{"id":46006,"date":"2024-03-03T00:06:58","date_gmt":"2024-03-03T00:06:58","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/essays.homeworkacetutors.com\/2024\/03\/effect-of-us-foreign-policy-on-china\/"},"modified":"2024-03-03T00:06:58","modified_gmt":"2024-03-03T00:06:58","slug":"effect-of-us-foreign-policy-on-china","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.colapapers.com\/us\/effect-of-us-foreign-policy-on-china\/","title":{"rendered":"Effect of US Foreign Policy on China"},"content":{"rendered":"
\n

What
\ndoes US foreign policy mean for the PRC\u2019s
\nglobal interest?<\/h4>\n

Introduction<\/h2>\n

U.S. foreign policy is a conflation of competing interests within the US and not a unified policy objective even though it may appear to be that way when reported by the mainstream media. But when it comes to US foreign policy and China, the messaging seems to be consistent; in part due to the threat that China poses to the US\u2019 superpower status. This essay will look at how US foreign policy is defined<\/a> and the examine its recent past with respect to China. It will examine foreign policy in the 21st<\/sup> century and show how China and the US share very common objectives in their foreign policy. This essay will also look at US foreign policy and Taiwan as it conflicts with China\u2019s global interests. Finally, it will explain US foreign policy as a countermeasure to the ascendancy of China\u2019s meteoric rise and question if there is an inevitability that these two superpower\u2019s interests will eventually converge.<\/p>\n

How is US foreign policy defined?<\/h2>\n

U.S foreign
\npolicy is orchestrated by the National Security Council and that in itself
\ncomprises of offices that report to the Executive; the President. The Office of
\nthe President directs U.S. foreign policy with advice from the following; the
\nSecretary of State, the National Security Advisor to the President, the
\nSecretary of Defence, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the
\nDirector of Central Intelligence. Their combined role is to apprise the Office
\nof the President with information concerning the U.S. national interests
\noverseas\u00a0(Sobel, 2011).<\/p>\n

However, the
\ndirection of foreign affairs is managed by the President and the Secretary of
\nState; whom the President appoints. In other words, depending on the agenda of
\nthe President and his\/her election promises, the U.S. national interests are
\nwhat the President determines to be the U.S. national interest. This may be
\naligned with a political party, U.S. allies\u2019 interests or exigent circumstances
\nand the interests of the Deep State\u00a0(Sobel, 2011).\u00a0 <\/p>\n

Apart from the
\nNational Security Council, Congress has an input into U.S. foreign policy for
\ntwo reasons. First, Congress needs to be aware of foreign policy considerations
\nbecause it has to deliberate the policy issues and implications and its effects
\non the nation. The views of individual members of Congress, regardless of their
\nleanings or party affiliation, have an input in policy moulding. Secondly,
\nCongress has to approve the funding for all foreign policy initiatives as part
\nof the government\u2019s annual budget and through additional appropriations. With
\nthe agenda of the President and potential moderation from Congress, U.S.
\nnational interests are shaped by a multitude of influences and it cannot be
\nidentified as realists, neoliberal etc. However, in practice, U.S. foreign policy seems to move in one direction
\nregardless of which President controls the White House or which party controls
\nCongress. This notion of the Deep State has been the consensus for over 30
\nyears but it would appear that the election of Donald Trump as president has
\nchallenged the power f the so-called \u2018Deep State\u2019.<\/p>\n

Foreign policy in the 21st<\/sup> century<\/h2>\n

Foreign policy in the 21st<\/sup> century isn\u2019t just about national interests anymore; most liberal economies share the same foreign policy. Most countries now have a foreign policy that includes initiatives on cybercrime from overseas non-state actors, international terrorism, climate change and environment, international health concerns such as AIDS, refugee and international settlement, international trade agreements etc\u00a0(Mitchell, 2017). All these are now core issues of foreign policy for almost every nation; this is the same for the US and China. In fact, one would argue that they largely share the same global interests. Except for to the traditional U.S. concerns such as Middle East policies, threats from Russia, obligations of NATO, economic threats to the U.S. dollar, dealing with crises, settling disputes and preventing the outbreak of conflicts and maintaining a peaceful world, the US and China<\/a> have similar global interests\u00a0(Andrews, 1994).\u00a0 <\/p>\n

In fact, in a
\nmultipolar world, global interests are no longer the remit of individual nation
\nstates but multilateral bodies which are both regional and international. Some
\nof these global interests are increasing in scope and technical complexity; a
\ngood example is combating cyber attacks and cyber warfare from non-state
\nactors. As nations become more interconnected and borders melt away because of
\nthe communication revolution and the 4th<\/sup> industrial revolution, international
\ndiplomacy is no longer hierarchical but convoluted; a matrix of relationships
\nand dependencies. <\/p>\n

