{"id":45785,"date":"2023-11-17T08:41:37","date_gmt":"2023-11-17T08:41:37","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/essays.homeworkacetutors.com\/2023\/11\/effect-of-the-2011-arab-spring-on-democracy-terrorism\/"},"modified":"2023-11-17T08:41:37","modified_gmt":"2023-11-17T08:41:37","slug":"effect-of-the-2011-arab-spring-on-democracy-terrorism","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.colapapers.com\/us\/effect-of-the-2011-arab-spring-on-democracy-terrorism\/","title":{"rendered":"Effect of the 2011 Arab Spring on Democracy & Terrorism"},"content":{"rendered":"
\n
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Introduction<\/h2>\n

In the year 2011, the world was shocked by events that sparked a series of major uprisings throughout the Middle East, a region known for its instability, fiercely dictatorial governments, exotic imagery, violence, and oil.\u00a0 The 2011 Arab spring was a start from a series of protests in countries of repressive and autocratic form of governments, which have been affected with great unemployment, rising living costs, low education and low human rights. The 2011 Arab Springs had extensive implications in the Middle East where countries went into a process of change. From peaceful protests, into violence and armed insurgency and full scale civil war and eventually the breakdown of civil society giving the rise of terrorist elements of the armed insurgency, who actively opposed the governments and who were prepared to use violence i.e. terrorist means. The countries which will discussed, in the context of the 2011 Arab spring, will include the following: Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, Yemen, Syria, Bahrain, Saudi Arabia and Morocco. Some of the key features will include evidence of the process of democracy. Institutions established to bring about change. Evidence of change from protest and concessions made to the people. However there are also other arguments to consider relating to the 2011 Arab springs which include the foreign intervention during the 2011 Arab spring, the rise and support of terrorist activities in the 2011 Arab spring.<\/p>\n

The 2011 Arab Spring began<\/a> in Tunisia, also known as the Jasmine Revolution there was major civil unrest across the country with street by street battles and mass demonstrations taking place in Tunisia, \u2018On January 14 a state of emergency was declared, and Tunisian state media reported that the government had been dissolved and that legislative elections would be held in the next six months. That announcement also failed to quell unrest, and Zine El Abidine Ben Ali stepped down as president\u2019, leaving the country in January 2011. Turkey thereafter had free and democratic elections. They saw the victory of a coalition of the Islamist Ennahda Party with this was one example of a country where free and democratic elections meant a government elected from its people. Also all political prisoners were released and the ban on political parties lifted.\u00a0 <\/p>\n

In Tunisia even though its revolution was
\nconsidered a success it is notable that the country has the most fighters of
\nIsil and other various \u2018rebel groups in Syria and Iraq taking part in terrorism
\nto uproot the government of the Syrian Arab Republic and the Libyan Arab
\nJamahiriya\u2019 (THE SOUFAN GROUP, 2017).<\/p>\n

In Syria protests calling for the resignation of President. Bashar al-Assad broke out in southern Syria in mid-March 2011 and spread through the country. The Assad regime responded with a brutal crackdown against protesters, drawing condemnation from international leaders and human rights groups. A leadership council for the Syrian opposition formed in Istanbul in August called the Free Syrian Army. However in Syria\u00a0 the little hope for democracy and concessions made my President Basher Al-Assad has turned into a full scale Civil war leading to the deaths of more than half a million people in Syria with numerous proxy wars and more recently have led to the rise of the Salifi movement ISIS. At the beginning of 2012 two prominent Salafi armed groups emerged: \u2018Jabhat al-Nusra and Kata\u2019ib Ahrar al-Sham (the Freemen of Syria Battalions) both of which embraced the language of jihad and called for an Islamic state based on Salafi principles\u2019 (International Crisis Group, 2012). <\/p>\n

\"\"<\/figure>\n

Libya<\/h2>\n

In
\nLibya from 1 September 1969 the \u2018Libyan Revolutionary Command Council (RCC)
\nheaded by Gaddafi abolished the monarchy and the old constitution and
\nproclaimed the new Libyan Arab Republic, with the motto: freedom, socialism,
\nand unity\u2019 (Michigan State University, 1994 \u2013 2016). The Leader Muammar Gaddafi
\nwould rule Libya for 42 years. Under Gaddafi, law number seventy-one of 1972
\nbanned all political parties and opposition groups. Dissent was punishable by
\ndeath, and in fact political opponents were assassinated both domestically and
\nabroad.<\/p>\n

