{"id":45746,"date":"2024-10-09T22:02:07","date_gmt":"2024-10-09T22:02:07","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/essays.homeworkacetutors.com\/2024\/10\/role-of-asean-in-conflict-management\/"},"modified":"2024-10-09T22:02:07","modified_gmt":"2024-10-09T22:02:07","slug":"role-of-asean-in-conflict-management","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.colapapers.com\/us\/role-of-asean-in-conflict-management\/","title":{"rendered":"Role of ASEAN in \ufeffConflict Management"},"content":{"rendered":"
\n

The \u201cASEAN Way\u201d<\/h3>\n

A Critical Assessment of the Role of ASEAN inConflict Management in Southeast Asia<\/h4>\n

Introduction<\/h2>\n

The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) has been at the forefront of managing conflicts<\/a> in Southeast Asia (SEA) since its creation in 1967. For fifty years, it has maintained peace and security in the region, and has been touted as the most successful inter-governmental organization in this respect.[1]<\/a> However, the role played by ASEAN and the nature of its contribution to conflict management in SEA remains widely debated. ASEAN is criticised for having a weak mandate, and for not playing a decisive role in managing conflicts between its member-states.[2]<\/a><\/p>\n

Some pundits claim that ASEAN has contributed to
\nconflict avoidance, but has failed to resolve actual conflicts.[3]<\/a> The
\nfailure to directly address and ultimately resolve conflicts between its
\nmember-states undermines ASEAN\u2019s credibility as a regional body with conflict
\nmanagement responsibilities. On the other hand, several reputable observers have
\nnoted that ASEAN is not intended to formally act as a third-party mediator unless
\nit is requested to do so by member-states.[4]<\/a>
\nRather, the Association is intended to serve as a vehicle to promote better relations
\namong its members.[5]<\/a>\n<\/p>\n

In light of such contending perspectives, this essay
\nargues that a common and accurate understanding of ASEAN\u2019s actual and potential
\nrole in conflict management can be achieved through an examination of the
\norganisation\u2019s mandate and mechanisms. This paper will clarify the role played
\nby ASEAN and provide an objective assessment of ASEAN\u2019s performance in conflict
\nmanagement. <\/p>\n

The essay begins with an examination of key ASEAN
\ndocuments which provide foundational authority and guidance for the
\nestablishment of mechanisms for conflict management. This is followed by a
\ncritical discussion of the theory behind the creation of ASEAN and an analysis
\nof how the Association has utilised available mechanisms in managing conflicts
\nin the region. The analysis will be informed and illustrated by examples of bilateral
\ndisputes in SEA where ASEAN has played a role in conflict management. The paper
\nwill conclude with a summary of pertinent findings and a brief assessment of
\nthe implications of the study.<\/p>\n

ASEAN Conflict Management: Mandate and Mechanisms<\/h2>\n

ASEAN\u2019s mandate and mechanisms for conflict management
\nare drawn from seven key ASEAN documents.[6]<\/a> An
\nexamination of these documents will clarify what ASEAN does and could do in
\nterms of conflict management in the region.<\/p>\n

The ASEAN Declaration<\/h3>\n

TheASEAN
\nDeclaration was adopted on 08 August 1967.[7]<\/a>
\nOtherwise known as the Bangkok Declaration, it outlines the aims and purposes
\nthat the regional cooperation intends to achieve, as well as processes and
\nmechanisms that shall be established to carry out these objectives. The ASEAN Declaration
\nestablishes ASEAN as an Association for regional cooperation among the
\ncountries of Southeast Asia. Cooperation is aimed at the \u201ceconomic, social,
\ncultural, technical, educational and other fields, and in the promotion of
\nregional peace and stability through abiding respect for justice, rule of law
\nand adherence to the principles of the United Nations Charter\u201d.[8]<\/a><\/p>\n

The reference to ASEAN\u2019s approach to conflict management
\nwas broadly highlighted in the Association\u2019s desire to \u201cestablish a firm
\nfoundation for common action to promote regional cooperation that contributes
\ntowards peace, progress and prosperity in the region\u201d.[9]<\/a> In
\nessence, the document lays the foundation of the role ASEAN plays in managing
\nconflicts between its member-states in SEA.<\/p>\n

The Declaration of ASEAN Concord<\/h3>\n

The so-called \u201cformative years\u201d from 1967 to 1976 led to
\nthe signing of the Declaration of ASEAN Concord on 24 February 1976 at Bali,
\nIndonesia.[10]<\/a>
\nIn pursuit of political stability, the \u2018ASEAN
\nConcord<\/em>\u2019 contains general principles and programme of action for ASEAN
\nmember-states to adopt as a framework for cooperation and improvement of ASEAN mechanisms
\nfor conflict management.<\/p>\n

Notably, the dominant principles advocated in this
\ndocument are the exclusive reliance on peaceful processes in the settlement of
\nintra-regional differences; mutual respect and benefit, self-determination;
\nsovereign equality; and non-interference in the internal affairs of nations.[11]<\/a> In
\naddition, the establishment of a Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality (ZOPFAN)
\nis also pursued.[12]<\/a>
\nThese formative years saw the development of a more vigilant ASEAN,
\nparticularly in its approach to regional peace and security.<\/p>\n

The Treaty of Amity and Cooperation<\/h3>\n

The
\nTreaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC) was also adopted in Bali in February
\n1976.[13]<\/a>
\nSigned by the Heads of States of ASEAN\u2019s founding members,[14]<\/a> TAC
\nprovides guidelines on conflict management, particularly the \u201cpacific
\nsettlement of disputes\u201d between its members.[15]<\/a> TAC
\noutlines fundamental principles that guide relations between the signatories,
\nincluding: non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries;
\npeaceful settlement of disputes; and the renunciation of the threat or use of
\nforce. [16]<\/a><\/p>\n