Multilateral
\ninstitutions play a very important role in both the US and China\u2019s foreign
\npolicies. Good examples of the conflation
\nof China\u2019s and US\u2019 global interests are the recent
\nParis Agreement on Climate Change, regulations on airspace and control, cross-border transactions, border security,
\ninternational agreements on food safety, collaboration with health, medicine
\nand pharmaceutical standards. In a multipolar world with ever decreasing
\nnational borders, and greater telecommunications connectivity, it is
\nincreasingly becoming harder to see where the US and China\u2019s global interests start and stop\u00a0(Holsti, 2009). <\/p>\n

China, Taiwan and the US<\/h3>\n

When it comes to China\u2019s global interest, Taiwan and the Cross-Strait relations plays an important part because it conflates with US foreign policy. The Cross-Strait relations are a tripartite relationship between Taiwan, China and the United States. Over the last three decades, the relationship has been somewhat stable but punctuated with threats of use of force and appeasement. On the one hand, China has always stressed that Taiwan is part of its \u2018One China\u2019 policy but always threatening that it would use force if Taiwan ever decided to secede and declare independence. Taiwan has been smart and refrained from actually declaring formal independence but continually threatening to do so yet maintaining a close economic relationship with China for its own benefit\u00a0(Hsieh, 2016). On occasion, Taiwan threatens China with talks of breaking the \u2018One China\u2019 policy. The United States has been involved in the tripartite relationship by acting an independent referee or umpire over the last three decades. <\/p>\n

The
\nUS foreign policy faces several important challenges in the region least of
\nwhich would be the fact that if there was a dispute or escalation of tensions
\nor outright war between China and Taiwan, the US would inevitably be dragged
\ninto a war it must win on two fronts; militarily because of its might and
\neconomically because of its position in world trade. China rightly sees it as a
\nwar on two fronts which would be counterproductive to its aims of modernization
\nand its national interests. The US deterrence and China\u2019s
\neconomic reform has by and large kept the extended peace; additionally,
\nTaiwan\u2019s refrain from declaring independence has subdued the confrontation\u00a0(Wu, 2005). That is not to say
\nthat there is no such desire for independence but that there are political and
\neconomic constraints to doing so at this point in time. At least that was
\nbefore the 2016 elections in Taiwan. <\/p>\n

The close ties the United States has with Taiwan is crucial despite the fact that they do not have any diplomatic ties or arrangement even though the United States has a huge economic trade with Taiwan. In fact, Taiwan ranks as the 9th<\/sup> largest trading partner of the United States; a surprising fact given its relative size. The United States still has political links with Taiwan as it does with any fledgeling democracy; which Taiwan has clearly demonstrated it is. As such the United States might feel obliged to come to its aid given the democratic values it shares and the economic relationship it has fostered over the years\u00a0(Rowen, 2015). On the contrary, there is the view that when one considers the geopolitics of the region, it is crucial for the United States to have as many allies as possible given the meteoric rise of China and the possibility that it will threaten the US as the world\u2019s hyperpower. Having Taiwan as a buffer to China\u2019s geopolitical expansion serves the interest of the United States. At the same time, many draw the point that China is the largest trading partner of the United States so it needs to be careful how it manages the Cross-Strait relations; it does not want to alienate is largest trading partner but at the same time it needs to keep a close eye on its political rival\u00a0(Schubert, 2010). In addition to this dilemma is the case of North Korea which is still technically at war with the United States. The war on terror has a front in parts of South East Asia which means the United States has a vested interest in the region and given its rapid spread, needs the support of China. Given the competing interests, the United States has to prevent a war between Taiwan and China meaning that it is in its interest to prevent Taiwanese independence and assert the \u2018One China\u2019 policy\u00a0(Andrews, 1994). If for any reason a war did break out between China and Taiwan over the issue of independence, the United States will certainly be between a rock and a hard place. <\/p>\n

China\u2019s rise; America\u2019s decline<\/h3>\n

Every aspect of China\u2019s
\nascendency almost invariably challenges the hegemony of the United States. In
\ngeopolitics, power abhors a vacuum and where one sees China flexing its
\neconomic and political might, it is surreptitiously coming into conflict with
\nAmerican interests. China\u2019s rise does imply American decline and will
\nultimately lead to a confrontation between the two powers\u00a0(Financial Times, 2016).<\/p>\n

\u00a0It is easy to forget that in
\n1820, Greece had revolted against the Ottoman Empire, Britain had opened the
\nfirst modern railway and was on its way to an exploding industrial revolution,
\nBrazil had nervously declared independence from Portugal and that China was the
\nworld\u2019s superpower with the largest share of global GDP. History has been
\nwritten specifically to gloss over these facts. Western academia has repeatedly
\nhighlighted China as a collective of starved, dispossessed and slaughtered
\npeople and not a prosperous, dynamic and global power from 1100 \u2013 1820. From
\n1078, China was the world\u2019s major producer of steel, the world\u2019s leader in
\ntechnical innovations, the world\u2019s leading trading nation, possessed the
\nlargest commercial ships and these are just to mention a few. <\/p>\n