Libya
\nhad the highest Human Development Index, the lowest infant mortality and the
\nhighest life expectancy in all of Africa. Even though, Libya was considered as
\na \u201cbrutal dictatorship\u201d by the west, it is clear that Libya was a prosperous
\nnation with free education and health care and laws that protect discrimination
\nand violence against woman as defined in the sources by the (Us Department of
\nState, 2017). Before the 2011 Arab spring al Qaeda and militant terrorism did
\nnot exist in the country. Libya was a peaceful nation which did not threat to
\nuse Weapons of Mass destruction nor other means to destabilise Europe by
\nterrorist means.<\/p>\n

The
\nevents in Libya turned from protests into a full scale civil war between the
\nNational Transition council and loyal forces of the Libyan armed forces. <\/p>\n

The Foreign intervention in the 2011 Arab Spring <\/h2>\n

Foreign intervention in the
\n2011 Arab spring was a pivotal moment during the Libyan Civil war. The United
\nNation Security Council on the 11th<\/sup> March 2011 passed on a
\nresolution to implement a no fly zone. The resolution implemented by NATO was
\nto prevent the harming of civilians in Libya and to implement and democratic
\nresolution in Libya (United Nations Security council, 2011). However during the
\nLibyan Civil war there wasn\u2019t any consideration of whom NATO was going to help
\nmilitarily.\u00a0 The parliamentary Foreign
\naffairs committee stated in the recent report that \u2018the possibility that
\nmilitant extremist groups would attempt to benefit from. The rebellion should
\nnot have been the preserve of hindsight. Libyan connections with transnational
\nmilitant extremist groups were known before 2011, because many Libyans had
\nparticipated in the Iraq insurgency and in Afghanistan with al-Qaeda\u2019. (The
\nForeign Affairs Committee, 2016).<\/p>\n

Movement towards Democracy <\/h3>\n
\n
\"\"<\/figure>\n<\/div>\n

In Many opposition participants called for a return to the constitution and a transition to multi-party democracy most notably in Tunisia and Libya however with the use of violent means which the effect could count as the use of terrorism to the government in charge. As violence increased security forced ordered to shoot with impunity defected. The Arab uprisings were less a cry for democracy<\/a> than a demand for better governance and improved economic performance. Few citizens across the region directly attributed to democracy itself the changes, good or bad, that the uprisings brought. By this measure at least, the uprisings and the events that followed did little to dampen the overall demand for democracy in the region as a whole. Citizens have continued to believe, as they did before the protests, that democracy is the best form of government and that the regimes in their countries have a long way to go to become fully democratic. Tunisia, the place where the Arab uprisings began and the site of the greatest progress toward democracy since then, represents an exception to this broader trend in public opinion. Since the Jasmine Revolution of 2011, Tunisians have grown increasingly concerned about the effects of democracy and have become less likely to say that this system is suitable for their country. Despite these trends, however, the vast majority of Tunisians continue to say that democracy, whatever its problems, is the best system of government for their country. As the Tunisian case suggests, Arab publics are responding mainly to developments at home rather than to wider regional factors. Thus Egyptians, unlike Tunisians, have been disinclined to hold democracy responsible for their country\u2019s rocky political course, and instead have blamed the Muslim Brotherhood and political Islam. This decision about where to place blame in turn reflects factors specific to the political situation as it has unfolded in Egypt since dictator Hosni Mubarak was forced to resign in February 2011.<\/p>\n

In Tunisia, there is clear
\npromise in the areas of freedom of association and freedom of expression, and
\nmedia freedom in particular. A fairly open field for the exercise of these
\nrights has emerged, in stark contrast to the deeply repressive environment for
\nnews media and civic groups under the Ben Ali regime. Civil society and trade
\nunions since January 14, 2011, have operated with a degree of openness and
\nindependence that was unimaginable before that date. In addition, spirited
\npolitical jockeying took place ahead of October\u2019s constituent assembly
\nelections and the elections themselves proved to be open, competitive, and
\npluralistic. But these gains do not mean that Tunisia has already cemented
\ninstitutional reforms in the media, civil society, or electoral politics.
\nInstead, they represent a promising early advance toward a culture of
\ntransparency and pluralism that must be safeguarded with concrete legal and
\nregulatory changes. If citizens, political leaders, and other influential
\nfigures make the right choices, they can fortify Tunisia\u2019s nascent democracy
\nagainst the challenges it will inevitably face.<\/p>\n