Adherence
\nto these critical considerations was evident in TAC Chapter 4, Article 13, \u2018Pacific Settlement of Disputes<\/em>\u2019, which stipulates
\nthat signatory member-states: \u201c[S]hall have the determination and good faith to
\nprevent disputes from arising. In case disputes on matters directly affecting
\nthem should arise, they shall refrain from the threat or use of force and shall
\nat all times settle such disputes among themselves through friendly
\nnegotiations\u201d.[17]<\/a> This
\nbasically determines how member-states should behave in situations where
\ndisputes may arise or have risen between them.<\/p>\n

In addition to settling disputes through regional
\nprocesses, the TAC provides for the creation of a \u2018High Council\u2019<\/em>,[18]<\/a>
\ncomposed of representatives at the ministerial level with the role of taking
\n\u201ccognizance of the existence of disputes or situations likely to disturb
\nregional peace and harmony\u201d.[19]<\/a> Further,
\nArticle 15 of TAC designates the \u2018High
\nCouncil\u2019<\/em> authority to recommend among disputing parties settlement of disputes
\nthrough (e.g. UN) mediation, inquiry or conciliation.[20]<\/a>
\nHowever, upon agreement of the parties in dispute, the \u2018High Council<\/em>\u2019 can in itself \u201cconstitute into a committee of
\nmediation, inquiry or conciliation\u201d [21]<\/a>
\nand resolve the conflict at the regional level.<\/p>\n

Salient to the aforementioned articles of TAC are
\nprescribed limitations on the role of the \u2018High
\nCouncil<\/em>\u2019 in dispute settlement. Article 16 emphasizes that Articles 14 and
\n15 cannot be applied unless parties to the dispute agree to their application.[22]<\/a> Explicitly
\nstated, mediation can only be employed in a dispute if parties to the dispute
\nagree to bring the matter to the \u2018High
\nCouncil<\/em>\u2019 for settlement. In effect, this provision significantly constrains
\nASEAN\u2019s conduct of conflict management between its member-states. As time
\nprogressed, further policies were adopted by ASEAN, which saw its role in the
\nregion continue to evolve.<\/p>\n

The Rules of Procedure of the High Council<\/h3>\n

On July 2001, during the 34th ASEAN Ministerial Meeting
\nin Hanoi, member-states adopted the Rules of Procedure of the High Council of
\nthe TAC in Southeast Asia.[23]<\/a>
\nThe Rules of Procedure consist of ten parts covering twenty-five \u2018Rules<\/em>\u2019 that apply to the \u2018High Council<\/em>\u2019 and to any of its working groups
\nin pursuance of its conflict management role.<\/p>\n

These Rules of Procedure prescribe the \u2018High Council\u2019<\/em> composition and designation
\nof the Chairperson; initiation of dispute settlement procedures; convening of proceedings
\nat the meetings of the \u2018High Council<\/em>\u2019;
\ndecision-making; as well as procedures for making amendments to the \u2018Rules<\/em>\u2019.[24]<\/a> Notable
\namong the procedures is a recurring thematic emphasis on expressed written communications
\nby parties in dispute when invoking the dispute settlement procedure. Of
\ncrucial importance is the written confirmation and \u201cagreement on the
\nprocedures\u201d from disputing parties by the Chairperson before the dispute
\nsettlement process can proceed.[25]<\/a> Moreover,
\nall decisions made at or by the \u2018High Council<\/em>\u2019
\nshall be through consensus and any amendment to these \u2018Rules<\/em>\u2019 shall be unanimously agreed by all the signatory
\nmember-states.[26]<\/a><\/p>\n

The Declaration of the ASEAN Concord II (Bali Concord II)<\/h3>\n

The Declaration of ASEAN Concord II, adopted in October
\n2003 during the 9th ASEAN Summit in Bali, demonstrates ASEAN\u2019s commitment to collaboration
\nand development within its member-states.[27]<\/a>
\nThe \u2018Bali Concord II<\/em>\u2019 reaffirms the Association\u2019s
\nresolve in pursuing fundamental values and principles enshrined in its
\ndeclarations, treaties and other key documents since 1967. The document reaffirms
\nthe importance of adhering to the principles of non-interference and consensus
\nin ASEAN cooperation and reiterates that TAC is an effective code of conduct
\nfor relations among governments.[28]<\/a><\/p>\n

ASEAN\u2019s commitment in upholding cultural diversity and
\nsocial harmony is evidenced by the ten \u2018Declarations<\/em>\u2019
\nmade in this second \u2018Concord<\/em>\u2019. Direct
\nreference to the significant role of ASEAN in conflict management is made in
\nDeclaration 4, which resolves \u201cto settle long-standing disputes through
\npeaceful means.[29]<\/a>
\nDeclaration 5 similarly promotes TAC as \u201ca diplomatic instrument for the
\npromotion of peace and stability in the region\u201d.[30]<\/a>
\nAside from endorsing the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) as the primary means to
\nenhance political and security cooperation in the wider ASIA-Pacific, new
\nframeworks were adopted to achieve a more \u201cdynamic, cohesive, resilient and
\nintegrated ASEAN community\u201d.[31]<\/a><\/p>\n

To attain these overarching goals, the Association
\nadopted frameworks for an ASEAN Security Community (ASC); an ASEAN Economic
\nCommunity (AEC); and an ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community (ASCC).[32]<\/a>
\nMost relevant, however, to ASEAN\u2019s role in conflict management is the creation
\nof the ASC. The ASC framework clearly establishes ASEAN\u2019s commitment to the UN
\nCharter and adherence to international law, aside from reiterating the
\npromotion of the well-established principles of ASEAN.[33]<\/a><\/p>\n

