a degree of shock
\nand panic to a crisis of potentially \u2018existential proportions\u2019 (as termed by a
\nMember of the Cabinet for the European Council President, 2014). Operating in
\nthis environment of crisis, diagnosing the crisis in behavioural terms as
\nresulting from fiscal profligacy and offering intergovernmental reform
\nsolutions limited to strengthening the SGP would have been both intellectually
\nand politically attractive. Not only were these
\npolicy frames fully in line with the
\nneoliberal <\/em>logic of \u2018sound\u00a0money\u00a0<\/em>and
\nfinance\u2019 enshrined since Maastricht (Dyson 2002), but they could also be implemented
\nvia secondary legislation under the current legal basis provided by the SGP
\nframework. Moreover, buttressed by its economic weight and its considerable
\nstructural power within the EMU set-up, Germany was also increasingly in a
\nstrong position to provide ideational leadership in framing neoliberal
\nsolutions to the crisis. This can be contrasted with France who, as the crisis
\nprogressed, was forced to abandon more Keynesian solutions in favour of
\nGermany\u2019s more limited fiscal discipline objectives. <\/p>\n

Conclusion <\/h2>\n

The intensification
\nof the crisis within the eurozone brought with it a marked intensification of
\nintergovernmental policy coordination within EMU. As the crisis progressed, the
\nresponse by European leaders was to adopt problem and solution frames
\nsupporting intergovernmental fiscal discipline. Importantly, these frames were
\nintellectually attractive as they were fully consistent with the neoliberal
\nfoundations underpinning EMU governance. Also, these frames were politically
\nsimple to express as they could be implemented in full under the pre-existing SGP
\nlegal framework. While there was a partial shift in the discourse towards
\nsupranationalism following the normalisation of the crisis, these discourses
\nwere always reflective of a limited reform ambition. In this context, a supranational
\nframing of the crisis was found to be limited by constraining ideas of national
\ninterest concerning state sovereignty and issues moral hazard. Germany was also
\nable to draw on its economic weight and bargaining power to provide ideational
\nleadership, further directing the reform agenda towards intergovernmental fiscal
\ndiscipline. <\/p>\n

In relation to the
\nwider literature, these findings are broadly consistent with \u2018new intergovernmentalist\u2019 claims that
\nsupranationalism is unlikely to be obtained in the post Maastricht integration
\nphase. This study though has helped develop a deeper political
\nunderstanding of the current integration impasse in EU fiscal governance, and
\nof the ideational and institutional path-dependencies working to limit the
\nscope for far reaching reform. This analysis has also contributed to existing
\ncritical analysis on European integration by emphasising the central importance
\nof neoliberal ideology in guiding framing preferences. Finally, one major
\nconsequence of these findings is that the imbalance between monetary and fiscal
\nintegration within the EMU framework will likely remain. However, further
\ninvestigation will be needed to assess the long-term sustainability of running a
\nsingle currency area with a decentralised system of fiscal policy.<\/p>\n

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Worlf, G.B. 2012. \u2018\u2018A budget for Europe\u2019s Monetary Union.\u2019\u2019 Bruegel
\nPolicy Contribution, Issue 12\/22.<\/p>\n

Wyplosz, C .2009.\u00a0 \u2018\u2018The Euro\u2019s Finest Hour?\u2019\u2019\u00a0 IMF Opinion,\u00a0
\nJune 09. <\/p>\n

Cited
\nPersonal Interviews <\/strong><\/p>\n

Council
\nof the European Union <\/strong><\/p>\n

Council Directorate
\nfor Economic Policy Official. 2013. Interviewed by the author (Brussels, 27th<\/sup>
\nSeptember).<\/p>\n

Senior official in
\nthe unit for economic policy<\/p>\n

Council
\nDirectorate for Economic Policy Official 1. 2013. Interviewed by the author
\n(Brussels, 28th<\/sup> September).<\/p>\n

Official in the unit
\nfor economic Policy<\/p>\n

Advisor to the
\nCabinet of the European Council President. 2014. Interviewed by the author
\n(Brussels, 4th<\/sup> April).<\/p>\n

Senior advisor to
\nthe President<\/p>\n

Member of the
\nCabinet for the European Council President. 2014. Interviewed by the author
\n(Brussels, 2nd <\/sup>April).<\/p>\n

Senior advisor to
\nthe President on economic and euro area issues<\/p>\n

EU
\nCommission<\/strong><\/p>\n

Secretariat
\nOfficial in DG ECFIN 1. 2013. Interviewed by the author (Brussels, 26th<\/sup>
\nSeptember).<\/p>\n

Part of the
\nCommission provided Secretariat<\/p>\n

Secretariat
\nOfficial in DG ECFIN 2. 2013. \u00a0Interviewed by the author (Brussels, 25th<\/sup>
\nSeptember).<\/p>\n

Part of the
\nCommission provided Secretariat <\/p>\n

Official in DG
\nECFIN (2013) Interviewed by the author (Brussels, 25th<\/sup> September). <\/p>\n

Fiscal policy
\nofficial<\/p>\n

Policy Advisor in
\nDG ECFIN (2013) Interviewed by the author (Brussels, 24th<\/sup>
\nSeptember).<\/p>\n

Adviser on policy
\ncoordination and strategic planning\u00a0 <\/p>\n

Senior Fiscal
\nPolicy Advisor in DG ECFIN (2013) Interviewed by the author (Brussels, 23rd<\/sup>
\nSeptember).<\/p>\n

Senior fiscal
\npolicy advisor <\/p>\n

Senior
\nDirector in DG ECFIN (2013) Interviewed by the author (Brussels,
\n26th September).<\/p>\n

Senior official in
\ncharge of coordination work in DG ECFIN <\/p>\n

\n

[1] [name deleted for peer review]. <\/p>\n

[2] Informed by the wider \u2018new institutionalism\u2019 literature, this broader theoretical exploration charts the ideational<\/em>\u00a0as well\u00a0institutional path dependences<\/em> working to limit the scope for reform within EMU (Bulmer 1994; Pierson 1996; Hay, 2006).<\/p>\n<\/div>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

\u00a0Framing the Eurozone Crisis: A Case of Limited Ambition Abstract The eurozone crisis provided a new opportunity for obtaining supranational fiscal integration within the European single currency area. This study applies a framing analysis to the crisis discourse that emerged from within the European Union\u2019s (EU) intergovernmental forums involved in fiscal policy coordination. As well […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":5,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[7418,5921,7536],"tags":[7419,3319,5337,5587,5586,249],"class_list":["post-37586","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-affordable-essay-writing-service","category-economics-examples","category-essay-examples-economics-examples","tag-academic-paper","tag-assignment-help","tag-dissertation-writing","tag-essay-writing","tag-online-tutoring","tag-write-my-paper"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.colapapers.com\/us\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/37586","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.colapapers.com\/us\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.colapapers.com\/us\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.colapapers.com\/us\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/5"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.colapapers.com\/us\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=37586"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/www.colapapers.com\/us\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/37586\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.colapapers.com\/us\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=37586"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.colapapers.com\/us\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=37586"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.colapapers.com\/us\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=37586"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}