{"id":45723,"date":"2021-09-02T08:07:37","date_gmt":"2021-09-02T08:07:37","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/essays.homeworkacetutors.com\/2021\/09\/effect-of-social-media-on-turkish-politics\/"},"modified":"2021-09-02T08:07:37","modified_gmt":"2021-09-02T08:07:37","slug":"effect-of-social-media-on-turkish-politics","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.colapapers.com\/us\/effect-of-social-media-on-turkish-politics\/","title":{"rendered":"Effect of Social Media on Turkish Politics"},"content":{"rendered":"
\n

Social media and their participatory role in Turkish politics<\/h4>\n

Abstract<\/h3>\n

Social movements have been definitely affected by information and communication technologies (ICTs) in the digital age. Today, they are mostly organized through social media where individuals can communicate easily with each other. In Turkey under an authoritarian regime where mass media have been increasingly controlled, regulated, and censored by the government, social media has been widely used<\/a>, especially by educated urban youth, to oppose the government by organizing protests. Social media plays a crucial role in Turkish politics, as not only opponents of the government use them, but also government officials and supporters are very much active on social media. Young generations used social media to organize the Gezi park protests in 2013 which have had a great impact on Turkish politics. There have also been whistle-blowers on social media who have been followed by millions of people, including Russian government officials. Turkish government\u2019s efforts to increasingly regulate social media have not succeeded since Turkish society has become more and more tech-savvy in order to have access to social media.<\/p>\n

1. Introduction<\/h2>\n

In Turkey under an authoritarian regime where mass media has been increasingly controlled, regulated, and censored by the government, e.g. censored media coverage during Roboski massacre in 2011, the Gezi Park protests and corruption scandal in 2013, Ankara and Suru\u00e7 bombings in 2015 etc., social media, as diverse as Facebook, Twitter, Youtube, and Ek\u015fiS\u00f6zl\u00fck (Sour Dictionary), have been widely used, especially by educated urban youth (92% of students in the Gezi Park Protests (Konda Ara\u015ft\u0131rma ve Dan\u0131\u015fmanl\u0131k, 2014)) to create groups where they can share their political opinions, to organize protests such as \u0130nternetime Dokunma!<\/em> (Don\u2019t Touch my Internet!) and the Gezi Park protests, to denounce corruption by sharing the wiretaps of the president Erdo\u011fan and his family, and to struggle against the islamo-conservative politics of the AK Party (Justice and Development Party) government that has been ruling the country since 2002. <\/p>\n

Besides, a participatory role<\/a> has been increasingly attributed to social media since not only opponents of the government, opposition politicians, journalists, and anonymous accounts that share accurate information about Erdogan\u2019s political and daily life use it to express their voice, but also pro-government supporters, the ruling party officers and deputies, and even AK trolls who are paid by the government to constantly circulate pro-government opinions on social media are getting more and more active in the digital world. <\/p>\n

Nevertheless, the government has been enlarging its control
\nover social media, and new laws are made or
\nexisting laws are amended concerning the Internet freedom that cause arbitrary
\nblockings of YouTube and Twitter and by prosecuting many people due to
\ncriticizing Erdogan on social media.<\/p>\n

Therefore, this paper, after elucidating
\nbriefly the relationship between information and communication technologies
\n(ICTs) and social movements, aims to explain the Turkish political experience
\nwith social media. Firstly, it reveals social media usage in Turkey. Secondly, the
\nattitude of young generations towards social media is being described. Later,
\nit shows the effect of social media on the organization of Gezi Park protests.
\nIt further informs about anonymous social media users and their role in Turkish
\npolitics. Finally it demonstrates increasing state regulation on the Internet
\nand social media. <\/p>\n

2. Information and communication technologies (ICTs) and social movements<\/h2>\n

In contemporary societies due to the increasing usage of the
\nInternet, and especially of ICTs, circumstances of political participation and
\nengagement have been changing. As Gladwell (2010) claims, nowadays activists
\nand protesters are \u2018defined by their tools\u2019.<\/p>\n

Even though the basic rules and norms of political activity
\nstill prevail, ICTs have been changing the organizational patterns of local and
\nglobal politics (Palfrey & Gasser, 2013). The phenomenon of networked
\ncitizen results in the constant interaction between public and private spheres
\nof political identities in various political milieus(Loader & Mercea,
\n2011). Therefore, ICTs play a key role in the processes of social and political
\nchanges in various countries by allowing
\nindividuals to co-produce and co-distribute information before, during, and
\nafter political engagement (Bennett, 2012; Shirky, 2011). <\/p>\n