It is also interesting to note that to be forward
\nlooking, ASEAN will \u201cexplore innovative ways to increase
\nits security and establish modalities for the ASEAN Security Community, which
\ninclude, inter alia<\/em>, the following
\nelements: norms-setting, conflict prevention, approaches to conflict
\nresolution, and post-conflict peace-building\u201d.[34]<\/a> The
\n\u2018Bali Concord II<\/em>\u2019 clearly indicates
\nthat ASEAN is determined to play a decisive role in managing conflicts in the
\nregion.<\/p>\n

The ASEAN Security Community Plan of Action<\/h3>\n

In late November 2004, during the 10th ASEAN Summit at
\nVientiane, Laos, the Association adopted the ASEAN Security Community Plan of
\nAction (ASCPA). ASCPA is underpinned by the \u201cprinciple of comprehensive
\nsecurity\u201d and seeks to operate on \u201cshared norms and rules of
\ngood conduct in inter-state relations; effective conflict prevention and
\nresolution mechanisms; and post-conflict peace building activities\u201d.[35]<\/a>
\nIt should be clarified, however, that ASCPA promotes an ASEAN-wide political
\nand security cooperation, and not a defence pact, military alliance or joint
\nforeign policy.[36]<\/a>
\nASCPA processes are guided by ASEAN\u2019s fundamental principles as outlined in
\n1967, which serves as a strong foundation of ASEAN cooperation.[37]<\/a><\/p>\n

In particular, ASCPA displays a high degree of
\ncontinuity and adherence to principles of inter-state collaboration while strengthening
\nframeworks for conflict management in SEA. The \u2018Plan<\/em>\u2019, which includes six components, is geared towards creating an
\nenvironment that ensures continued peace, security and stability in the region.[38]<\/a>
\nThe emphasis is on exclusive reliance to peaceful processes in settling
\nintra-regional differences and disputes. The \u2018Plan<\/em>\u2019 also aims to achieve a standard of common adherence to norms
\nand good conduct among its member-states, strengthening confidence-building
\nmeasures, carrying out preventive diplomacy, resolving outstanding regional
\nissues and enhancing cooperation on non\u2013traditional issues.[39]<\/a><\/p>\n

In addition, the \u2018Plan<\/em>\u2019
\naims to create conditions for sustainable peace and preventing the re-emergence
\nof conflicts in affected areas. As part of its role in conflict resolution, ASEAN
\nencourages using existing regional dispute settlement mechanisms and processes
\n(e.g. TAC), but does not prohibit member-states to utilize national, bilateral
\nand international mechanisms (e.g. UN). To ensure effective implementation of ASCPA,
\nspecific measures are envisaged \u2013 such as strengthening of the TAC regime; dispute
\nsettlement mechanisms; and the ARF process.[40]<\/a>
\nThe development of an ASEAN Charter is also a priority of the \u2018Plan\u2019<\/em>. It can be surmised that ACSPA, provides
\na workable framework with which ASEAN can operate to promote and enhance its
\nrole in managing conflicts between its member-states in SEA.<\/p>\n

The Charter of ASEAN<\/h3>\n

One of ACSPA\u2019s top priorities, the ASEAN Charter, was adopted
\nin 2007, and it entered into force on 15 December 2008. The Charter serves as a
\n\u201cfirm foundation in building an ASEAN community by providing \u2018legal status<\/em>\u2019 and \u2018institutional framework<\/em>\u2019 for ASEAN\u201d.[41]<\/a>
\nThe \u2018Charter<\/em>\u2019 not only reaffirms
\nwell-established principles and mechanisms advocated in other key ASEAN
\ndocuments, but substantially highlights the importance of conflict management
\nthrough peaceful settlement of disputes.[42]<\/a><\/p>\n

As a testament to ASEAN\u2019s resolve in pursuing peaceful
\nsettlement of disputes, Chapter VIII of the \u2018Charter<\/em>\u2019 was dedicated to this end. Aside from promoting timely dialogues,
\nconsultation and negotiation in settling disputes, Article 22 of the \u2018Charter<\/em>\u2019 stipulates that ASEAN should
\nmaintain and establish dispute settlement mechanisms in all areas of
\ncooperation.[43]<\/a> Disputing
\nmember-states can, likewise, resort to good office; conciliation; or mediation.[44]<\/a>
\nCompliance with findings, recommendations or decisions resulting from these
\nmechanisms shall be monitored by the ASEAN Secretariat or any other designated
\nASEAN body. Needless to say, the \u2018Charter<\/em>\u2019
\nembodies aspirations for an ASEAN community that promotes \u201ccommon desire and
\ncollective will to live in a region of lasting peace, security and stability\u201d.[45]<\/a>
\nEssentially, these aspirations prompt ASEAN to play a decisive role in conflict
\nmanagement with the ultimate objective of improving peace and security in SEA.<\/p>\n

Conflict Management in Southeast Asia<\/h2>\n

The creation of ASEAN was primarily the result of resolute
\nefforts of founding member-states to establish a regional cooperation that
\ncould provide a viable framework for conflict management.[46]<\/a>
\nThe formation manifested the original member-states\u2019 sincere desire to handle
\nexisting and future disputes through peaceful means, seeking to improve peace
\nand security in SEA. Thus far, ASEAN has been credited as \u201cone of the most
\nsuccessful experiments in regional cooperation in the developing world\u201d.[47]<\/a>
\nAt the heart of this claim, is ASEAN\u2019s role in \u201cmoderating intra-regional
\nconflicts\u201d that has not only significantly reduced the likelihood of war, but
\nmaintained peace in the region.[48]<\/a><\/p>\n