In Egypt, the months since
\nMubarak\u2019s ouster have revealed a much darker outlook for reform. As of the end
\nof October, the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) had resorted to familiar
\nmethods of repression, including severe curbs on the activities of civil
\nsociety and independent media, and foment of sectarian tensions for political
\ngain. The SCAF\u2019s extension and expansion in September 2011 of the country\u2019s
\noppressive emergency law, a hallmark of the Mubarak era, sent a chilling signal
\nto those working toward democratic governance. The scope of the law\u2014nominally
\nrestricted in 2010 to narcotics and terrorism offenses\u2014was widened to include
\nlabor strikes, traffic disruptions, and the spread of false information.<\/p>\n

Egypt could achieve almost
\nimmediate progress by opening and defending the space for civil society and the
\nnews media, while ensuring fair, open, and transparent elections in November
\n2011. But if these first-tier reforms in the areas of free expression and
\nassociation are not enacted and are prevented from growing roots, then the more
\ndifficult overhauls of the judiciary, security services, and other state
\ninstitutions are far less likely to follow or succeed.<\/p>\n

Tunisians favoured giving
\nreligious leaders a say over government decisions in 2011, this percentage held
\nsteady during the transition. In 2013, the share of Tunisians agreeing with
\nthis statement was 24 percent, suggesting that support for political Islam may
\neven have gone up a bit. Meanwhile, trust in Ennahda, the main Islamist party,
\nalso stayed fairly stable, dipping only five points to 35 percent. Taken
\ntogether, these results imply that the attitudes of Tunisians toward the
\nrelationship between religion and politics and the country\u2019s main Islam-based
\nmovement changed little following the transition. Differences between the
\nTunisian and Egyptian transitions likely explain the contrasting effects on
\npublic opinion. In Tunisia, Ennahda won only a plurality of National
\nConstituent Assembly seats and formed a weak \u201ctroika\u201d government with two
\nsecular parties. Although feeble and unsteady, this arrangement fostered an
\nenvironment of democratic compromise and relative inclusiveness. Rather than
\nblame Ennahda or its ideology for transition-era travails, Tunisians updated
\ntheir beliefs about the costs and benefits of a democratic system. In Egypt,
\nIslamists won a commanding majority in parliamentary elections and narrowly won
\nthe presidency. In November 2012, President Mohamed Morsi decreed that he would
\nbe above the law pending the ratification of a new constitution. Soon
\nthereafter, the Islamist-dominated Constituent Assembly finalized a draft
\nconstitution with no support from secular or minority voices. The Arab uprisings not only sparked major
\ntransformations in some countries, such as Egypt and Tunisia, but also spurred
\nlimited reforms in others, among them Algeria, Jordan, and Morocco. Despite all
\nthese changes, however, publics across the region in 2013 tended to rate their
\nregimes as no more or less democratic than had been the case in 2011.
\nTunisians, for example, had experienced free and fair elections but were still
\nno more likely to say that their regime was democratic (BBC, 2017). EU
\nannounced its support for the democratic progress in Tunisia and Egypt, which
\nwas followed by further unrest in several other Arab states, potentially
\nleading to radical changes of Middle East polity. An affirmative wording became
\npart of official EU documents, as it for instance could be seen when in 2011
\nthe EU launched its renewed European Neighborhood Policy (ENP), stating that
\nthe \u201cEU needs to rise to the historical challenges in our neighborhood.\u201d This
\nnew version of the ENP was characterized by two significant elements. First of
\nall, the new policy allowed for an increased differentiation regarding the
\nlinks between each ENP-partner and the EU as to cater to the needs and
\naspirations of the specific Mediterranean state. The principle of \u2018more for
\nmore\u2019 was the second central pillar of the reformulated ENP, together with the
\nopposite, a principle of \u2018less for less\u2019. The latter signaled that the EU
\nintended to downgrade its relations with regimes, which violated human rights,
\nincluding making use of targeted sanctions.<\/p>\n