Few academics would now dispute that China was the
\nworld\u2019s hyperpower <\/em>for 800 years
\nbefore the rise of British imperialism in the 19th<\/sup> century. Western
\nimperialism and China\u2019s decline has been documented in detail which this essay
\ncannot do justice to. The rise of Chinese economic and political strength is
\nunquestionably due to the Communist Party of China which began when the Third
\nPlenary Session of the 11th Central Committee of Communist Party of China
\nadopted a reform policy triggering the private sector[1]<\/sup><\/a>. <\/p>\n

One example of where a Chinese ascendency will
\nconflict with US dominance is in the sphere of international banking where the
\nU.S. has had complete control since the Second World War. With the criticism that the World Bank is an instrument of
\nAmerican foreign policy (the World Bank Group president has always been a U.S.
\ncitizen nominated by the US), China has nurtured the desire to exert itself
\nunto the world stage. In addition, the reforms repeatedly called for by China
\nat the World Bank, IMF and ADB have been unheeded. The Asian Infrastructure
\nInvestment Bank is a China-led financial
\ninstitution designed to lend to development of infrastructure and other
\nproductive sectors in Asia. Examples of the sort of investments would be
\nprojects on water and sanitation, land and environmental development,
\ntelecommunications, technology and innovation, agriculture and rural
\ndevelopment etc. The original 10-member nation-state
\nsignatories ratified the AIIB articles on 25th<\/sup> December 2015 and
\nbegan with a capital of US$100 billion. AIIB is headquartered in Beijing, China
\nwith a current membership of 57 and an Asian and Oceania outlook. All G8
\nmembers have joined the AIIB except the United States and Japan. If the last 30
\nyears of Chinese ambitions are anything to go by, the AIIB will surpass the
\ndominance and output of the World Bank sometime in the second half of this
\ncentury\u00a0(Eckart, 2016). <\/p>\n

Another area where China\u2019s ascendancy will directly challenge the U.S. is international trade.
\nThe One Belt, One Road Initiative is seen as the next frontier in which China
\nwill dominate international trade at the expense of the U.S.\u00a0 In Imperial China, \u2018the Silk Road\u2019 served as
\na vast trade network across Asia reaching Europe on land (and from the South
\nChina Sea to the Mediterranean Sea). Originally derived from the trade of silk,
\nit grew to include other goods as well as act as a conduit for technology,
\nphilosophies, art and cultural influences. Used by the Greeks, Syrians, Romans,
\nArabs, Turks, Indians and of course the Chinese, it survived for centuries.
\nChinese President Xi Jinping initiated the policy in 2013 with the view to
\nbuilding an economic link between China, Asia, Africa and Europe via road links
\nand seaports. The plan is so audacious
\nthat it will attempt to cover countries that represent 55% of the world\u2019s GDP,
\n70% of the world\u2019s population and three-quarters
\nof the world\u2019s known energy reserves. <\/p>\n

One Belt, One Road initiative is not only an economic
\noffensive but a geopolitical and diplomatic offensive causing considerable
\nconsternation amongst political observers who argue that China risks stirring
\nopposition from its neighbours. The \u2018Belt\u2019 is land-based while the \u2018Road\u2019 is sea-based.
\nA series of planned and future infrastructure projects are expected to build or
\nlink ports, maritime passages such as rivers and canals, roads, airports,
\nrailways, oil and gas pipelines, power plants, refineries, Free Trade Zones
\nwith the express purpose of creating a connectivity to enable Chinese
\nexpansion. Another way of looking at this initiative is to cast one\u2019s mind back
\nto the U.S.\u2019 Marshall Plan to rebuild Europe after WWII although one must note
\nthat the Marshall Plan was a series of grants and not loans. What do these both
\nspell for China\u2019s future and America\u2019s decline? At this point, there are
\ncertainly more questions than answers\u00a0(MOFCOM, 2017).<\/p>\n

Conclusion<\/h2>\n

The United
\nStates and China have a lot in common because foreign policy in the 21st<\/sup>
\ncentury has more commonalities than it did in the 19th<\/sup>-century world of realpolitik<\/em>. Their national interests converge more than they
\ndiverge. But where they do diverge, it
\nseems they have managed to find a workable alliance. Whether it\u2019s on issues about
\nTaiwan, international trade or the One Belt One Road Initiative, US foreign
\npolicy and China\u2019s global interest are aligned in many ways.<\/p>\n

Bibliography<\/h2>\n