International Relations Theories on Regional Cooperation<\/h3>\n

The success of ASEAN in managing disputes in the
\nregion, particularly in the early 1990s,[49]<\/a>
\nhas led regional scholars to question \u2018Western<\/em>\u2019
\nmodels of regional cooperation that advocate legalistic and formalistic
\ninstitutions.[50]<\/a> These
\nwestern constructs draw on the \u2018International
\nRelations Theories<\/em>\u2019 on \u2018Realism<\/em>\u2019
\nand \u2018Liberalism<\/em>\u2019. \u2018Realists<\/em>\u2019 such as John Hertz, view international
\nrelations as a \u201cvicious circle of security and power accumulation as states are
\ndriven to acquire more and more power in order to escape the impact of the
\npower of\u00a0 others\u201d.[51]<\/a>
\nFor \u2018realists<\/em>\u2019, survival in an \u2018anarchic<\/em>\u2019 international system cannot be
\nachieved through interdependence, but rather states are inclined to be isolationist
\nin character, which guides their behavior in their relations with other states.[52]<\/a><\/p>\n

\u2018Liberalism<\/em>\u2019,
\non the other hand, particularly \u2018neo-liberalism<\/em>\u2019,
\naccepts the \u2018realist<\/em>\u2019 premise
\nconcerning \u201canarchy as a given of the international system and that cooperation
\namong states, while possible, arises only in response to states pursuing their
\nshort-term self-interests.\u201d [53]<\/a>
\n\u2018Neo-liberalism<\/em>\u2019 proved influential
\nin the study of international organizations from late 1970s, as it advocates
\ninterdependence and international collaboration among states.[54]<\/a>
\nInterestingly, both \u2018neo-liberalists<\/em>\u2019
\nand \u2018neo-realists<\/em>\u2019 view international
\ninstitutions (e.g. ASEAN), as \u201ckey agents of peaceful change\u201d that can regulate
\nthe behavior of states \u2013 i.e. manage conflicts between states. However, \u2018neo-realists<\/em>\u2019 view \u2018change<\/em>\u2019 as a \u201cconsequence of shifts, often violent, in the balance
\nor distribution of power\u201d.[55]<\/a>
\nOn the other hand, \u2018neo-liberalists<\/em>\u2019
\nposit that change can \u201coccur peacefully through international institutions\u201d.[56]<\/a>
\nNonetheless, it has been argued by some scholars, that \u2018constructivism<\/em>\u2019 has been the main theoretical framework for the
\nstudy of regional cooperation in SEA.[57]<\/a><\/p>\n

The theory of \u2018constructivism<\/em>\u2019
\npostulates that international relations is \u201ca process of social learning and
\nidentity formation, driven by transactions, interactions and socializations\u201d.[58]<\/a>
\nLike \u2018realism<\/em>\u2019 and \u2018liberalism<\/em>\u2019, \u2018constructivism<\/em>\u2019 recognizes the \u201cpossibility of change being a
\nfundamentally peaceful process with its sources lying in the \u2018perceptions<\/em>\u2019 and \u2018identifications<\/em>\u2019 among actors \u2013 or states\u201d. Acharya suggests that
\nsuch processes explains the propensity of states to develop cooperation and \u201cmutual
\ninterdependence\u201d, which encourages states to renounce the use of force in
\nsettling disputes between them.[59]<\/a><\/p>\n

\u2018Constructivism<\/em>\u2019
\nadvocates the idea of a \u2018community<\/em>\u2019 \u2013
\nthe sharing of \u201cvalues, norms and symbols that provide social identity\u201d that
\nultimately reflects long-term interests, such as peaceful settlement of
\ndisputes and maintenance of peace and security in the region. Notably, \u2018constructivists<\/em>\u2019 recognize the importance
\nof norms, particularly their impact in shaping international relations. Norms
\nnot only \u201cregulate state behavior\u201d, but also, redefine state interests as well
\nas create state and collective identities.[60]<\/a>
\nASEAN, as a collection of diverse identities with shared values and norms, is
\nclearly a product of a \u2018constructivist<\/em>\u2019
\ntradition.<\/p>\n

The \u2018ASEAN Way\u2019<\/h3>\n

The ASEAN model for conflict management, otherwise known
\nas the \u2018ASEAN Way<\/em>\u2019, is a classic
\nmanifestation of \u2018constructivism<\/em>\u2019. Characterized
\nby \u201cinformality and organizational minimalism\u201d in contrast to \u2018Western<\/em>\u2019 constructs\u2019 primacy of legal
\nand formal institutions, the \u2018ASEAN Way<\/em>\u2019
\nof managing disputes is regarded as vital to the success of regional
\ncooperation in SEA. The \u2018ASEAN Way<\/em>\u2019 is
\ncharacterized by a preference to work outside the parameters of formal or
\ninstitutional frameworks in order to avoid conflict or contain it.[61]<\/a>
\nIn effect, this has led ASEAN to successfully build its own unique mechanism
\nfor dispute settlement.[62]<\/a>
\nDespite ASEAN\u2019s perceived success, the organization has been widely criticized
\nas having a weak mandate, ineffective mechanisms, and of not playing a decisive
\nrole in managing disputes between its member-states [63]<\/a>
\n\u2013 an aspect that will now be explored.<\/p>\n

This essay argues that ASEAN\u2019s success in conflict
\nmanagement can be measured by the role it has played in managing conflicts
\nbetween member-states. Several scholars suggest that ASEAN has been effective
\nin avoiding conflict, but has failed to resolve conflicts between its member-states.[64]<\/a>
\nIn order to objectively determine the effectiveness of ASEAN in this realm, conceptual
\nclarity is needed. Conflict management is a combination of three elements: Conflict
\nprevention or avoidance, conflict containment and conflict termination (settlement
\nand resolution).[65]<\/a> Muthiah Alagappa distinguishes
\n\u2018conflict avoidance\u2019<\/em> \u2013 as the
\npractice of not addressing specific disputes for the sake of the larger
\ngrouping and regional stability \u2013 from \u2018conflict
\nresolution\u2019<\/em> as the attempt at solving the historical, diplomatic, economic
\nand or military origins of a particular conflict.[66]<\/a>
\nResearch suggests ASEAN has been successful in managing conflicts, particularly
\nbetween the original member-states.[67]<\/a>
\nThis does not, however, mean all conflicts were resolved or did not occur.<\/p>\n

