{"id":74902,"date":"2019-07-08T13:07:10","date_gmt":"2019-07-08T13:07:10","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/essays.homeworkacetutors.com\/do-nuclear-weapons-promote-peace-and-stability\/"},"modified":"2019-07-08T13:07:10","modified_gmt":"2019-07-08T13:07:10","slug":"do-nuclear-weapons-promote-peace-and-stability","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.colapapers.com\/us\/do-nuclear-weapons-promote-peace-and-stability\/","title":{"rendered":"Do Nuclear Weapons Promote Peace and Stability?"},"content":{"rendered":"
\n

Does the existence
\nof nuclear weaponry increase peace and stability in the international system? <\/h4>\n

1.\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 Introduction<\/h2>\n

In which ways does the existence of nuclear weaponry increase peace and stability in the international system? This essay argues both for and against the nuclear peace hypothesis, otherwise known as the nuclear deterrence theory. It will draw on quantitative dyadic-based evidence from Robert Rauchhaus\u2019s\u2019 study published in the Journal of Conflict Resolution<\/em> in 2009, which finds support for the existence of the stability-instability paradox. This in term explains that while nuclear weapons do in fact provide a nuclear peace in some examples, which promotes strategic stability and prevents major wars<\/a>, it also allows for more frequent, lower intensity conflicts. Included will be the arguments and point of views from both deterrence optimists, pessimists and on-the-fence scholars, as well as providing specific examples and case studies, predominantly the Cold War.<\/p>\n

2.\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 Nuclear Peace Hypothesis<\/h2>\n

The Nuclear Peace Theory is an international
\nrelations theory that argues that the presence of nuclear weapons induces
\nstability and decreases the chance of major conflict under some circumstances. The
\nlack of a third war following the second was said to have been induced by
\nnuclear stability during the Cold War. This was said to have been caused by the
\nmutual possession of second strike retaliation by the two powers of that war,
\nthe United States (US) and the Soviet Union (USSR), which eliminated the
\npossibility of victory for either side because of Mutually Assured Destruction,
\nor the MAD doctrine\u00a0(Lieber & Press, 2016). Second strike ability
\nis considered vital to nuclear deterrence, as otherwise the opposition could attempt
\nto win the war by striking first. Mutual second-strike capabilities generally
\ncause a mutually assured destruction defense strategy but is possible that one
\nstate has a lower minimal deterrence strategy. Lower minimal deterrence is when
\na state possesses only what is necessary to be able to reciprocate second strike\u00a0(Long & Green, 2014) . This doctrine was pursued
\nby China and India when the US and the USSR were developing powerful first and second-strike
\nabilities during the Cold War (Jones, 2001). The Nuclear Peace Hypothesis
\nis criticized by scholars as proliferation of states increases the chance of
\nlow-intensity interstate conflict, but also the chance of nuclear material
\nbeing procured by violent groups such as terrorist group Al Qaeda, who are exempt
\nfrom the threat of nuclear retaliation as they are stateless (Sagan S. , 1994). <\/p>\n

2.1. Proliferation optimists and pessimists<\/h3>\n

Why have there
\nbeen no major wars between great powers in the last 6 decades? The three leading
\ntheories in IR have offered their own answers and views on this question. Neoliberalism
\nis most cited- Advancing Kant\u2019s perpetual peace theory (1795), neo liberals
\nhave surmised the foundation of this peace to be built upon democracy (Moaz & Russet, 1993), trade (Keohane & Nye, 1977) and international
\norganisations\u00a0(Keohane,
\n2015)\u00a0(Rauchhaus,
\nEvaluating the Nuclear Peace Hypothesis, 2009). Constructivist
\npoint of view is somewhat in line with that of the (neo) liberalist\u2019s, but it
\ncredits the Long Peace to the social constructs within a state and society,
\nsuch as normative behaviour and actions. Neorealism, the third leading theory,
\nhas a completely different approach and attributes the peace to nuclear
\ndeterrence and bipolarity (Seepersad, 2011)\u00a0(Waltz, 1990). Even though nuclear
\ndeterrence is one of the main facets of realist consideration for Long Peace,
\nnot much research has been done into proving why exactly it does. Most of the
\nstudies done have been focused on nuclear weapons and crises, or nuclear
\nweapons and conflict escalation\u00a0(Rauchhaus, 2009). <\/p>\n