However, it should be noted that social media occupy the role of
\n\u2018facilitators of protest rather than causes\u2019 (Wolfsfeld et al., 2013:120). They
\nare intrinsically related to both the organizational and cultural structures of
\nsocial movements and the conditions by which these movements are structured
\n(Tufekci, 2014a & Tufekci, 2014d). Besides, these movements are
\nfundamentally critical of modern institutions that are sunk into the
\naccusations of corruption and repression, and
\nthey do not have leaders to coordinate and organize mobilization processes
\n(Tufekci, 2014d; Tufekci, 2014a). <\/p>\n

As a consequence of technological developments and
\ndecreasing economic costs of accessing the Internet, social media furnish
\npeople a chance to actively participate in the production and the circulation
\nof political news and opinions that were previously under the hegemony of political
\nparties and mass media organizations (Loader & Mercea, 2011; Bryer, 2011).
\nThe mutual connection between individuals, for instance at the moment of
\npolitical crises when regimes try to stop online information flow, assists them
\nto employ necessary measures to sustain their connectivity (Howard &
\nAgarwal et al., 2011). For example, as it was the case in the Asiana Airlines
\nincident, information created by the users of digital media can be the only
\nsource for the broadcasting of certain events to larger public (Kim et al.,
\n2015).<\/p>\n

By decentralizing the process of news production and
\nlimiting the control of so called gate-keepers, they allow the wider public to interact and converse among each
\nother while also creating another scale of the importance of information since
\naccessing these created social milieus becomes more significant than accessing
\ninformation (Meier, 2012). The access of people to information created and
\nbroadcasted in the digital space by following certain e-mail lists and social
\nmedia profiles and pages therefore is not the same for each user as the
\nvisibility and accessibility of information in these milieus are restricted to
\nsome people who are distinguished by the others with their advantages of being
\na sort of member of these groups (Kavada, 2015). <\/p>\n

On the other hand, social media do not prevent the
\naccumulation of information by a few entities, such as Facebook, Twitter,
\nYouTube etc., which are the main actors in this new phenomenon (Loader & Mercea,
\n2011). In addition, activists, politicians and journalists that were already
\nengaged in political debates and causes are the ones who use social media most
\nactively, and users of social media do not completely give up following media
\ncoverage produced by big media enterprises (Loader & Mercea, 2011).<\/p>\n

The Internet, according to Kaplan & Haenlein (2010:60),
\nis \u2018a platform to facilitate information exchange between users\u2019. Apart from
\nbeing platforms of strengthening existing social networks and aiding
\nindividuals to join other networks or create new groups, social media,
\nmoreover, are platforms where new kind of decentralized and non-hierarchical
\ngroupings are formed (Kelly Garrett, 2006). <\/p>\n

Besides, by facilitating communication and coordination of
\nactors engaged in political activity they provide flexibility for the
\norganization of social movements (Bennett &Segerberg, 2011). For instance,
\nas Howard & Hussain (2011) and Howard & Agarwal et al. (2011) argue,
\nalthough opposition and dissent against authoritarian regimes had existed for
\nmany years in Arab countries, the adoption of social media during the Arab
\nspring and consequently the individualization of information flow were the main
\nreasons for the success of respective movements since people used them to build
\npolitical and social networks and to organize demonstrations simultaneously in
\nvarious places.<\/p>\n

On the other hand, according to Howard & Hussain
\n(2011:47), although the Internet in these countries was only available to ten
\nto twenty percent of their population, which were \u2018an elite made up of educated
\nprofessionals, young entrepreneurs, urban dwellers, and government workers\u2019 and
\nas a result an influential part of these societies, the strongest and toughest
\nmovements took place in the countries where people were relatively more
\nnetworked, and their technical knowledge about social media was relatively
\nhigher. Moreover, social media can be the only available means to public when
\nconfronting political regimes in authoritarian countries (Howard & Hussain,
\n2011). For instance, they played a crucial role in Iran where traditional
\nopposition methods are completely suppressed by the government(Eaves, 2009). As
\na result, the Internet has acquired a controversial role against political
\nelites that rule with the methods and ideas of non-digital era (Howard & Agarwal
\net al., 2011). <\/p>\n

At the end, although the size of an individual\u2019s social
\nnetwork affects his or her possibilities to follow diverse events and issues
\n(Boulianne, 2015), it should be argued that social media allow individuals
\nto personalize information in the digital space and distribute it with others
\nwhile restructuring the role of NGOs as facilitators rather than as direct
\nactors (Bennett &Segerberg, 2011; Shirky, 2011).<\/p>\n