ASEAN\u2019s
\neffectiveness in managing conflicts through \u2018conflict avoidance<\/em>\u2019 was exemplified during the expansion of ASEAN
\nin the 1990s. The addition of new member-states ushered in new challenges, often
\ninvolving border disputes \u2013 e.g. between Thailand and Cambodia (Preah Vihear
\nTemple Dispute), the sovereignty disputes between Indonesia and Malaysia over Pulau
\nSipadan and Pulau Ligitan or the Philippines and Malaysia (Over Sabah Island).[68]<\/a>
\nThe majority of these cases were peacefully settled bilaterally or through
\ndialogue with other member-states.<\/p>\n

Bilateral
\nefforts were managed and facilitated by mechanisms established by ASEAN, in
\nparticular the TAC and the ASEAN Charter.[69]<\/a>
\nThis also highlights the role of ASEAN as a facilitator rather than a
\nthird-party mediator in the disputes. However, some member-states preferred
\ninternational arbitration (e.g. Malaysia and Singapore over Pedra Branca\/Pulau
\nBatu Puteh) at the International Court of Justice when bilateral negotiations
\nfailed or were unable to deliver amicable solutions.[70]<\/a>
\nIf success in conflict management is examined from the perspective of prevention
\nor avoiding member-states\u2019 use of military might, then ASEAN can be regarded as
\n\u201cimpressive\u201d, in as much as no border or sovereignty dispute has resulted in a shooting-war
\nsince regional cooperation was established.[71]<\/a><\/p>\n

The \u2018ASEAN Way<\/em>\u2019 of peacefully managing existing
\nand potential disputes among member-states has indeed achieved peace, stability
\nand security in the region. However, even with such commendable
\naccomplishments, ASEAN was criticised of \u201csweeping the conflicts under the
\ncarpet\u201d rather than resolving them.[72]<\/a>
\nSome scholars claim that these failings illustrate the limitations of ASEAN\u2019s \u2018institutional framework<\/em>\u2019 in conflict
\nmanagement.[73]<\/a><\/p>\n

Ralf
\nEmmers claims that ASEAN fails to resolve conflicts because of the \u2018residual mistrust<\/em>\u2019 between the
\nmember-states.[74]<\/a> From
\na \u2018constructivist<\/em>\u2019 perspective, he
\nclarifies that \u2018trust<\/em>\u2019 is \u201ca belief
\nthat the other side is trustworthy, and that is willing to reciprocate
\ncooperation\u201d.[75]<\/a> \u2018Mistrust\u2019<\/em>, on the other hand, is a \u201cbelief
\nthat the other side is untrustworthy, or prefers to exploit one\u2019s cooperation\u201d.[76]<\/a>
\nThis \u2018mistrust<\/em>\u2019 has roots in deep-seated
\ndomestic and regional circumstances. Prevalence of strategic competition,
\nnational identities and patriotic nationalism, suspicion and historical
\nanimosities are among those cited.[77]<\/a>
\nDomestic interests which are driven largely by politics rather than domestic
\ninstitutions and bureaucracies are also offered as an explanation.[78]<\/a>
\nEmmers argued that this \u2018mistrust<\/em>\u2019
\nbetween the member-states essentially restricts ASEAN\u2019s ability to address
\nconflicts in SEA.<\/p>\n

Rising
\nabove these \u2018mistrusts<\/em>\u2019 will remove this
\nstumbling block which undermines ASEAN\u2019s ability to resolve conflicts. It will enable
\nASEAN to progress from conflict avoidance to conflict resolution. Cultivating \u2018trust<\/em>\u2019 between member-states can be
\nchallenging, but not impossible. ASEAN has in fact started to create conditions
\nfor increased interaction through overall cooperation of member-states under
\nthe \u201cASEAN-umbrella\u201d.[79]<\/a>
\nThis is evidenced by increased conduct of ASEAN summits (twice a year), regular
\nconsultations and dialogues, and regional military training exercises, among
\nothers. <\/p>\n

It
\nshould be noted that the Association\u2019s creation was primarily rooted in the
\ndesire to promote better relations among its member-states. More importantly,
\nASEAN can only formally act as a third-party mediator, and only has the mandate
\nto resolve conflicts if member-states voluntarily subscribe to its mechanisms
\nfor conflict management. Therefore ASEAN\u2019s effectiveness in conflict management
\nis considerably enhanced if member-states actively utilize these regional
\nmechanisms. Until then, ASEAN conflict management will only be successful in
\nterms of conflict avoidance and prevention rather than conflict resolution.<\/p>\n

Conclusion<\/h2>\n

This
\nessay examined key ASEAN documents to provide an understanding of what ASEAN
\ncan and cannot do in managing conflicts between its member-states. An analysis
\nof pertinent documents reveals that ASEAN is putting considerable effort into
\npromoting peaceful settlement of disputes among its members. ASEAN\u2019s approach
\nwas to adopt fundamental principles which create readily available mechanisms for
\nconflict management for member-states. The \u2018ASEAN
\nWay<\/em>\u2019 of managing conflicts is underpinned by well-established principles of
\nrespect for national sovereignty, non-interference in
\nthe internal affairs of a member-state, peaceful settlement of disputes and renunciation
\nof the threat or use of force.<\/p>\n

ASEAN\u2019s institutional framework in conflict management
\nis inherently characterised by a preference to work outside formal or
\ninstitutional models in order to avoid or contain conflict. This led ASEAN to build
\nits unique mechanisms for dispute management. The \u2018ASEAN Way<\/em>\u2019 manifests \u2018constructivism<\/em>\u2019
\nthrough \u2018constructivist<\/em>\u2019 traditions
\nthat promotes shared norms, values, and collective identities. This explains
\nASEAN\u2019s predisposition to develop cooperation and mutual interdependence which renounces
\nthe use of force in settling disputes.<\/p>\n