There is no debate
\nabout whether nuclear weapons decrease the chance of war, as when both states posses\u2019
\nnuclear weapons they do<\/em> decrease the
\nchance of major war. However, what has not been widely discussed is that they
\ndo not decrease the chance of civil, periphery and small wars, which still causes
\nthe expenditure of wealth, resources and lives. <\/p>\n

Proliferation
\noptimists, such as Kenneth Waltz (1990) and John Lewis Gaddis (1992), hypothesise
\nthat the reason that there has not been a third world war, despite the second
\nfollowing the first within twenty years, and the Cold War right after that, is
\nbecause of the Nuclear Deterrence Theory. Because of the absolute destructivity
\nof nuclear weapons, even the least intelligent of leaders can understand that
\nusing them would be disadvantageous for everyone involved, thus there are no
\nwars. <\/p>\n

Proliferation
\ncritics are described as those who hold diametrically opposed views. They do no
\ndeny that nuclear deterrence discourages major wars but safety, rational and
\nmoral critics believe that the deterrent value outweighs the possibility of
\nnegating war. The shared view is that nuclearizing states, such as the South of
\nAsia, could lead to inadvertent escalation, or further proliferation on
\nunstable nations\u00a0(Sagan S. , 1994). <\/p>\n

Safety critics
\nsuch as Scott Sagan (1993), argue that the
\npossibility of nuclear weapons falling into the hands of terrorist stateless
\ngroups or accidental detonation or exchange during the war, are too big of a
\nsafety concern, and so overwhelm the positive presence of them possibly
\naverting WWIII (Sagan S. D., 1993). Rationality critics such as Bob Jervis are not being critical of
\nthe underlying logic nuclear deterrence, but rather of deterrence failure as
\npeople are not perfectly rational beings, and mistakes can be made\u00a0(Jervis, 1989). Moral critics such
\nas Richard Falk (1991) argue that nuclear weapons violate international law,
\nand are immoral, but do not argue against whether nuclear weapons actually make
\nwar less likely. <\/p>\n

One of the scholars
\nviewed as being the most opposed to the nuclear peace theory is John Mueller, however,
\nif the reader were to go through his books in detail, they would learn that
\nthey haven\u2019t denied that nuclear weapons do not help enforce the current peace.
\nHe says that the lack of World War III and the cause of Long Peace is
\nattributed to education, changing norms and interdependence (between
\nstates), and that he believes that WWIII would not have happened, despite
\nnuclear weapons, but he does not deny they helped enforce peace\u00a0(Mueller, 1988).<\/p>\n

As the reader has possibly gleaned by now,
\nand will realise by the
\nend of this essay, Nuclear Peace is not a simple matter and as we continue,
\nproliferation pessimists and optimist\u2019s groups have some of each of their
\nclaims verified. In favour of proliferation optimists, the possession of
\nnuclear weaponry by both states does decrease the possibility of major war, and
\nthis can possibly be explained in Snyder\u2019s essay on the stability-instability
\nparadox. However, pessimists can justify most of their claims hereafter, as if
\nthere is an imbalance with one state possessing and the other not, there is an
\nincreased likelihood of war. Additionally, looking at this holistically, the
\npossession or creation of nuclear weapons are closely associated with increased
\nconflict, casualties and clashes, however all at a lower intensity. This
\nsupports Snyder\u2019s previously mentioned stability-instability theory, which
\nsuggests a link between nuclear perceived peace and increased lower-intensity
\nconflicts, which is further supported by Rauchhaus\u2019s Nuclear Peace
\nHypothesis<\/em>\u00a0(2009).<\/em><\/p>\n

3.\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 Stability Instability Paradox<\/h2>\n