The Algerian government
\nremoved its incongruous 19-year state of emergency. Oman\u2019s elected legislature
\ngot the authority to pass laws. Sudan\u2019s war criminal president promised not to
\nseek reselection. All the oil-rich states committed to wealth redistribution or
\nthe extension of welfare services. But real-world politics is not just what
\nhappens offline. A classically trained social scientist trying to explain the
\nArab Spring would point to statistics on the youth bulge, declining economic
\nproductivity, rising wealth concentration, high unemployment, and low quality
\nof life. These explanatory factors are often part of the story of social
\nchange. It does not diminish their important causal contribution to the Arab
\nSpring to also say that digital media shaped events and outcomes: digital media
\nwere singularly powerful in getting out protest messages, in driving the
\ncoverage by mainstream broadcasters, in connecting frustrated citizens, and in
\nhelping them realize that they shared grievances and could act together to do
\nsomething about their situation.<\/p>\n

Evidence of NATO Support of Terrorism during the 2011 Arab Spring<\/h3>\n

There is significant evidence
\nto suggest that the Arab Spring in Libya, Syria and Tunisia were one of the
\nmain reasons to the rise of terrorist activities thorough the Middle East with
\ncriminal gang\u2019s acquiring large scale military grade equipment from NATO and
\nwho were benefiting from the large scale breakdown of law and order and also
\nthe collapse of the criminal justice system. Some of the criminal and terrorist
\nactivities included: \u201cpeople trafficking, arbitrary detention, torture,
\nunlawful killing, indiscriminately attack, abduction, bombings and rape\u201d (The
\nForeign Affairs Committee, 2016).<\/p>\n

\n

\u2018The U.S. supported opposition which overthrew Libya\u2019s Gadaffi was\u00a0largely comprised of Al Qaeda terrorists\u2019. (Brad Hoff, 2017).<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n

According to a 2007 report by West Point\u2019s Combating Terrorism Centre, \u2018the Libyan city of Benghazi was one of Al Qaeda\u2019s main headquarters and bases for sending Al Qaeda and fighters of the Salafi-Jihadist movement\u2019 into Libya, Syria, Iraq and Yemen during and before the start of the 2011 Arab Spring who wanted to destabilise and overthrow the governments in those countries (The Combating Terrorism centre, 2017).<\/p>\n

\"\"<\/figure>\n

<\/em>The Hindustan Times\u00a0reported in March 2011: \u2018There is no question that Al Qaeda\u2019s Libyan franchise, Libyan Islamic Fighting Group, is a part of the opposition,\u2019 Bruce Riedel, former CIA officer and a leading expert on terrorism, told Hindustan Times (Yashwant Raj, 2017). It has always been Gaddafi\u2019s greatest enemy and its main stronghold is Benghazi. It is also reported that Al Qaeda flags were\u00a0flown in the Benghazi courthouse<\/a>\u00a0once Gaddafi was toppled.<\/p>\n

Incidentally,
\nGaddafi was on the verge of invading Benghazi in 2011, 4 years after the West
\nPoint report cited Benghazi as a hotbed of Al Qaeda and Salafi terrorists.
\nGaddafi claimed \u2013 rightly it turns out \u2013 that Benghazi was an Al Qaeda
\nstronghold and a main source of the Libyan rebellion.\u00a0 But NATO planes\u00a0stopped
\nhim<\/a>, and protected Benghazi. \u2018The White House and senior Congressional
\nmembers,\u2019 the group wrote in an interim report released Tuesday, \u2018deliberately
\nand knowingly pursued a policy that provided material support to terrorist
\norganizations\u00a0in order to topple a ruler Muammar Gaddafi who had
\nbeen working closely with the West actively to\u00a0suppress al-Qaeda (BBC,
\n2017). \u201cSome look at it as treason,\u201d said Wayne Simmons, a former CIA officer\u00a0who
\nparticipated in the commission\u2019s research.<\/p>\n