ASEAN, thus far, can be considered successful,
\nparticularly in its role in regional conflict avoidance or conflict prevention.
\nOn the other hand, it can only effectively act to resolve conflicts if
\nmember-states voluntarily subscribe to ASEAN\u2019s prescribed mechanisms. Bilateral
\ndisputes among member-states in the region have considerably benefited from
\nthese processes, but have mostly fallen short of formal resolution. <\/p>\n

\u2018Mistrust<\/em>\u2019
\nbetween member-states is cited as an enduring factor that undermines ASEAN\u2019s
\ncapacity for successful conflict management. Overcoming this challenge should
\nbe ASEAN\u2019s top priority, if it is determined to act decisively and maximize its
\nfull potential in managing conflicts in the region. This is the only way that
\nASEAN can truly fulfil its mandate of promoting peace, stability and security
\nin Southeast Asia \u2013 and beyond.<\/p>\n

Bibliography<\/h2>\n

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Alagappa, Muthiah.
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Amer, Ramses. \u201cExpanding
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Chareonwongsak,
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Keohane, Roberto. International Institutions and State
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Miall, Hugh,
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Sridharan, Kripa.
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\n[Accessed on 18 Jun 2017].<\/p>\n

The ASEAN
\nDeclaration (Bangkok Declaration) Bangkok. 08 August 1967. at
\nhttp:\/\/asean.org\/the-asean-declaration-bangkok-declaration-bangkok-8-august-1967\/.
\n[Accessed on 18 Jun 2017].<\/p>\n

The Declaration of ASEAN Concord, Bali, Indonesia. 24 February 1976. at http:\/\/asean.org\/?static_post=declaration-of-asean-concord-indonesia-24-february-1976.
\n[Accessed on 18 Jun 2017].<\/p>\n

Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia Indonesia. 24 February
\n1976. at http:\/\/asean.org\/treaty-amity-cooperation-southeast-asia-indonesia-24-february-1976\/.
\n[Accessed
\non 18 Jun 2017].<\/p>\n

Zakaria, Haji Ahmad. \u201cThe Structure of Decision-Making\u201d. In
\nSharon Siddique and Sree Kumar (eds), The Second ASEAN Reader<\/em>.
\nSingapore: ISEAS. (2003). in Kripa Sridharan. \u201cRegional Organizations and
\nConflict Management: Comparing ASEAN and SAARC\u201d. Crisis States Working Papers<\/em> 2:33 (March 2008). at
\nhttp:\/\/www.lse.ac.uk\/internationaldevelopment\/research\/crisisstates\/download\/wp\/wpseries2\/wp332.pdf,
\n[Accessed on 18 Jun 2017].<\/p>\n

\n

[1]<\/a> Melly Caballero-Anthony,
\n\u201cMechanisms of Dispute Settlement: The ASEAN Experience\u201d. Contemporary
\nSoutheast Asia<\/em> 20:1 (April 1998), 39.<\/p>\n

[2]<\/a> Ramses Amer, \u201cThe Association
\nof Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN): Conflict Management Approach Revisited;
\nWill the Charter Reinforce ASEAN\u2019s role?\u201d, Austrian Journal of South-East
\nAsian Studies <\/em>2:2 (2009), at
\nhttp:\/\/nbn-resolving.de\/urn:nbn:de:0168-ssoar-362807. [Accessed
\non 01 Jun 2017], 7.<\/p>\n

[3]<\/a> Ibid, 76.<\/p>\n

[4]<\/a> Ibid, 24.<\/p>\n

[5]<\/a> Ibid.<\/p>\n

[6]<\/a> ASEAN Key Documents: The
\nASEAN Declaration (Bangkok Declaration); The Declaration of ASEAN Concord;
\nTreaty of Amity and Cooperation; The Rules of Procedure of the High Council of
\nthe Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia; Declaration of ASEAN Concorde
\nII (Bali Concorde II); The ASEAN Security Community Plan of Action; and the
\nCharter of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, (ASEAN Charter), in the Association
\nof Southeast Asian Nations Website, at http:\/\/asean.org\/. [Accessed on 18 Jun
\n2017].<\/p>\n

[7]<\/a> The ASEAN Declaration (Bangkok
\nDeclaration).<\/p>\n

[8]<\/a> History: The Founding of ASEAN, at http:\/\/asean.org\/asean\/about-asean\/history\/<\/a>, [Accessed on 18 Jun 2017].<\/p>\n

[9]<\/a> The ASEAN Declaration (Bangkok
\nDeclaration).<\/p>\n

[10]<\/a> Ramses Amer, \u201cThe Association of
\nSoutheast Asian Nations (ASEAN): Conflict Management Approach Revisited; Will
\nthe Charter Reinforce ASEAN\u2019s role?\u201d, 9; The Declaration of ASEAN Concord.<\/p>\n

[11]<\/a> The Declaration of ASEAN Concord.<\/p>\n

[12]<\/a> Ibid.<\/p>\n

[13]<\/a> Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast
\nAsia.<\/p>\n

[14]<\/a> Five Founding Member-states: Republic of
\nIndonesia, Malaysia, Republic of the Philippines, Republic of Singapore, and
\nthe Kingdom of Thailand<\/p>\n

[15]<\/a> Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast
\nAsia.<\/p>\n

[16] TAC Fundamental Principles: a. Mutual respect for the independence,
\nsovereignty, equality, territorial integrity and national identity of all nations; b. The right of
\nevery State to lead its national existence free from external interference,
\nsubversion or coercion; c.
\nNon-interference in the internal affairs of one another; d. Settlement of
\ndifferences or disputes by peaceful means; e. Renunciation of the threat or use
\nof force; f. Effective co-operation among themselves.<\/p>\n