3. The relationship between social media and politics in Turkey<\/h2>\n

3.1. Social media usage in Turkey<\/h3>\n

Turkey, according to Howard (2010) has a significantly
\nonline society that uses social media to follow news and interact with each
\nother. Howard (2010:96) further claims that \u2018Turkey\u2019s political parties are
\nvery active online, information technologies are prevalent, the country has a
\ndemocratic history\u2019. Saka (2014:418) asserts that \u2018Turkey is one of the top 20
\ncountries for Internet penetration (ranking 11th)\u2019, \u201894 percent of Turkey\u2019s
\nonline population uses Facebook\u2019, and \u2018Turkey has the highest penetration rate
\nin Twitter usage globally as well as being second in the world for check-ins on
\nFoursquare\u2019. According to PEW Research Center (2014), in Turkey, 82% of
\nInternet users access the internet daily, 79% of Internet users use social networking
\nsites, and 42% of social networking users share their political opinions on
\nsocial networking sites. Besides, as Tufekci (2014b) and Varnali&Gorgulu
\n(2015) highlight, Twitter with around eleven million users in Turkey, plays the
\nrole of an agora for people to access political information.<\/p>\n

In Turkey, the Internet and social media not only have been
\nincreasingly used by large public, but also mainstream media corporations
\nattempt to be more active online to reconstruct their relationship with people,
\nwho distrust them due to their economic affiliations with the Turkish government
\nand its supporters (Open Society Foundations, 2012). The opposition has been
\nusing social media for a long time and refers
\nthem \u2018as a tool to oppose censorship\u2019 (Tufekci, 2014b) while enforcing their
\nnetworks through WhatsApp, Viber, and Facebook to be politically informed
\nagainst huge media censorship in recent years and to call for demonstrations
\n(Tufekci, 2014c). For example, social media serve minorities, \u2018such as
\nenvironmentalist and leftist political groups\u2019, to organize demonstrations and
\ndenounce discriminations exercised by the government (Open Society Foundations,
\n2012:40). Therefore, in Turkey social media can be considered as a tool to
\nreach news and information that big media corporations do not broadcast and as a
\ntool increasingly crucial for some people\u2019s lives (Tufekci, 2014c).<\/p>\n

Even though politicians, generally, do not interact with
\ntheir followers on social media (Open Society Foundations, 2012), recent online
\nexperiences of the opposition politicians, such as the usage of Eksi Sozluk by
\nthe leader of the main opposition party CHP (Republican People\u2019s Party), and
\nthe usage of Periscope and Facebook by the leader of the pro-Kurdish party HDP
\n(Peoples\u2019 Democratic Party) to answer the questions of people before the
\nelections in 2015 (Es&Hoyng, 2015) can reveal that social media have been
\nprogressively used in an interactive manner by the opposition politicians to
\nreach their audiences due to increasing censorship in mass media.<\/p>\n

Twitter is widely used by government supporters and most of
\nthe deputies and officials of the ruling party too (Tufekci, 2014c). There are
\nvarious examples concerning the interactive usage of social media by the ruling
\nparty deputies, such as the creation of a poll by the Minister of Finance on
\nTwitter for asking people\u2019s opinions about a possible taxation of meteorite
\nfragments found in a village by villagers (Today\u2019s Zaman, 2015).<\/p>\n

3.2. Young generations and social media in Turkey<\/h3>\n

According to PEW Research Center (2014), in Turkey, 60% of
\n18-29 years old use social networking sites. Social media in their political
\nlives play a key role since they do not trust and follow media coverage from
\nbig media corporations (Celik, 2013). As a result, urban youth from middle
\nclass origins, who have been born into the digital world and criticized \u2018as an
\napolitical digital generation\u2019, not only use social media to express their
\ndissent against the AK Party government, but they also use them to organize
\ndemonstrations and to break long existing social boundaries between diverse
\nidentities (Celik, 2013).<\/p>\n