The Aftermath of the 2011 Arab Spring<\/h2>\n

As
\nof 2017, it seems that only in its birthplace, Tunisia, has the Arab Spring
\nbeen successful in the establishment of something which vaguely resembles a
\nWestern style democratic system. Egypt saw its first-ever
\ndemocratically-elected president, the pro-Islamist Mohammed Morsi, overthrown
\nin a military coup in 2013 led by Abdel Fattah al-Sisi. Libya has descended
\ninto a civil war of its own, with four factions vying for supremacy: the
\ndemocratically elected Council of Deputies, Libya Dawn (an Islamist
\norganisation backed by Qatar, Sudan and Turkey), the Shura Council of Benghazi
\nRevolutionaries (again an Islamist organisation) and Islamic State. Syria
\nmeanwhile presents a most complicated picture: Assad and the Free Syrian Army
\nare still fighting against one another; both are fighting against Islamic
\nState; an American-Arab League air force is bombing ISIS bases in eastern
\nSyria; and the Kurds are busy establishing an independent state in the north.
\nThe Syrian civil war has become something of a proxy war, with behind the
\nscenes Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Qatar and Iran all manoeuvring for advantage. <\/p>\n

The
\nrise of Isis was in direct response to the funding and arming of rebel groups
\nsuch as the Free Syrian (BBC, 2017). American troops from Iraq in December
\n2011. In April 2013 Islamic State was created by a fusion of the Islamic State
\nof Iraq and the al-Qaeda affiliated Jabhat al-Nusra (although not all members
\nof Jabhat al-Nusra support this. The Arab Spring protests were partly caused by
\nthe rise on food prices across the region: one of the first actions by Islamic
\nState in any new territory it takes control of is to lower the price of bread.
\nAs is often the case, people will submit to any kind of regime if their
\npersonal safety is assured. <\/p>\n

free
\nspeech and civil society and arrested those calling for political change.
\nAccording to some analysts, Al Qaeda has some regional interests, which include
\nthe ousting of the Shiite-aligned Syrian President Bashar al-Assad while
\nsupporting Islamists in the Middle East to attain power; or some of the goals
\nalready achieved through recent Arab Spring uprisings, which have politically
\ndestabilized the region already (Williams 2013). We are conscious of the
\ncurrent turmoil in the Middle East and North Africa, while various components
\nof Al-Qaeda hope to be able to consolidate amid the lawlessness and power
\nvacuums that have emerged in some regions following successful revolutions and
\nin areas experiencing on-going conflict. Equally aware, however, of Al-Qaeda\u2019s
\nincreasing marginalization, the group\u2019s media publications continue to strive
\nto present jihadism as the most appropriate way to protect collective
\ninterests, eliminate adversaries, eradicate vice and establish a zealously
\npious social order. (Holbrook 2012). However, the biggest problem has been how
\nthe Arab Spring took a lot of pressure off Islamic radical groups and allowed
\nthese fanatics to more easily recruit, raise money, and organize more violence.
\nThe revived Islamic terror groups promptly began attacking their former allies
\n(the secular and democratic reformers) as well as Westerners. The leaders of
\nthe Arab Spring movements were initially sympathetic to Islamic radical groups,
\nseeing them as fellow victims of the old dictatorship. Now most of the Arab
\nSpring leaders see the Islamic radicals as more interested in imposing another
\ndictatorship.<\/p>\n

\u00a0In 2011, the authorities carried out a major
\ncampaign of repression in the wake of the Arab uprisings by censoring public
\ndiscussion of the movement for Arab democratization, prosecuting or arbitrarily
\ndetaining scores of social-media commentators and human rights lawyers, and
\nstrengthening the online censorship of domestic social-networking services.
\nHowever to the contrary violence continued unabated in 2011, with high-profile
\npolitical assassinations and high civilian casualty rates in Libya, Syria and
\nEgypt. <\/p>\n

As
\n2011 drew to a close, officials in Egypt made headlines by conducting a series
\nof raids on NGOs that monitor human rights and promote democracy. Most of the
\ntargeted organizations were Egyptian; a few were international groups (Freedom
\nHouse was one of the latter). The authorities were insistent that the raids,
\nwhich included the seizure of files and computers, were legal and technical in
\nnature. Government officials emphasized and reemphasized that they believed
\nhuman rights organizations had a role to play in a democratic Egypt. Their
\nactions indicated otherwise. In fact, the behaviour of the Egyptian
\nauthorities, now and under Mubarak, reflects a deep-seated hostility to NGOs
\nthat support democracy and human rights<\/p>\n