[17]<\/a> Treaty of Amity and
\nCooperation in Southeast Asia.<\/p>\n

[18]<\/a> Article 14, Chapter IV: Pacific Settlement
\nof Disputes, Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia Indonesia, 24 February
\n1976, at http:\/\/asean.org\/treaty-amity-cooperation-southeast-asia-indonesia-24-february-1976\/<\/a>, [Accessed on 18 Jun 2017].<\/p>\n

[19]<\/a> Article 15, Chapter IV: Pacific Settlement
\nof Disputes Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia Indonesia, 24
\nFebruary 1976, at http:\/\/asean.org\/treaty-amity-cooperation-southeast-asia-indonesia-24-february-1976\/<\/a>, [Accessed on 18 Jun 2017].<\/p>\n

[20]<\/a> Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast
\nAsia.<\/p>\n

[21]<\/a> Ibid.<\/p>\n

[22]<\/a> Ibid.<\/p>\n

[23]<\/a> Rules of Procedure of the High Council of the
\nTreaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia.<\/p>\n

[24]<\/a> Ibid.<\/p>\n

[25]<\/a> Rules of Procedure of the High Council of the
\nTreaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia.<\/p>\n

[26]<\/a> Ibid.<\/p>\n

[27]<\/a> Declaration of ASEAN Concord II (Bali Concord
\nII).<\/p>\n

[28]<\/a> Ibid.<\/p>\n

[29]<\/a> Ibid.<\/p>\n

[30]<\/a> Ibid.<\/p>\n

[31]<\/a> Declaration of ASEAN Concord II (Bali Concord
\nII); Jho, Whasun and Soo A Chae.
\n\u201cHegemonic Disputes and the Limits of the ASEAN Regional Forum\u201d. Pacific Focus<\/em> XXIX:2 (August 2014). 237.<\/p>\n

[32]<\/a> Declaration of ASEAN Concord II (Bali Concord
\nII).<\/p>\n

[33]<\/a> Ibid.<\/p>\n

[34]<\/a> Ibid.<\/p>\n

[35]<\/a> ASEAN Security Community Plan of Action.<\/p>\n

[36]<\/a> Ibid.<\/p>\n

[37]<\/a> ASEAN Fundamental Principles: Principles of
\nnon-interference; consensus based decision-making; national and regional
\nresilience; respect for the national sovereignty; the renunciation of the
\nthreat or the use of force; and peaceful settlement of differences and
\ndisputes.<\/p>\n

[38]<\/a> Six Components ASCPA: Political
\nDevelopment; Shaping and Sharing Norms; Conflict Prevention; Conflict
\nResolution; Post-Conflict Peace Building; and Implementing Mechanisms.<\/p>\n

[39]<\/a> ASEAN Security Community Plan of Action<\/p>\n

[40]<\/a> Ibid.<\/p>\n

[41]<\/a> ASEAN Charter.<\/p>\n

[42]<\/a> Ramses Amer, \u201cThe Association of Southeast
\nAsian Nations\u2019 (ASEAN): Conflict Management Approach Revisited; Will the Charter
\nReinforce ASEAN\u2019s role?\u201d 25.<\/p>\n

[43]<\/a> ASEAN Charter.<\/p>\n

[44]<\/a> Ibid.<\/p>\n

[45]<\/a> Ibid.<\/p>\n

[46]<\/a> Ramses Amer, op. cit., 19.<\/p>\n

[47]<\/a> Amitav Acharya, \u201cSecurity
\nCommunities and ASEAN in Theoretical Perspective\u201d, in Constructing a Security Community in Southeast Asia<\/em>: Politics in Asia Series<\/em>, edited by
\nMichael Leifer, 1-14. (London and New York: Routledge, 2001), 5.<\/p>\n

[48]<\/a> Amitav Acharya, \u201cSecurity
\nCommunities and ASEAN in Theoretical Perspective\u201d, 5.<\/p>\n

[49]<\/a> Paris Peace Agreement on Cambodia in 1991, Amitav
\nAcharya, \u201cSecurity Communities and ASEAN in Theoretical Perspective\u201d, 5.<\/p>\n

[50]<\/a> Ibid.<\/p>\n

[51]<\/a> John Hertz, \u201cIdealist Internationalism and
\nthe Security Dilemma\u201d, World Politics, <\/em>vol. 2 (January 1950), 157\u2013180,
\nin Amitav Acharya, \u201cSecurity Communities and ASEAN in Theoretical Perspective\u201d,
\nin Constructing a Security Community in
\nSoutheast Asia<\/em>: Politics in Asia
\nSeries<\/em>, edited by Michael Leifer, 1-14. (London and New York: Routledge,
\n2001), 1.<\/p>\n

[52]<\/a> Ibid.<\/p>\n

[53]<\/a> Robert Keohane, \u201cInternational
\nInstitutions: Two Approaches\u201d, International Studies Quarterly <\/em>32:4
\n(December 1988); Robert Keohane, International Institutions and State Power:
\nEssays in International Relations Theory <\/em>(Boulder, CO: Westview Press,
\n1989), in Amitav Acharya, \u201cSecurity Communities and ASEAN in Theoretical
\nPerspective\u201d, 2.<\/p>\n

[54]<\/a> Ibid.<\/p>\n

[55]<\/a> Robert Keohane, \u201cInternational Institutions:
\nTwo Approaches\u201d; Robert Keohane, International Institutions and State Power:
\nEssays in International Relations Theory, <\/em>in Amitav Acharya, \u201cSecurity
\nCommunities and ASEAN in Theoretical Perspective, 2.<\/p>\n

[56]<\/a> Amitav Acharya, \u201cSecurity Communities and
\nASEAN in Theoretical Perspective\u201d, 3.<\/p>\n