3.3. The role of social media in the Gezi Park protests<\/h3>\n

Although only 13% of the population in Turkey have higher
\neducation level, 60% of Gezi Park protesters had either an undergraduate or a
\ngraduate degree (Konda Arastirma ve Danismanlik, 2014). Besides, students
\nconstituted a relatively big part (37%) of protesters in contrast to their
\nlower representation (7%) in the country\u2019s demographic situation (Konda
\nArastirma ve Danismanlik, 2014). Only 8% of protesters did not have a social
\nmedia account (Konda Arastirma ve Danismanlik, 2014). Thus as opposed to the majority
\nof society (71%) that initially heard about the Gezi Park protests via
\ntelevision, 69% of protesters heard about it for the first time on social media
\n(Konda Arastirma ve Danismanlik, 2014).Finally, people that used social media
\nfor accessing information about protests were critical towards the police
\nviolence and Erdogan in contrast to the supportive attitude towards Erdogan and
\npolice forces of people who followed the news about protests on television
\n(Konda Arastirma ve Danismanlik, 2014).<\/p>\n

Therefore, as Erdogan called Twitter as a scourge (Gursel,
\n2013), \u2018social media played an important role in providing information
\nregarding developments during the protests and for those wishing to express
\ntheir support\u2019 (Amnesty International, 2013:50). According to Tastan (2013),
\nsocial media fuelled the participation of people in the Gezi Park protests.
\nVissers & Stolle (2014) argue that Facebook amplified the mobilization of
\npeople during the Gezi Park protests.<\/p>\n

Saka (2014:420) claims that protesters were already active
\non social media before the beginning of protests. Therefore, Twitter played a
\nkey role in the proliferation of the Gezi Park Protests since the first
\noccupants of the Park adopted it as their tool to distribute the cutting of
\ntrees (Tufekci, 2013). Varnali & Gorgulu (2015) underscore that there was a
\nsignificant increase in the number of daily tweets sent within Turkey from nine
\nmillion to fifteen million during the first day of protests. The contrast
\nbetween the censorship of big media corporations and content circulation on
\nsocial media irritated people, and hence they went out on streets to see what
\nhad been happening and participated in demonstrations (Tufekci, 2013). <\/p>\n

Twitter, during the Gezi Park protests, was considered as an
\nonline platform where people could express their opinions freely and share
\noccurring political events (Varnali & Gorgulu, 2015). Protesters by using
\nsocial media could coordinate spontaneously and broadcast police brutality
\nwhile affirming their presence in protest fields (Tufekci, 2014a). Protesters
\nconstantly shared their activities in the Gezi Park or in other parts of the
\ncountry via Facebook and Twitter (Gole, 2013). For instance, the individual
\nprotest of Erdem Gunduz by standing silently towards Gezi Park got spread
\nthrough Twitter, and the hashtag #duranadam (#standingman) became a worldwide
\ntrend topic (Gursel, 2013). However, not only protesters, but also AK Party
\nsupporters widely used Twitter to express their disapproval for protests and to
\nsupport Erdogan by creating hashtags, as diverse as
\n\u2018#TurkeyStands-BehindThePrimeMinister, #StopLyingCNN,
\n#ReligiousYouthFollowingEachOther\u2019 (Varnali&Gorgulu, 2015:4).<\/p>\n

3.4. The role of @fuatavni_f and others in Turkish politics <\/h3>\n

@fuatavni_f, anonymous whistle-blower who shares accurate
\ninformation about the juridical system, police force, and foreign policy of
\ncurrent Turkish government, has around two million seven hundred nine thousand
\nfollowers on Twitter as of April 18, 2016. His previous account before the
\ncourt order that blocked its access within Turkey, according to Akarcesme
\n(2014), \u2018had reached over 1 million followers\u2019. Besides, since he has been
\nrevealing diverse information about the daily life of the president Erdogan
\n(Gurbuz, 2014), he was identified by Erdogan as one of the members of his team
\n(Akarcesme, 2014).<\/p>\n

Not only people in Turkey follow his Twitter account to
\nlearn what was not said by the government and mainstream media about corruption
\nscandals (Larson, 2014) or the affiliations of the government with rebel
\ngroups, or even with internationally recognized terrorist groups by supplying
\nthem heavy weapons and arms, but also a Russian government officer during a
\npress conference repeated the assertions of Fuatavni that had taken place a
\nmonth before the shooting of the Russian fighter by Turkish military and had
\naccused Erdogan for planning shooting of a Russian fighter to prevent a loss on
\nhis power and influence in the Syrian game (Cumhuriyet Gazetesi, 2015). Apart
\nfrom @fuatavni_f the Turkish government also suffered from many wiretaps, which
\nrevealed corruptive relationships occurred between Erdogan, his family, four
\nministers, and pro-government businessmen shared by two anonymous Twitter
\naccounts @Haramzadeler333 and @Bascalan (Today\u2019s Zaman, 2014).<\/p>\n