There
\nwere many heroes, many casualties, and many martyrs to freedom\u2019s cause in 2011.
\nThere were also many extraordinary achievements. Authoritarians who aspired to
\nrule in perpetuity were toppled in Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya, and autocratic
\nheads of state in Yemen and Syria however who would know what would replace the
\nauthoritarian structures of law and order, society and education<\/p>\n

Foreign countries especially the West
\nincluding Britain, USA and France were the first countries to take advantage of
\nthe deteriorating situation in the Middle East whilst not condemning the
\nviolence, used this as a pretext to intervene in Sovereign nations for the
\nbenefit of them self and not for the ordinary civilians\u00a0 (Greenwald, 2017).\u00a0 <\/p>\n

The USA had early discomfort with democracy
\nas a foreign policy during the 2011 Arab Spring. \u2018Despite the unfortunate
\ncharacterization that it was leading from behind, America\u2019s firmness in
\nassisting NATO\u2019s Libyan campaign was an important step. After initial
\nhesitation, the administration has also cautiously supported the process of
\nbuilding democratic systems in Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya\u2019. It is a strong
\ncontradiction where the NATO bombings were a pretext of getting rid of Muammar
\nGaddafi and there was no plan on how the establish democracy after arming
\nterrorist groups according to the (Atlantic, 2017).<\/p>\n

In
\nconclusion it is clear that the 2011 Arab Spring was a factor that caused the
\nrise of terrorist activities throughout the Middle East and the wider region.
\nEvidence of large scale protests harboured terrorist organisation such as
\nAl-Qeada who wanted to see revolutions take place throughout the Middle East
\nand the cause of the rise of ISIS who have pledged to reign terror around the
\nworld. However other factors are responsible such as the British and US arming
\nrebel groups in Syria and Libya. NATO bombing campaigns in Libya. Democracies
\nwere successful in Tunisia and Egypt, also in Libya but it is very difficult to
\ncomprehend whether living conditions and freedoms have improved since the 2011
\nArab Spring. <\/p>\n

The 2011 Arab the rise of Democracy or Terrorism?<\/p>\n

\"\"
(The Combating Terrorism centre, 2017)<\/figcaption><\/figure>\n
\"\"<\/figure>\n
\"\"<\/figure>\n

References<\/h2>\n

Aaron Schips. (2011). NATO
\nannounces withdrawal of all troops from Libya<\/em>. Retrieved December 27, 2016,
\nfrom
\nhttps:\/\/www.neweurope.eu\/article\/nato-announces-withdrawal-all-troops-libya\/<\/p>\n

Atlantic, T. (2017, January 10).
\nRetrieved from The Atlantic: http:\/\/www.theatlantic.com\/international\/archive\/2016\/04\/obamas-worst-mistake-libya\/478461\/<\/p>\n

BBC. (2017, 01 12). Arming Syrian
\nrebels: Where the US went wrong<\/em>. Retrieved from
\nhttp:\/\/www.bbc.co.uk\/news\/magazine-33997408&gws_rd=cr&ei=dT6OWNrxIKnBgAaOs56QAg<\/p>\n

BBC. (2017, January 22). Viewpoint:
\nWhy Arab Spring has not delivered real democracy<\/em>. Retrieved from
\nhttp:\/\/www.bbc.com\/news\/world-middle-east-27632777<\/p>\n

Brad Hoff. (2017, 01 15). Retrieved
\nfrom foreignpolicyjournal,:
\nhttp:\/\/www.foreignpolicyjournal.com\/2016\/01\/06\/new-hillary-emails-reveal-true-motive-for-libya-intervention\/<\/p>\n

Freedom House. (2017, 01 08). FREEDOM
\nIN THE WORLD 2012<\/em>. Retrieved from
\nhttps:\/\/freedomhouse.org\/sites\/default\/files\/Full%20Report%20Essay%20-%20PDF%20Version.pdf<\/p>\n

Greenwald, G. (2017, 01 11). The
\nIntercept<\/em>. Retrieved from
\nhttps:\/\/theintercept.com\/2016\/01\/27\/the-u-s-intervention-in-libya-was-such-a-smashing-success-that-a-sequel-is-coming\/<\/p>\n

International Criminal Court. (2016,
\nJanuary 1). Case Sheet Saif Al-Islam Gaddafi,<\/em>. Retrieved from
\nhttps:\/\/www.icc-cpi.int\/libya\/gaddafi\/Documents\/GaddafiEng.pdf<\/p>\n