[57]<\/a> Ibid.<\/p>\n

[58]<\/a> Ibid, 2.<\/p>\n

[59]<\/a> Philip E.Jacob and Henry Teune, \u201cThe
\nIntegrative Process: Guidelines for Analysis\u201d, in Philip E.Jacob and James
\nV.Toscano (eds), The Integration of Political Communities<\/em> (Philadelphia:
\nLippincott, 1964), 4, cited in Joseph S. Nye, \u2018Comparative Regional Integration:
\nConcept and Measurement\u2019, International Organization <\/em>22:4 (Autumn 1968),
\n863, in Amitav Acharya, \u201cSecurity Communities and ASEAN in Theoretical
\nPerspective\u201d, 2.<\/p>\n

[60]<\/a> Amitav Acharya, \u201cSecurity Communities and
\nASEAN in Theoretical Perspective\u201d, 4.<\/p>\n

[61]<\/a> Mely Caballero-Anthony, \u201cMechanisms for
\nDispute Settlement: The ASEAN Experience\u201d, 38.<\/p>\n

[62]<\/a> Ibid.<\/p>\n

[63]<\/a> Michael Leifer, ASEAN and the Security
\nof South East Asia <\/em>(London: Routledge. 1989).<\/p>\n

[64]<\/a> Ralf Emmers, \u201cEnduring Mistrust and Conflict Management
\nin Southeast Asia: An Assessment of ASEAN as a Security Community\u201d, TRaNS:
\nTrans-Regional and National Studies of Southeast Asia<\/em> 5:1 (2017), at
\nhttps:\/\/www.cambridge.org\/core\/journals\/trans-trans-regional-and-national-studies-of-southeast-asia\/article\/enduring-mistrust-and-conflict-management-in-southeast-asia-an-assessment-of-asean-as-a-security-community\/.
\n[Accessed on 01 Jun 2017], 75.<\/p>\n

[65]<\/a> Muthiah Alagappa, \u201cRegionalism and Conflict
\nManagement: A Framework for Analysis\u201d, Review of International Studies <\/em>21:4
\n(1995): 369, in Kripa Sridharan, \u201cRegional Organizations and Conflict Management:
\nComparing ASEAN and SAARC\u201d, Crisis States
\nWorking Papers<\/em> 2:33 (March 2008), at
\nhttp:\/\/www.lse.ac.uk\/internationaldevelopment\/research\/crisisstates\/download\/wp\/wpseries2\/wp332.pdf,
\n[Accessed on 18 Jun 2017], 3.<\/p>\n

[66]<\/a> Muthiah Alagappa, \u201cRegionalism and Conflict
\nManagement: A Framework for Analysis\u201d, 3.<\/p>\n

[67]<\/a> Ramses Amer, \u201cExpanding ASEAN\u2019s Conflict
\nManagement Framework in Southeast Asia: The Border Dispute Dimension\u201d, Asian Journal of Political Science<\/em> 6:2, 41.<\/p>\n

[68]<\/a> Ramses Amer, \u201cExpanding ASEAN\u2019s Conflict
\nManagement Framework in Southeast Asia: The Border Dispute Dimension\u201d, 35-56; Ramses
\nAmer, \u201cManaging Border disputes in Southeast Asia\u201d, Kaijan Malaysia, Journal of Malaysian Studies: Special Issue on
\nConflict Management in Southeast Asia<\/em>, XVIII:1-2, 30-60.<\/p>\n

[69]<\/a> Ramses Amer, \u201cExpanding ASEAN\u2019s Conflict Management
\nFramework in Southeast Asia: The Border Dispute Dimension\u201d, 35-56; Ramses Amer,
\n\u201cManaging Border disputes in Southeast Asia\u201d, 30-60.<\/p>\n

[70]<\/a> Ibid, 41.<\/p>\n

[71]<\/a> Ramses Amer, \u201cThe Association of Southeast
\nAsian Nations\u2019 (ASEAN): Conflict Management Approach Revisited; Will the
\nCharter Reinforce ASEAN\u2019s role?\u201d, Austrian Journal of South-East Asian
\nStudies <\/em>2:2 (2009), at
\nhttp:\/\/nbn-resolving.de\/urn:nbn:de:0168-ssoar-362807. [Accessed on 01 Jun 2017], 19.<\/p>\n

[72]<\/a> Haji Ahmad
\nZakaria, \u201cThe Structure of Decision-Making\u201d, in Sharon Siddique and Sree Kumar
\n(eds), The Second ASEAN Reader<\/em>. Singapore: ISEAS (2003); in Kripa Sridharan,
\n\u201cRegional Organizations and Conflict Management: Comparing ASEAN and SAARC\u201d, Crisis States Working Papers<\/em>, 2:33
\n(March 2008), at
\nhttp:\/\/www.lse.ac.uk\/internationaldevelopment\/research\/crisisstates\/download\/wp\/wpseries2\/wp332.pdf,
\n[Accessed
\non 18 Jun 2017].<\/p>\n

[73]<\/a> Kriengsak Chareonwongsak, \u201cASEAN\u2019s limits
\nin conflict resolution in the region\u201d, Presented at the International Security
\nin the Asia-Pacific: Beyond ASEAN-centred Security? Nanyang Technological
\nUniversity, 9\u201310 October 2014.<\/p>\n

[74]<\/a> Ibid.<\/p>\n

[75]<\/a> Ibid, 76.<\/p>\n

[76]<\/a> Ibid.<\/p>\n

[77]<\/a> Ibid.<\/p>\n

[78]<\/a> Ralf Emmers, \u201cEnduring Mistrust and Conflict Management
\nin Southeast Asia: An Assessment of ASEAN as a Security Community\u201d, 94.<\/p>\n

[79]<\/a> Ramses Amer, \u201cThe Association of Southeast
\nAsian Nations\u2019 (ASEAN): Conflict Management Approach Revisited; Will the
\nCharter Reinforce ASEAN\u2019s role?\u201d, 24.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

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