3.5. State regulation on the Internet and social media in Turkey<\/h3>\n

In Turkey \u2018censorship is now made easier\u2019 (Ermert,
\n2014).Following the Gezi Park protests and corruption scandals the Internet
\nstarted to be increasingly regulated (Akgul & Kirlidog, 2015). As a
\nconsequence, a new amendment, which was considered as against freedom of speech
\nand privacy on the Internet, was passed in the parliament and approved by the
\nex-president Gul (Akgul & Kirlidog, 2015).<\/p>\n

By repeating that Twitter and YouTube must establish
\nofficial offices in order to sustain their activities in Turkey the Turkish
\ngovernment has been blocking access to Twitter and YouTube many times in recent
\nyears (Akgul & Kirlidog, 2015). Moreover, Turkey was the leader country
\nthat asked Twitter the most removal requests between July and December 2014
\n(Akgul & Kirlidog, 2015; Lubbock, 2015). For instance, @Haramzadeler333 and
\n@Bascalan were blocked following the dissemination of corruption wiretaps
\n(Akgul & Kirlidog, 2015), and in March 2014 \u2018a court order blocked Twitter
\nfor several days\u2019 (BBC Trending, 2014). However, these bans did not cause
\nTwitter users to decrease their online activity, but oppositely increased it
\n(Akgul & Kirlidog, 2015; Farrell, 2014; Saka, 2014; Freedom Research
\nAssociation, 2015), more precisely the volume of tweets doubled following the
\nban of Twitter (Es & Hoyng, 2015).<\/p>\n

According to Es & Hoyng (2015), the AK Party government
\nhas been attempting to sustain their power on social media by creating an army
\nof AK trolls that spontaneously share pro-government information from fake
\naccounts controlled by a few people paid by the government. Besides, around 70
\npeople, so far, have been\u2018prosecuted for insulting the president, Recep Tayyip Erdo\u011fan,
\nan offence punishable by up to four years in prison\u2019 due to their posts on
\nsocial media (Lubbock, 2015). Nevertheless, all these efforts to ban social
\nmedia have been resulted in creating a quite well-informed population on
\ntechnological devices and especially on ICTs (Lubbock, 2015; Yalkin et al.,
\n2014).<\/p>\n

4. Conclusion<\/h2>\n

As a conclusion, it should be stated that social media have
\nbeen adopted by many people in various countries to express their political
\nopinion and to participate in political activities and debates. These people
\nattribute social media a very significant role in their political and social
\nlives as in their opinions political institutions have already lost their
\ncredibility.<\/p>\n

In Turkey social media are considered by wide public as the
\nonly tool to freely express their political opinion. Young generations
\nespecially in urban milieus use them to coordinate and interact with each other
\nin the moments of public dissent and anger towards the government. By
\ncirculating information about demonstrations and police brutality on social
\nmedia Gezi Park protesters could express their anger and inter-communicate
\nduring street clashes with the police. Furthermore, well-known anonymous
\nTwitter accounts, e.g. @fuatavni_f is followed by every one out of five Twitter
\nusers in Turkey, occupy a crucial role in their struggle against the Turkish government
\nand corruption. Finally, although the government hardens access to social media
\nplatforms and the Internet in general, these measures result in improving the
\ntechnological skills of social media users since every time a web-site or
\napplication is blocked more and more people get to know new tools such as VPN
\nproviders to reach them.<\/p>\n

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Social media and their participatory role in Turkish politics Abstract Social movements have been definitely affected by information and communication technologies (ICTs) in the digital age. Today, they are mostly organized through social media where individuals can communicate easily with each other. In Turkey under an authoritarian regime where mass media have been increasingly controlled, […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":3,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[6629,8396,5822],"tags":[5676,5686,5780,5294,5674,5677,5678,6403,4639],"class_list":["post-45723","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-do-my-homework-politics","category-paper-writing-service","category-politics","tag-1500-words-assessment-task","tag-ace-homework-tutors","tag-assignment-homework-help-answers","tag-bishops-writing-bureau","tag-create-a-2-4-page-resource","tag-create-powerpoint-include-harvard-referencing","tag-i-need-completed-essay-in-300-400-words","tag-write-a-3-5pg-paper","tag-write-a-page-assignment"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.colapapers.com\/us\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/45723","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.colapapers.com\/us\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.colapapers.com\/us\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.colapapers.com\/us\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/3"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.colapapers.com\/us\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=45723"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/www.colapapers.com\/us\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/45723\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.colapapers.com\/us\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=45723"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.colapapers.com\/us\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=45723"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.colapapers.com\/us\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=45723"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}