Michigan State University. (1994 \u2013
\n2016). Global Edge<\/em>. Retrieved December 27, 2016, from
\nhttp:\/\/globaledge.msu.edu\/countries\/libya\/history\/<\/p>\n

The Combating Terrorism centre.
\n(2017, January 14). Al\u2010Qa\u2019ida\u2019s Foreign Fighters in Iraq: A First Look at
\nthe Sinjar Records,<\/em>. Retrieved from University of Oregen,:
\nhttp:\/\/library.uoregon.edu\/ec\/e-asia\/reada\/felter.pdf<\/p>\n

The Foreign Affairs Committee.
\n(2016). HC 119 Libya: Examination of intervention and collapse and the UK\u2019s
\nfuture policy options<\/em>. Retrieved december 27, 2016, from
\nhttp:\/\/www.publications.parliament.uk\/pa\/cm201617\/cmselect\/cmfaff\/119\/119.pdf?utm_source=119&utm_medium=module&utm_campaign=modulereports<\/p>\n

THE SOUFAN GROUP. (2017, January 2).
\nFOREIGN FIGHTERS An Updated Assessment of the Flow of,<\/em>. Retrieved from
\nhttp:\/\/soufangroup.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/2015\/12\/TSG_ForeignFightersUpdate3.pdf<\/p>\n

United Nations. (2017, January 20). UN
\nHuman Rights council,<\/em>. Retrieved from
\nhttp:\/\/www.ohchr.org\/Documents\/HRBodies\/HRCouncil\/CoISyria\/A-HRC-31-CRP1_en.pdf<\/p>\n

United Nations Security council.
\n(2011). Resolution 1970 (2011)<\/em>. Retrieved December 27, 2016, from
\nhttp:\/\/www.nato.int\/nato_static_fl2014\/assets\/pdf\/pdf_2011_02\/20110927_110226-UNSCR-1970.pdf<\/p>\n

Us Department of State. (2017,
\nJanuary 3). Libya,<\/em>. Retrieved from State Gov,:
\nhttps:\/\/www.state.gov\/documents\/organization\/160075.pdf<\/p>\n

Williams. (2017, January 22).
\nRetrieved from https:\/\/williamsinstitute.law.ucla.edu\/wp-content\/uploads\/Herman-Gendered-Restrooms-and-Minority-Stress-June-2013.pdf<\/p>\n

Yashwant Raj. (2017, January 14). The
\nHindustan Times,<\/em>. Retrieved from
\nhttp:\/\/www.hindustantimes.com\/world\/qaeda-men-amongst-libyan-rebels\/story-Un2joUDcEd30wgmVAH1mnN.html<\/p>\n

Key words and definition:<\/h3>\n

Democracy: a system of
\ngovernment by the whole population or all the eligible members of a state,
\ntypically through elected representatives.<\/p>\n

Terrorism: the unofficial or
\nunauthorized use of violence and intimidation in the pursuit of political aims.<\/p>\n

ISIS: Islamic State of Iraq
\nand al-Sham<\/p>\n<\/div>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

Introduction In the year 2011, the world was shocked by events that sparked a series of major uprisings throughout the Middle East, a region known for its instability, fiercely dictatorial governments, exotic imagery, violence, and oil.\u00a0 The 2011 Arab spring was a start from a series of protests in countries of repressive and autocratic form […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":3,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[8523,6588,8396],"tags":[5676,5686,5780,5294,5674,5677,5678,6403,4639],"class_list":["post-45785","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-do-my-homework-international-relations","category-international-relations","category-paper-writing-service","tag-1500-words-assessment-task","tag-ace-homework-tutors","tag-assignment-homework-help-answers","tag-bishops-writing-bureau","tag-create-a-2-4-page-resource","tag-create-powerpoint-include-harvard-referencing","tag-i-need-completed-essay-in-300-400-words","tag-write-a-3-5pg-paper","tag-write-a-page-assignment"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.colapapers.com\/us\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/45785","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.colapapers.com\/us\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.colapapers.com\/us\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.colapapers.com\/us\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/3"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.colapapers.com\/us\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=45785"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/www.colapapers.com\/us\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/45785\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.colapapers.com\/us\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=45785"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.colapapers.com\/us\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=45785"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.colapapers.com\/us\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=45785"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}