Neither pessimistic nor optimistic of proliferation,
\nthere is a group of scholars who believe that nuclear weapons tend to promote
\npeace between states that both have Nuclear Weapons, but do not create peace
\noverall. The international relations theory behind their belief is the
\nstability instability paradox\u00a0(Krepon, 2005), that two states
\nunderstand that if they had a major war between them, then it would be the
\npreviously mentioned Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD). However, because
\neither state is aware that the other state is aware of this, and there is an
\nunspoken threshold that they won\u2019t go beyond in terms of aggravation, then the
\ncollective agreement leads to small wars, proxy wars or periphery wars, and not
\nallowing any of these conflicts to escalate to nuclear warfare. An example of
\nthis is during the Cold War, the powers of that war (US and the USSR) never
\nengaged directly through warfare, but engaged indirectly through proxy and
\nminor wars in Korea, Vietnam, and Afghanistan among others, and used large
\namount of resources and manpower to regain the upper hand over one another. <\/p>\n

Support of this theory was seen in Robert
\nRauchhaus\u2019s quantitative study in 2009, Evaluating the Nuclear Peace
\nHypothesis, <\/em>which builds on the dyadically analysed Democratic Peace
\nTheory, and includes controls to search for nuclear only inclusive conflicts. Working
\nin symmetrical and asymmetrical variables (asymmetrical being one state has
\nnuclear weapons, and the other being symmetrical) he includes regression
\nanalysis[1]<\/a>
\nthat controls the study for nuclear weapons only, so the results only show
\nconflicts between states that include nuclear weapons. His results are quite
\ninteresting, as they show that in every case where nuclear weapons are
\nincluded, they are associated with an increase in all types of conflict;
\nmilitarized, aggressive force used and fatalities between all countries, and
\nwar between asymmetric dyads (one state possessing nuclear weapons and the
\nother not). Although the results state that
\nnuclear weapons bring conflict, they do include the exception that there are no
\ndirect wars between the two countries involved if they both possess nuclear
\nweapons, although there is a high probability of minor or indirect conflicts
\nbetween them. \u00a0<\/p>\n

The assumptions of the connection between MAD
\nand the stability instability paradox is that as a consequence of this
\ntruce-like behaviour, actors will be rational and will apply that rationality to
\nhow they manage conflicts and the ultimate goal being the avoidance of nuclear
\nwarfare, and thus, destruction. However, although logical, this might not be
\nthe case on the international relations stage, as some nations could have the
\nbelief that life after death is a big improvement than the current life we are living
\nand will attempt to aid a swift transition to the \u2018afterlife\u2019. This would then
\nbe perfectly rational to them, but not to many other nations, who are
\npredominantly atheist\u00a0(Harris, 2005). <\/p>\n

4.\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 Conclusion<\/h2>\n

Nuclear weapons went from being viewed as
\ninstruments of Apocalypses, to a form of reassurance, deterrence and
\nnegotiation. They have been viewed as either a good or a bad force for a long
\ntime, but the reality of the situation as seen in the discussion above, is that
\nnuclear weapons are in fact a very complex and bipolar topic. Although they do
\nencourage a sort of peaceful truce between countries both holdings nuclear
\nweapons in regard to major wars, there is a proven increase in lower intensity
\nwars between those states, and so can one really call that peace? Do the
\nsmaller war casualties get counted towards this truce or are these numbers
\ndisregarded in comparison to the damage that would be done by nuclear bombing?
\nIn comparison, if there is an asymmetry then there is a great chance of dispute
\nand war from the side with the nuclear weapon. When these theories are
\ncombined, the stability instability paradox has been explained and supported. <\/p>\n

This essay has demonstrated my beliefs that
\nalthough nuclear weapons prevent major wars, it does not create peace in the
\ntypical sense, as the peace described is rather a tense and precarious
\nagreement to cease fire, with many smaller and still detrimental wars still occurring.
\nIf one had to really call this type of truce peace, then it would be peace
\nbuilt on fear, distrust and hatred, which is not really peace at all. <\/p>\n

It would be interesting to have further research done in nuclear weaponry and peace having a correlation.\u00a0 It would be intriguing to examine potential intended consequence when states try to acquire nuclear weapons, and the possibility of their opposition (or other concerned states) going to war with them to prevent that. More simply put, if the proliferation process itself has the possibility to drive further conflict. A modern case study would be Iran trying to access\/research nuclear weapons<\/a>, and states negative response to that. Another interesting direction a study could take could be theoretically discuss what the outcome would be if nuclear weapons were to be banned, and if humans would invent a new horror in the form of DNA affecting biological warfare? <\/p>\n

References<\/h2>\n